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P R E F A C E 
This book is a product of three years' research as Rockefeller 
Foundation Teaching Fellow of the East African Institute of Social 
Research in Kampala. Field work, in the sense of exclusive con-
centration on primary research, was conducted in two sections: a 
four months' visit immediately preceding Uganda's independence in 
October 1962 and the twelve months f rom July 1963. The material 
used in the case studies of individual unions was prepared at the 
beginning of 1964 although an attempt has been made to take 
account of subsequent changes by revision at the editorial stage. 
Because of the almost total absence of published records, apart 
f rom press reports, the book depends heavily upon interview 
material and unpublished files. The nature of the information being 
sought excluded the possibility of using a standard pattern of 
questionnaire. This raises the general problem of identification of 
sources and documentation. In defence of my failure to produce 
specific references for many statements, I would subscribe to the 
view on this propounded by William Foltz: 
"Because of the conditions imposed on many of the interviews 
and even more in consideration of the use to which such information 
might be put, I have, as a general rule, not identified my respondents. 
Similarly, I was granted privileged access to some private and 
governmental documents not normally available to the public, and 
have felt obliged not to reveal these sources. I am certain that any-
one who has done recent political research in Africa will appreciate 
the need for such reticence." (Foltz, 1965, p. viii). 
I must, however, acknowledge my debt to several people whose 
advice was especially valuable at various stages in the writing of 
this work. Professor Colin Leys, now of the University of Sussex, 
first interested me in the possibility of doing this type of study; Mr. 
Martin Byers (Uganda Labour Commissioner), Mr. George Foggon 
(Labour Adviser to the Ministry for Overseas Development), Dr. 
Walter Elkan of Durham University, Mr. George Bennett and Mr. 
Allan Flanders of Oxford University all read the early drafts of 
what was then a doctoral dissertation; Dr. Joseph Gugler and 
Professor James Coleman have provided a number of useful sug-
gestions in their capacity as Directors of Research at the East 
African Institute. Finally, I must thank my wife for typing and 
correcting innumerable drafts and for acting as my most trenchant 
critic. 
A work of this sort could not have been written without the 
active and willing assistance of a very large number of people who 
gave up their time to submit to interviews and also made available 
written sources of information. The opinions and errors herein 
remain my responsibility but I freely acknowledge my great debt 
to Ugandan hospitality. 
R. D. Scott 
Kampala 
December, 1965 
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Chapter One 
T H E U G A N D A N S E T T I N G 
Uganda is isolated geographically f r o m non-African influences, 
a fact which helps to explain the relatively late contact with European 
civilisation and the retention of tradit ional institutions. Although 
Uganda forms the main basin and headwaters of the Nile, the 
country looks to the east rather than to the north. There is little 
contact with the Sudan or Congo (Leopoldville), and Uganda ' s 
main communicat ion link is the 800 miles of railway line through 
Kenya to the Indian Ocean at Mombasa . Uganda is essentially an 
East African territory, linked to Kenya and Tanganyika by the 
common focus of Lake Victoria and a diminishing range of co-
ordinated government services made possible by a common history 
of British administration. 
The country itself is comparable in size to Ghana or Great 
Britain, al though its 91,000 square miles support a populat ion of less 
than 7 million people. The bulk of the country forms a plateau just 
under 4,000 feet above sea-level, sloping away towards the north so 
tha t the River Nile drops 1,700 feet between Lake Victoria and the 
point where it crosses the Sudan border. The format ion of the 
African rift valleys produced a string of shallow lakes and the 
towering Ruwenzori Mounta ins in the west of Uganda, while the 
volcanic Moun t Elgon (14,000 feet) dominates the eastern boundary 
with Kenya. The altitude provides Uganda with an equable climate 
despite its location astride the equator. 
Although some mixing of cultures has occurred, especially in 
urban areas, a clear division can still be drawn between the Bantu 
a round the Lake and in the west, and the Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic 
in the nor th and east. In addition, over ten per cent of the popu-
lation are recent immigrants f r o m neighbouring countries. Most 
come f r o m the over-populated and politically disturbed areas of 
Rwanda and the Southern Sudan to work as labourers in the more 
prosperous agricultural areas. An important group have also come 
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wage-earning: the short-term migrants (or " target workers"), 
the long-term migrants more committed to a working life of 
wagee-arning and the resident workers. 
In all three types, the dominant factor is the complex relationship 
between the Africans and their land. Short-term migration remained 
the dominant feature of the labour structure in Uganda until 
recently because, in the words of the East Africa Royal Commission: 
"i t appears as the most economic choice which the African can 
make . . . the only system through which a considerable section of 
the African populat ion can meet its needs, because the economic 
opportunities for specialisation have either been absent or have 
been seriously circumscribed by legal and customary restrictions." 
(CO, 1955, p. 154). In Uganda, the main restriction was the 
continued existence of customary land tenure practices. 
Two very different types of labourer were more committed to 
the wage-earning labour force in Uganda than these short-term 
migrants (Elkan and Fallers, 1960). The first group was the 
Ganda . They enjoyed three important advantages over other tribes. 
Because Buganda was the base f r o m which both the colonial admini-
stration and the missions operated, the Ganda had greater edu-
cational opportunit ies and consequently occupied more skilled 
clerical positions. Another legacy of the colonial regime was the 
special mailo land tenure system which provided 9,000 square miles 
of African freehold under the Agreement of 1900 between the 
British Government and the Kabaka . Buganda is naturally well 
endowed, so this special freehold tenure system allowed the alienation 
of land lights to raise fluid capital and also the development of 
agricultural enterprise beyond the simple peasant level. Finally, the 
Ganda were able to join the urban labour force without leaving 
home because the major centres of employment were within easy 
reach of their tribal territory. 
This meant that the Ganda could move easily between agriculture 
and urban employment and simultaneously combine the two sources 
of income. As a result they tended to stay in employment for longer 
periods because there were fewer pressures to leave the job. As wages 
rose, the incentive to leave the town decreased, so it might have been 
expected that wage employment would become a perpetual necessity. 
Yet, sooner or later, most did leave. They used the capital they had 
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After the Ganda , the Luo and Luhya f rom Kenya were the most 
stable members of the labour force. Like the Ganda, they had 
integrated long periods of town labour into their pattern of socio-
economic behaviour. But, unlike the Ganda who commuted daily 
or weekly, the Luo and Luhya had to travel long distances to find a 
market for their labour. Their tribal territory (above Kisumu in the 
Nyanza Province of Kenya) provided insufficient jobs because that 
area was not as naturally well endowed, and was twice as densely 
populated, as Buganda. Consequently, they travelled widely over 
East Africa and of ten stayed away for periods of twenty years. 
Kampala and Jinja cou 'd be reached quickly and cheaply by rail or 
lake steamer and attracted a large number of Luo and Luhya 
migrants. 
F r o m this description of the African labour force in Uganda, it 
can be seen that the degree of commitment to urban living varied 
between tribal groups and that there was no equivalent to the fully 
urbanised body of wage earners found in more developed western 
societies. This fact had important implications both for industrial 
development in general and for the growth of t rade unions in 
particular. 
There were two major non-African immigrant races in Uganda : 
the Europeans, mainly British, and the Asians, a term used to 
include people originating f rom the sub-continent of India (i.e., 
Indians, Pakistanis and Goans). Without the prospect of permanent 
settlement along the Kenya pattern, the Ugandan Europeans 
regarded their role as essentially temporary and were mainly occu-
pied in the higher ranks of the civil service and in the manage-
ment of large-scale commercial organisations. By contrast, the 
Asians often regarded Uganda as their home and faced the pro-
blem of coming to terms with the unfriendly situation arising f rom 
the transfer of power to an African government (Ghai, 1965). 
As Elkan and Fallers point out, the Asians were concentrated in 
occupations which aroused " the envy of the mult i tude" and owned 
a great deal of the visible capital of the country. They handled a 
large proport ion of retail trade and the marketing of agricultural 
produce. Asian businessmen also controlled the two large sugar 
estates and many small factories. 
Although racial jealousies and frictions lacked the intensity ot 
nthpr areas in Africa thev were an imoortant environmental factor 
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fill the middle positions as skilled clerks and technicians. Writing 
in 1955, Sofer noted tha t : 
"Frictions between the various ranks of workers in industry 
requires interpretation in the light of the larger social structures 
within which industrial firms operate and in the light of the dis-
tinctive culture of each participating group ." (Sofer, 1954, p.77). 
This, in turn, had important repercussions for the development 
of trade unions. Because all groups in Uganda saw their occupational 
interests in racial terms, the early unions tended to be racially ex-
clusive. In some cases, Asian unions preceded Afr ican; in others, 
the Africans kept out Asians who appeared as direct barriers to 
their own advancement. An I C F T U Mission in 1958 noted that , 
throughout Africa all three racial groups were suspicious of sub-
merging their identity in a common trade union organisation. In 
Uganda, the racial organisation of industrial associations was most 
accentuated in the railways. A report on the industrial relations in 
the railways noted the strains placed on workplace relations by this 
situation of racial exclusiveness, causing every complaint to be 
tainted by racial prejudice and suspicion. The report noted tha t : 
"Apar t f rom the fact that this method of organisation (by race) 
would appear to be completely contrary to the fundamenta l prin-
ciples of t rade unionism, it is inevitable that each union or associ-
ation looks on all aspects of employment f rom a racial point of 
view." (EAHC, 1960, p.2). 
The modern cash economy involved relatively few Africans (only 
200,000 wage-earning employees and perhaps 500,000 cash crop 
farmers). It was statistically unimportant when compared with the 
numbers engaged in peasant subsistence agricultuie. In general, 
Uganda 's economic prosperity depended upon her ability to produce 
crops which could find a profitable sale on the world 's markets. The 
country relied heavily upon cotton and coffee but produced only a 
small percentage (5 %) of the total world output in both. Thus she 
could not exert a controlling influence over fluctuating world prices 
and suffered f rom world-wide depression in the price of these two 
commodities. 
Both cotton and coffee were grown on small scale farms where 
they formed subsidiary cash crops to supplement subsistence agri-
culture. A later development in Buganda was the large scale African-
owned coffee plantation employing significant numbers of migrant 
i t • 
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tea was grown by African small-holders. The bulk of Ugandan tea, 
however, was produced on large estates owned by individual 
Europeans or public companies such as the Uganda Company. 
Two Asian families, Madhvani and Mehta , also had large tea in-
terests as well as exercising a monopoly over domestic sugar 
production. Sugar depended upon a protected market within East 
Africa, but tea was an increasingly important export crop. 
All other forms of economic activity depended upon agriculture, 
in particular upon the prosperity of the coffee and cotton industries. 
During the boom period following the Second World War , high 
export prices encouraged the development of service industries and 
small scale production of consumer goods. Uganda ' s geographical 
isolation limited export prospects but it offered protection for 
producers of bulky or perishable consumer products. This spon-
taneous response to an increased domestic market usually took the 
form of small scale and locally financed enterprises. Only a few esta-
blishments existed which employed more than two hundred people in 
1956; most industrial expansion had taken the form of "backyard 
factories" financed by local Asian entrepreneurs and employing 
only a handful of labourers. 
At a later period, the Government began taking an interest in 
industrial expansion. Taxat ion was used to drain off agricultural 
profits into special development funds as well as into price equal-
isation reserves to offset any future price slump. The Government 
hoped that a measure of industrialisation might offset the inherent 
instability of total dependence on the world market for agricultural 
commodities. Consequently, large scale development projects were 
encouraged and, in some cases, directly financed by the Govern-
ment. 
By 1956, the boom in primary products was over. The price 
equalisation reserves prevented an immediate general slump, bui 
Government and private investment slackened. Numbers in employ-
ment began to decline, and continued to do so for a number of years. 
The rise in statutory minimum wage rates in 1959 and 1962 probably 
accentuated this trend by encouraging employers to adopt more 
efficient methods of labour utilisation (Scott, 1965(a)). Earlier, 
the prevalence of short-term labour meant that workers did not stay 
in jobs long enough to acquire the specialised skills needed in mass 
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1965). It was no longer in the best economic interests of the urban 
worker to leave his job at regular intervals and return to his farm. 
Wages were now high enough to compensate for any loss of cash 
crop income and he would find it extremely difficult to get another 
j o b on his return. Close links were still maintained with the tribal 
area but visits were confined to short trips made possible by the 
generous leave provisions allowed by most of the larger companies. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that stabilisation of labour 
was a relatively new phenomenon and that, during the formative 
period of union development, migrant labour posed special prob-
lems for those trying to build up industrial organisations. 
Chapter Two 
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS 
The early development of trade unions in Uganda falls clearly 
into two stages. In the first stage, t rade unions served as a vehicle for 
political expression in the absence of any alternative. Industrial 
relations were neglected because of the ignorance and relative pros-
perity of the migrant wage-earning groups. In the second stage, the 
political functions of the so-called unions were taken over by overtly 
political organisations. At the same time, economic depression 
provided a stimulus for activity in the unions' normal field of 
industrial relations and external influences began to take effect. 
As far back as 1938, a body was founded in Uganda ca'ling 
itself a trade union. However, it is clear that this was associated with 
the earliest stirrings of political nationalism without any concern 
for the regulation of industrial relations (Apter, 1961, pp. 202-205). 
Political parties were out of the question at this time, viewed by 
officialdom as a challenge to the authority of the administration and 
the tradit ional rulers. The trade union was an approved organisation, 
sanctioned and encouraged by the Colonial Office. Thus a trade 
union could be used to give some appearance of legitimacy to the 
statements of aspiring political leaders. 
In this case, a group of Ganda politicians formed the Uganda 
Motor Drivers Association. Its founder was Mr. James Kivu and 
he was assisted by Mr. I . K. Musazi, one of the key figures in 
Buganda politics. The association was duly registered with the 
Labour Depar tment , but it rarely functioned as a trade union 
throughout its six years of activity. Instead it provided a platform 
from which its political leaders directed criticism towards the 
policies of both the Protectorate and the Buganda Kingdom 
Government. Its members were drawn f rom the young and politically 
aware group of taxi drivers in Kampala . It included both employers 
and employees so that it demanded higher wages and, at the same 
time, high government subsidies for the owners. Yet basically it 
was a political organisation. The 1944 Labour Depar tment Report 
noted tha t : 
"The main activities of the Association continue to be directed 
towards internal political affairs, especially those concerned with 
the Kingdom of Buganda." (LDR, 1944, p. 7). 
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In January, 1945, strikes and violent rioting occurred. A wildly 
unrealistic wage claim seems to have been used to encourage support 
for a general strike. However, a Commission of Enquiry found that 
the motives behind the riots were political rather than economic: 
Buganda "was badly infected with the political virus", a phrase 
which gives an insight into official attitudes towards political parties 
(UP, 1945, p. 32.).Members of the Motor Drivers Association were 
deeply involved; Kivu, Musazi and other leaders were deported and 
the union folded up. 
The causes of the 1945 disturbances had not been removed. 
Young Ganda radicals still chafed at the policies of their own rulers 
and the union was still the only vehicle for political expression. 
Musazi was released in 1946 and returned to "un ion" organising. 
In April, 1949, the Transport and General Workers Union was 
registered. The intention was to form a comprehensive union for all 
workers in Uganda. Once again, the hard core of members were 
Kampala taxi drivers, although recruitment was also successful 
among transport workers in Busoga. Musazi also founded the 
Uganda African Farmers Union as a focus for opposition to the 
Protectorate's marketing control of cotton and coffee. Both organ-
isations were purely political in aim and involved themselves in 
further political disturbances in 1949. Again the unions were banned 
and the leaders rusticated. Musazi had collected funds f rom his two 
organisations to back a trip to Britain to put the case of his members 
directly to the highest colonial authorities. He was forbidden to 
return. A British politician visiting these nationalist leaders noted 
confusion about the political role of unions—"The Africans thought 
it would solve a lot of their problems if they could have a TUC" . 
(Stonehouse, 1960, p. 56). 
In the meantime, there was little interest in the formation of 
trade unions outside the realm of party politics. This was partly a 
result of the constant economic and social factors discussed earlier. 
But the particular circumstances of the period also influenced this 
lack of interest. Most farms produced enough food for family 
subsistence with a surplus for cash sale. F rom 1938 onwards, these 
cash crops of cotton and coffee began to fetch high prices with 
wartime shortages and the post-war boom. There was little incentive 
to leave the traditional agricultural economy while these conditions 
continued. As a result, urban and plantation labour was in short 
supply. Even large scale migration f rom Rwanda-Urundi, the 
western areas and later f rom Kenya did little to ease the shortage. 
The employers were forced to compete for the scarce commodity by 
offering reasonable pay and conditions. Only the sugar plantations, 
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using a system of dierct recruitment f rom the western and northern 
border areas, could dictate harsh terms. Significantly, it was only in 
these plantations that serious strikes occurred as workers sought 
to improve their relatively bad conditions (UP, 1942). 
The bulk of the work force, in their short spells away from 
agriculture, seem to have found conditions reasonably satisfactory. 
Consequently they displayed little interest in official attempts to 
sponsor union organisations or the rabble rousing activities of 
politicians. An official report summed up the situation: 
"Under local conditions in which ties of family and locality are 
still dominant and where few of the African population have yet to 
seek paid employment in order to live, it is not expected that much 
interest will be shown in trade unionism . . . Economic prosperity 
plus an unsatisfied demand for labour, which means that a man has 
a full choice of employment, continue to serve as an insurance 
against unrest." (LDR, 1951, p. 16). 
Throughout this early stage the railway workers were the only 
group organised into genuine trade unions, free from party politics. 
With the extension of the railway, a large number of Kenyans were 
transferred to Uganda. They brought with them the ideas of union-
ism already well developed among Kenya railwaymen and a branch 
of the Kenyan union was set up in 1946. Initially this seems to have 
been a multi-racial organisation, but the Labour Department 
records that a Railway Asian Union was registered separately in 
1948. The Africans continued to operate from headquarters in 
Nairobi. As late as 1956, the Railway African Staff Union was still 
considered to be the only effective union in Uganda. 
The transition to the second stage of union development seems 
to have occurred between 1952 and 1955. It was assisted by the 
liberal regime of Sir Andrew Cohen, and then by a depression of 
agricultural prices. 
A trades dispute ordinance had been enacted earlier to provide 
simple measures for conciliation and voluntary arbitration. The 
absence of unions or formal industrial relations machinery meant 
that it was not much used. Cohen sponsored the 1952 Trades 
Unions Ordinance discussed in Chapter 4. The primary purpose of 
the ordinance was to prevent unions from being used for purely 
political purposes. An attempt was made to ensure that the organ-
isations were backed by a specific body of industrial workers. 
Consequently provisions required that all union members except the 
secretary should have been employees of the industry concerned 
for at least three years and that membership of more than one 
organisation was illegal. Registration was to be compulsory and 
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for political ambitions. In this sphere they had been made redundant 
by official tolerance of overtly political organisations. The 1954 
Labour Department Report noted with approval that: 
"Even though a state of emergency existed in Buganda for 
most of the year and the political situation was somewhat involved, 
labour remained calm". (LDR, 1954, p. 13). 
From 1952 until 1955, agricultural prosperity continued and 
with it the labour shortage. At the same time, workers were 
deeply suspicious of unions because of their earlier association 
with politics, but the Labour Department was aware of the need to 
develop some form of industrial relations machinery to help maintain 
a contented work force. 
In the absence of unions, the Labour Department turned to 
works committees as a stop gap. These committees consisted of 
members of management and representatives of all workers em-
ployed in a particular workplace. In British industry, works com-
mittees are concerned mainly with welfare, amenities and sometimes 
productivity and efficiency. It was initially intended in Uganda 
that they should fulfil much wider functions because of the lack 
of union development. Elkan has indicated the fundamental 
weakness of a system of joint consultation not backed by union 
organisation: 
"There tends to be no machinery through which representatives 
are kept in touch with the views they represent. . . Unlike collective 
bargaining, consultation is initiated by the employers, and the 
employers have generally ignored the need to make formal provision 
for contact between representatives and their electors. They 
have assumed that this contact is automatically maintained." 
(Elkan, 1960, p.12). This assumption was clearly in error, as 
"elections" usually took the form of appointment by management 
and the more educated tribal groups were able to claim a monopoly 
of seats on the works committee (Elkan, 1955, Chapter 6). 
The transitional situation in 1955 can be best illustrated from 
a detailed account of the major industrial issue of that year. A 
recurrent feature of Ugandan labour relations was a rash of minor 
strikes at the beginning of each calendar year when increments were 
expected. In 1955, the usual rash turned into an epidemic because 
of the implementation of a Salaries Commission Report. This in-
creased wages for established officers in the civil service and also 
back-dated the increases to January 1954. The payment of large 
lump sums of back pay in January 1955 aroused the jealousies of 
the unestablished workers. Strikes followed among dustmen, hedge-
cutters, sweepers, hospital assistants, laboratory technicians and 
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council employees. Initially the workers were resisted and told to 
submit their grievances through their works committees. 
Then 2,300 employees of the Public Works Department went 
out on strike against the advice of their works committee. They 
claimed back pay on the grounds of long service, and also had 
minor grievances arising out of the changes in salary structure. Be-
cause the strikers had lost confidence in the members of the official 
works committee, a special strike committee was elected to nego-
tiate with the Director of Public Works. Since they could not speak 
English and were ignorant of the legal aspects of the case, this 
committee asked an African lawyer, Mr. J. L. Zake, to represent 
them. 
Zake recalls that the Government were at first reluctant to allow 
him to act for the strikers as they associated lawyers with politics. 
But in fact the strikers were particularly anxious "to keep the poli-
ticians out". Fruitless discussion followed. Mr. Nicklin, a former 
British trade unionist employed in the Labour Department, failed 
in his conciliation attempts. He apparently used the opportunity 
to try and persuade the men to form a union, but found them sus-
picious of the political implications of such a move. 
Finally, the newly appointed Labour Commissioner took the 
novel step of appointing a conciliation committee. The committee 
was to consist of one representative from each side under an in-
dependent chairman agreeable to both sides. This seems to have 
been the first time, the Labour Department itself had not undertaken 
this function. At the time, Zake believed that others in Government 
were suspicious of this move as they felt that there was no truly 
independent person in Uganda to act as chairman. The strikers were 
to submit a list from which Government would choose. It is interest-
ing to note that no African candidate was acceptable to the strike 
committee because all capable Africans were either working for 
Government or involved in local politics. The church was also 
held to be part of "the establishment", so that the final list con-
tained three members of Makerere University College. 
The Director of Public Works reluctantly accepted Professor 
Ingham, but made it clear that he did not approve of this method 
of settlement and regarded Makerere people as pro-African. The 
Government's case rested on the fact that unestablished employees 
were employed on a monthly ticket basis and not on a fixed con-
tinuing salary, and that unestablished wages had been constantly 
adjusted to rises in the cost of living. This was shown not to accord 
with the facts in many cases. The final decision rejected the general 
principle of back pay, but provided compensation for various 
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groups shown to be underpaid in the past. Grievances arising out 
of salary regrading and the use of strike action were also settled. 
This dispute shows the uncertainties current in the conduct of 
industrial relations in 1955. There was no fixed procedure for deal-
ing with disputes where it was felt that the settlement would benefit 
from outside participation. The Labour Commissioner believed that 
Government employees would have more confidence in an indepen-
dent tribunal but his view was not shared by others. On the 
workers' side there was suspicion of African politicians and the 
unions with which they were still associated in the public mind. At 
the same time, the works committee had not been called together 
during the four months preceding the strike, and it was by-passed 
when its opinion did not coincide with that of the majority of the 
workers. A vacuum was being created in industrial relations which 
trade unions only began to fill after 1955. 
In Uganda the boom in coffee and cotton prices continued until 
the Korean War armistice in 1953. The Government's price stabili-
sation policy prevented an immediate collapse since growers con-
tinued to receive much the same price. But spending from reserves 
which had been built up in the years of prosperity was reduced. 
The Labour Department Report for 1955 records "a decline in the 
demand for labour but still little unemployment". (LDR, 1955, 
p. 3). The 1956 report pointed out that industrial expansion had 
absorbed what otherwise would have been a labour surplus, and 
that a 14 per cent drop in numbers employed in building and con-
struction work indicated a general slackening in the economy as a 
result of falling world prices for agricultural products (LDR, 1956. 
p. 6). By 1957, significant unemployment existed in urban areas as 
the economy continued to slow down. For the first time, Ugandans 
could not depend upon agriculture as a sure source of cash income. 
Wage-earning became vital and, with a labour surplus, it was im-
portant to hold any job available. Trade union organisation now 
appealed to the workers as a means of self-protection — in parti-
cular, protection against competition from outside labour and the 
resulting opportunities for exploitation by the employer. The im-
portance of wage-earning compared with agriculture in turn led to 
greater stabilisation of the labour force, which made the task of 
union organisers much easier than previously. 
Economic decline in agriculture was not the only factor encour-
aging union growth after 1955. Discussing the general post-war 
growth of trade unions in under-developed areas, an International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) official made the following comment: 
"Three factors have made advances possible — (a) constant inflow 
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of outside or international influences; (b) the pressure of trade 
union rivalries often based on political or ideological influences; 
and (c) new policies concerning freedom of association as a result 
of political or constitutional changes." (Daya, 1955 pp. 358-369). 
In Uganda all three of these factors have been present in varying 
degrees of importance. Freedom of association had long been 
guaranteed by the Colonial Office. Following the 1952 Trade Union 
Ordinance, the policy of assisting trade unions was more vigor-
ously pursued in Uganda. Certainly all legal and administrative 
hindrances had been removed. 
International influences first made their appearance as a result 
of more sensational events in the political sphere. Sir Andrew 
Cohen's deportation of the Kabaka of Buganda in late 1953 in-
volved a number of British Labour Party politicians in the ensuing 
negotiations. Uganda became a focus for the Opposition's attack 
on colonial policy and the interest extended beyond the Kabaka-
ship. This period marked the beginning of the British Trades Union 
Congress's (TUC) continuing interest in Uganda's labour relations. 
In addition, the international trade union movement was becoming 
more active in Africa and Uganda received visiting missions from 
a wide variety of organisations. Aid and advisers followed, and the 
process culminated in the establishment in 1958 of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) Kampala training 
college for union officials from all over English-speaking Africa. 
Rivalries based on ideologies were not important in the early 
development of the unions, although Chapter 5 discusses in detail 
the later impact and present importance of international influences 
and their role in stimulating union growth (see also Legum, 1962, 
pp. 81-92). 
The influence of Kenyan migration also speeded up union deve-
lopment. Elkan has pointed out that the Ganda dominated the 
works committees and the early Kampala unions because, staying 
regularly in employment, they were more interested in wages and 
conditions. Yet the bulk of the Ganda still relied on the land for 
subsistence and as an alternative source of income. It has been 
noted earlier that the Kenyans were much more urbanised. They 
stayed in employment for long periods and, using Lake Victoria's 
cheap transport facilities, could visit their homes in short periods 
of annual leave. 
The first contact with Kenyan unionism was made in the rail-
ways. This led to the foundation of the only effective union existing 
in Uganda before 1955. Kenyan migration was noted, in passing, 
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by the 1947 Labour Report, but large scale migration seems to have 
started eight years later. This was due partly to political and econo-
mic pressures from within Kenya, where the 'Mau Mau ' rebellion 
had disturbed the regular pattern of urban life, but it was largely 
the attraction of Ugandan industrialisation. Development funds 
built up in the years of prosperity were used on projects aimed at 
diversifying the economy. This industrialisation included exploita-
tion of copper deposits in the western province, but was mainly 
centred on Jinja and the Owen Falls Hydro-Electricity Scheme. The 
projects included a textile mill, copper smelters, a brewery, a 
tobacco factory and, at Tororo, a cement works. 
The 1957 Labour Department Report mentions that the influx 
of Kenyans coincided with unemployment and food shortages and 
that official action was taken to discourage this migration (LDR, 
1957, p. 7). But employers in the new industries offered good em-
ployment prospects to Kenyans who often had previous factory 
experience and stayed long enough to be trainable. As in the rail-
ways, they also brought with them some knowledge and experience 
of union activity. 
In 1955, Mr. Tom Mboya visited Uganda and assisted at the 
birth of the Uganda Trades Union Congress (UTUC), a weak or-
ganisation of four small unions. In his memoirs he recalls being 
told that: 
"The Baganda were quite satisfied and do not look on themselves 
as workers, and so there would be no possibility of organising a 
trade union in Uganda. To some extent these warnings were correct 
for in many Uganda unions, the leadership had to come from Kenya 
workers resident in Uganda." (Mboya, 1963, p. 198). 
This was particularly true of industrial unions located at Jinja, 
where a significant proportion of the labour force was Kenyan in 
origin. The Ganda were prominent in the relatively ineffective or-
ganisations catering for workers in 'white collar' occupations cen-
tred on Kampala. 
Table II (p. 22) gives a clear indication of the rapid expansion 
in union activity between 1957 and 1962, both in the total number 
of union members and in the range of industries organised. More 
than most statistics on Africa, the accuracy of these figures is open 
to question as there was no effective machinery to check the esti-
mates of the leaders themselves. The figures for 1963 in Table III 
(p. 23) show the divergence in many cases between fully paid up 
members and "book members" who often did no more than fill in 
a membership card. During 1963, there was a tightening up of 
supervision and the General-Secretary of the Vernacular, Primary 
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and Junior Secondary Teachers Union was prosecuted for claiming 
10,000 members when subscriptions had been collected from less 
than 200. 
Table I 
U N I O N G R O W T H , U G A N D A A N D KENYA 
Uganda Kenya 
Workers Unionists j Unions ! j Workers Unionists . . Unions 
1952 200,000 259 ; 7 
| ! 
i j 468,000 20,688 13 





1958 257,400 4,784 i 13 
|| 
i ! 596,800 
j j 
18,357 23 





Source: Colonial Office: Trade Unions in the British Colonial Territories. A 
periodic digest of labour statistics (Colonial Office Library mimeo-
graphed). 
A useful indication of the rate of growth is found in Table I 
comparing the situation with, that in the Kenya trade unions. The 
main factors in this rapid growth seem to have been the impact of 
large numbers of Kenyan migrants with previous experience of 
union activities, the increasing interest taken in Uganda by inter-
national union organisations and the declining employment posi-
tion which led to greater stabilisation of the labour force. A num-
ber of small unions began with a burst of activity and then remained 
dormant for a few years before being absorbed by more vigorous 
competitors. By the end of 1963, a period of rationalisation had 
begun, so that the total number of union members increased while 
the number of separate organisations declined. 
A change in employer attitudes paralleled this sudden develop-
ment of strong trade unions. Employers' associations such as the 
Tea Planters Association and the Cotton Association existed before 
the Second World War, but were concerned mainly with the fixing 
of prices and exerting informal pressure on the colonial administra-
tion. A Federation of Uganda Employers was registered in 1945 
with the Registrar of Trade Unions. The Labour Department Re-
port for 1946 praised the Federation's "keen interest and valuable 
constructive criticisms" and added tha t : 
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"It is to be hoped that it will in time become more fully representa-
tive of the employers of labour in Uganda, particularly in the 
direction of organised recruitment." (LDR, 1946, p . 6). 
•';•:' By 1948, the Federation was virtually defunct and "just as badly 
organised as the employees." (LDR, 1948, p. 16). Because voting 
I ; was weighted according to numbers employed, the two large sugar 
estates were able to dominate the proceedings and to determine that 
the main business dealt with the most economic methods of recruit-
ing migrant labour to cope with the current labour shortage. 
It was not until 1957 that any interest was displayed in an em-
ployers' organisation concerned with industrial relations 
Successive reports of the Labour Department urged that 
"employers must organise themselves on a comparable basis 
to that adopted by the organisations of employees." (LDR, 1957, 
p. 16). In 1958, the Secretary of the Overseas Employers 
Federations visited East Africa in connection with developments 
in Kenya and made efforts to revive the old Federation 
in a new form. A number of larger firms agreed to form a purely 
consultative "Society of Employers" and to explore the possibility 
of co-ordinating their personnel policies to take account of the re-
cent expansion of trade union activities. Because it was feared that 
the appearance of an employers' association might further stimulate 
union growth, the Society at first met in secret and established only 
informal contact with the Labour Department. In 1959, when the 
Government raised the statutory minimum wage rates for urban 
areas without consulting the Society, the members realised that 
. their objectives could only be fulfilled by emerging as a public body. 
In April 1960, the Society was formally registered with the Re-
gistrar of Trade Unions. After its membership had increased to 
35 firms, the retiring Deputy Labour Commissioner was appointed 
as a full-time Executive Officer. In July 1961, the name of the or-
ganisation was changed to the Federation of Uganda Employers, 
and its constitution was redrafted to allow the entry of smaller 
; ; firms grouped together in subsidiary organisations. The press re-
lease announcing this change is significant as it outlines the basic 
motives behind the growth of the organisation: 
"It is likely that there will be a considerable increase in the 
growth and strength of the trade union movement (in the future), 
maybe not from a spontaneous desire of the workers but from the 
increasing outside influence being brought to bear in this field . . . 
another factor that makes it imperative for employers to be united 
to safeguard their interests is the possibility of irresponsible pro-
mises of unreal wage levels which might come out of the present 
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background of Uganda with constitutional changes and government 
by political parties." (Uganda Argus, 5 July 1961). 
F rom that time, the Federat ion increased its membership and 
strengthened its organisation by sponsoring the emergence of specia-
lised Trade Associations. The Federat ion itself functioned as a rep-
resentative of employers' interests on general issues of policy, and 
as an information centre. With two former members of the Labou r 
Department as its executive officials, it was in a good position to 
offer technical assistance to members engaged in negotiations with 
unions. However, it was the sectional Trade Associations which 
were directly concerned with the negotiation of collective agree-
ments and with their enforcement in collaboration with the unions 
concerned. 
The chief weakness of the employers' organisations was the 
lack of discipline over their members with regard to the observation 
of collective agreements. To some extent this can be attributed to 
the weakness of union leadership in not facing up to the problem 
of organising the more "difficult" members of the trade. There was 
also a fundamental conflict between the idea of combination em-
bodied in the Federat ion and the atti tudes of many of the members. 
Apar t f rom the larger Joint companies, the great majori ty of em-
ployers in Uganda were Asians running businesses as family con-
cerns. They were usually suspicious both of recognising a union 
and of collaborating with their competitors, and the exclusive role 
of the family placed special stresses upon the efficiency of person-
nel management (Desai, 1965). It is clear, however, that the 
existence of employers' associations contributed very considerably 
to the expansion and consolidation of the union movement m 
Uganda. Although few employers positively welcomed unions, the 
existence of the associations helped to reinforce the view that unions 
were at least a legitimate vehicle for the expression of the interests 
of their workers. 
C h a p t e r T h r e e 
PROBLEMS OF UNION ORGANISATION 
Table II demonstraies the rapid growth in both the number of 
unions and union membership in the period between 1952 and 1961. 
The size and distribution of union membership at the end of 1963 
is indicated in Table III. As might be expected in a country in 
which communications were generally poor and there was a low 
rate of literacy, the earliest and strongest unions were based upon 
workers grouped in industries at a particular location. Apart from 
the Railway African Union, the most important unions in terms of 
activity and paid-up membership have been located at the indus-
trial ccntres: electricity, sugar plantations, textiles, tobacco, brewe-
ries and copper smelters near Jinja; petroleum. Central Government 
workshops and college junior employees in Kampala; copper mines 
and tea plantations in the Western Province and cement at Tororo. 
The public services also account for a large percentage of union 
membership but, with the exception of the railway workers, 
the unions concerncd have been relatively passive. Craft unions 
have never made any progress whatsoever, and general unions 
dealing with a number of minor employers are a relatively late 
development. 
In order to avoid repetition and to narrow the scope of investi-
gation, an arbitrary selection of the most important unions was 
made. Choice was partly dictated by the available source material 
and the willingness of individual leaders to co-operate, but the 
main aim was to provide a sample which would represent the 
main problems. The Railway African Union was chosen because 
of its pioneering role and for the special problems faced by workers 
employed in organisations operating in all three East African 
territories. The National Union of Clerical, Commercial and 
Technical Employees had the longest history of the general unions 
and experienced a remarkable expansion in numbers during 1963. 
Of the major industrial unions, the Uganda Tobacco Workers 
Union is the oldest and one of the most efficiently organised, while 
the Uganda Textile Workers Union became involved in the longest 
and most bitter strike in the history of labour relations in the 
country. The National Union of Plantation Workers, potentially 
the largest union in Uganda, had a very chequered history which 
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Table I I I 
T R A D E U N I O N MEMBERSHIP , 1963 
Year of Book Paid-Up 
Union Regist- Member- Member-
ration. ship. ship. 
Kampala Local Government 1952 198 198 
•Railway African 1955 3,505 3,505 
•Clerical 3,008 2,419 
Medical Assistants 286 20 
Makerere Employees . . 1956 758 720 
Printing 1957 406 406 
•Tobacco » 640 640 
Teachers African 1958 11,128 167 
Postal European » 27 27 
Textiles „ 1,686 1,686 
Lango Transport 1959 t985 t 
Railway Asian 122 122 
•Transport and General » 11,400 t 
Co-operative >J 144 94 
•Plantation Workers 1960 14,601 8,712 
Cement 837 837 
Electricity >> 1,157 606 
Hotel and Domestic 11,020 t 
Ginnery and Millworkers 1961 35 25 
Bunyoro Local Government J» 307 210 
Busoga Co-operatives »> 198 198 
Busoga Local Government »» 1,207 46 
•Breweries 629 629 
•Petroleum „ 1-600 t 
•Public Employees 1962 16,699 16,699 
•Posts and Telecommunication 894 886 
•Building and Civil Engineering 1963 2,537 2,537 
Steel Corporation » 175 t 
•Mine and Smelters JJ 2,159 1,214 
t Not available; the 1962 figure has been cited if known. 
* Affiliated with relevant International Trade Secretariat 
Source: Uganda Labour Department files (unpublished). 
union development, particularly problems of finance, leadership 
and organisation. This will be followed by two chapters dealing 
with the main sources of union ideas, the first dealing with the 
labour policy of the British colonial administration and the second 
with other external influences such as the International Labour 
Organisation and the various international union organisations. 
A. Union Structure 
Because there is such a wide variety in the size and effectiveness 
of the union organisations in Uganda, it is difficult to make valid 
generalisations about common characteristics. The detailed case 
studies in the following chapters show how the powers and 
functions of the same official vary between unions. To take one 
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example, the General Secretary of the Uganda Tobacco Workers 
Union (640 members, mainly in Jinja and Kampala) was able to 
pay closer attention to individual grievances of members than the 
General Secretary of the National Union of Plantation Workers 
(8,712 members spread over a wide area of Toro and Buganda). 
Even in unions nominally of the same size, there was a great 
difference in effectiveness, so that a branch official of the weakly 
organised Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union 
often performed a different set of functions from a branch official 
of the more centralised Uganda Public Employees Union. 
The presence of a full-time official has been a key factor in 
the survival and growth of most unions in Uganda. Unions with 
a membership of less than about 300 cannot support the financial 
burden of a full-time official's salary so that these unions have 
not prospered in Uganda. They have either faded away or been 
absorbed into larger organisations. This was true of the small 
civil service unions which preceded the emergence of the nation-
wide Uganda Public Employees Union and of the many epheme-
ral organisations which were eventually organised into a single 
general union covering woodworkers, civil engineering and road 
construction. In Jinja, attempts were made to organise a union 
of workers at the Kilembe Mines Copper Smelters which failed 
until an amalgamation was arranged with the much larger mine-
workers organisation based 300 miles away in the Ruwenzori 
mountains. 
All the unions discussed in the following case studies employed 
at least one full-time official, usually the General Secretary. The 
Railway African Union was unusual in its dependence upon a 
full-time executive President. As unions grew in size, it became 
common to employ a clerk to deal with routine correspondence 
and to look after the office in the absence of the full-time official. 
Unions with a number of branches outside the urban area often 
employed two or three full-time officials but it was uncommon 
for any of them to be based outside Kampala or Jinja. In theory, 
contact was maintained with the more remote areas by tours of 
inspection and by the convening of meetings of national councils 
on which up-country branches had members. In practice, com-
munications between branches and the headquarters in Kampala 
or Jinja were generally very poor. Only the Railway African 
Union had an effective system of keeping in touch, based upon the 
obvious physical link of the railway itself. 
This lack of effective communications had an important effect 
upon the conduct of union business. There was a strong tendency 
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for the central branch to determine national policy and to mono-
polise the services of the full-time official. Union rules were 
required to make provision for the adequate representation of 
sectional interests and the constitutions of most unions placed 
supervisory powers in the hands of a national conference and a 
national executive committee on which rural areas were represent-
ed. However, in practice, neither body exerted much authority 
over the full-time officials and those members of the executive 
committee who lived in the urban areas and were thus always 
close to the centre of operations. The initiative in the conduct of 
union affairs lay with this small group. 
The up-country branches of the various unions reacted to this 
situation in various ways. In the Amalgamated Transport and 
General Workers Union, the main problem for the central leaders 
was to prevent the branches from acting on their own initiative 
without reference to national policy. In the Uganda Public 
Employees Union, there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm 
among branch officials in the more remote areas so that the union 
functioned effectively only when stimulated by the visit of national 
officials. In the Tobacco Workers Union, difficulties arose because 
common problems faced by the rural branches in the north were 
passed to a national negotiating body which was dominated by 
leaders whose main concern was with Jinja and Kampala. The 
Railway African Union was the most strongly integrated of the 
Ugandan unions but, even so, some branch officials dissented from 
the decision to strike in 1959 and the national leadership had to 
defeat a splinter organisation started by one of them. 
At the branch level, unions depended upon office-bearers who 
held full-time jobs in the industry concerned. On the whole, large 
scale employers were prepared to allow a limited amount of time 
off for the conduct of union business and even the use of company 
premises for union offices. Smaller firms, such as those dealing 
with general unions, were not prepared to make such concessions 
and it was necessary to conduct union affairs after office hours. 
Lack of any training in union management among these part-
time officers placed a considerable strain upon the full-time Gene-
ral Secretary as he was often forced to do work which might 
otherwise have been left to members of the branch executive. 
In one textiles factory, the system of shop stewards was deli-
berately encouraged and recognised as a useful means of dealing 
with grievances at the lowest level. In other large enterprises, 
unofficial leaders tended to emerge from the informal groups into 
which the work-force divided itself. Because tribes often specialise 
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in particular skills and prefer to work in exclusive units, the shop 
steward system had the effect of giving expression to divisive 
tribal interests which cut across the aim of union solidarity. Con-
sequently, unions at the national level tended to be dominated by 
a small group in the urban centre associated with the full-time 
General Secretary and, at the local level, to be weakened by lack 
of forceful and united leadership. 
B. Finance 
In a circular to members, the Secretary of the Overseas 
Employers Federation wrote in 1956 that: 
"One of the major failures of colonial trade unions is attributable 
to their financial weakness and the consequence that they attract 
as officers men who are themselves unstable, either crooks or ideal-
ists and very few of the latter." (Circular, 23 July 1956). 
This uncharitable assessment does have the value of pointing to 
the key weakness of the union movement in Uganda, the lack of 
stable sources of income. Because workers had no experience of 
contributing to voluntary workplace associations and did not grasp 
the value of such associations, union leaders had great difficulty 
in collecting regular contributions. At the same time, workers 
would respond to ad hoc appeals for support over issues such as a 
strike for wage claims which were demonstrably in their immediate 
interests. Consequently, financial instability often led leaders to 
stir up strife at frequent intervals in order to swell union funds. 
In later years, two factors led to an improvement in the general 
(financial position of many unions. The first was the great expan-sion of aid received from overseas union organisations. The precise 
nature of this aid is discussed in Chapter 5, but often it took the 
form of direct financial assistance to pay for administrative 
expenses and the salaries of local officials. A common pattern 
was that an international adviser would arrive to investigate the 
situation, offices would be set up and local officials paid a salary 
for a short period until the new union was strong enough to be 
self-supporting. This was true of the Railway African Union, the 
National Union of Plantation Workers, the Uganda Public 
Employees Union and the Uganda Building Construction Civil 
Engineering and Allied Workers Union. It was intended that the 
Uganda Trades Union Congress should develop in the same way, 
but this organisation continued to depend heavily upon regular 
contributions from the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions. The danger in this seems to be that unions will make 
little effort to build up their own finances for as long as they are 
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certain that funds will flow in from outside, unless such funds are 
rigidly supervised by the donor organisation. 
The second source of financial strength for the unions was the 
extension of the check-off system of dues collection. Under this 
system, the employer deducts the union subscription from the pay 
packets of all employees who have signed a form of authorisation. 
The system has definite advantages for the union leaders as it 
assures them of a regular income and relieves them of their most 
onerous administrative duty. Instead of spending many hours 
every month chasing after subscriptions from each member, leaders 
have only to secure a signature on an authorisation form. From 
the point of view of the employers, the extra administrative burden 
is offset by the increase in the financial stability of the union, 
which means that higher quality officials will be attracted by the 
regular wages and there will be less deliberate provocation of indus-
trial unrest. The employer can also use withdrawal of the check-
off privilege as a powerful bargaining counter in times of stress. 
This type of consideration influenced most of the more important 
employers in Uganda to accept the idea of the check-off after 1960. 
All the unions discussed in the case studies negotiated check-off 
agreements with at least some of their employers, although there 
was a varied degree of success in putting the agreements into 
practice. The Central Government extended a check-off agreement 
to the Uganda Public Employees Union for its unestablished 
employees, but, in a debate in the National Assembly, the Minister 
of Labour refused to entertain the suggestion that the check-off be 
made compulsory wherever unions existed. He did accept, how-
ever, that the policy would be given official encouragement.' 
Significantly, one of the most telling arguments put forward in 
favour of the check-off was that it would allow Uganda to get 
rid of foreign interests, a reference to the widespread dependence 
of unions upon international assistance. (Ug. 1963 (b), pp. 99-111). 
The growth in union funds brought with it problems of efficient 
financial administration. Mr. W. Friedland, writing of Tanga-
nyika, noted that members of unions were suspicious about the use 
to which officials put their financial resources, often with justifica-
tion (Friedland, 1963). Previously, union funds in Uganda 
were hardly worth taking and there were few cases of financial 
mismanagement brought to public notice. With the extension of 
the check-off system and the availability of foreign aid funds, there 
was an increase in peculation. In March, 1963, the Administrator 
General felt constrained to report in the following terms: 
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"It is still a matter of concern that too high a proportion of 
Union Officials have little idea and even less concern about the 
requirements in the law that oblige them to maintain books of 
account reflecting the day-to-day position of the Union. To make 
matters worse, some Unions, which have hitherto shown themselves 
incapable of keeping proper accounts when their income has not 
risen above a few hundred shillings, now aspire to grandiose 
'check-off' systems to collect subscriptions. All too often the 
Union Officials have made it clear that they regard such formalities 
as a bore." (Ug„ 1963, p. 4). 
This sort of attitude to financial affairs was perhaps a reflection 
of the general inefficiency which plagued union leadership in 
Uganda. There were a few capable and dedicated individuals 
involved at different stages of union development, but they were 
usually disillusioned by the low calibre of their colleagues and the 
poor response of members. 
C. Migrant Labour and Tribal Loyalties 
Much of this weakness can be attributed to the widespread use 
of migrant labour during the formative period of union develop-
ment. In 1955, the problems associated with migrant labour 
seemed so insurmountable to the East Africa Royal Commission 
that their report concluded that: 
"The attempt to encourage the growth of trade unions on the 
British model is likely, for some time to come, to represent an 
expenditure of effort which might be employed more effectively 
in other directions." 
In listing their reasons for this conclusion, the report noted 
that: 
"The African still has a background of peasant agriculture and 
this background dominates his interests even when he is a wage-
earner in the towns . . . a large part of urban development is 
obtained through labourers who are migrant. To be effective, a 
trade union must be a stable and continuous association of work-
people, but stability and continuity are not readily found in urban 
employment where the stable labour force is so small." (CO, 1955, 
p. 161). 
The effect of migrant labour on the urban social structure had 
important implications for union development. Two studies of the 
Ugandan labour force in this period noted that the habits and 
aspirations of migrant workers were accepted as a premise of 
employment policies, and that little effort was made to encourage 
a stable work force. The absence of such voluntary associations 
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as trade unions tended to perpetuate the instability of labour by 
reducing the opportunities for assimilation into an urban way of 
life. In turn, unions received little support because migrant 
workers did not identify their future interest with their conditions 
of work. 
As a result, the first unions in Uganda were based upon the 
two tribes outside the normal pattern of short-term migration, the 
Ganda and the Luo. In both cases, workers of these tribes stayed 
in urban employment long enough to realise that they would bene-
fit from an institution safeguarding their terms and conditions of 
employment. Of the two tribes, the Luo tended to be the more 
active because they did not have a supplementary income from 
the land as did the Ganda, and were more prepared to tackle 
manual and heavy skilled labouring. The Ganda were on the 
scene earlier in Kampala but restricted their activity to the "white 
collar" occupations. With the increasing stabilisation of workers 
from other areas, the dominance of these two tribes in union leader-
ship declined as new groups asserted themselves. In particular, the 
Luo tended to be pushed out on the grounds that they were out-
siders from Kenya. 
Associated with the problem of migrant labour was the 
problem of the continued attachment among workers to their 
families and tribal organisations. The habit of returning 
periodically to the family land tended to strengthen tribal links, 
just as the links increased the desire to return. The traditional 
social structure based on the tribe and the extended family was 
not without advantages for the worker in urban society. The 
extended family protected him against unemployment and sickness 
by providing accommodation with relatives in town when he was 
not earning, and offered him social security on retirement. Many 
tribal associations existed in urban centres to assist him in 
becoming assimilated into the urban environment and to secure 
employment. They acted as sporting and social clubs as well as 
employment agencies and mutual aid societies for organising 
funerals and the care of dependents. 
From the point of view of the trade unions, the traditional 
structure sometimes served to increase the ability of the union to 
remain out on strike. During the long railway workers' strike in 
1959, a union circular advised that dependents should be sent home 
to ease the strain on the union's virtually non-existent strike fund. 
On the whole, however, the continuing importance of tribal 
loyalties worked against the growth of effective unions. A social 
survey of Jinja in 1955 revealed that urban life tended to sort the 
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immigrant population along tribal lines so that tribal clusters" 
appeared both in the urban settlement pattern and in the types of 
jobs to which each tribe was assigned. A sharp division also 
developed between the local Soga and Ganda and the immigrant 
"foreigners" because the former owned nearby land and possessed 
full political rights under the local administration. These divisions 
were reinforced by the tendency for certain tribes to seek particu-
lar jobs because of education, physique or previous experience m 
industry elsewhere. The survey concluded tha t : 
"The partial correspondence between tribe, occupational 
classification and earnings probably favours the maintenance of 
tribal distinctions . . . and hampers the developments of racial soli-
darity cutting across social groupings." (Sofer, 1955, p. 46). 
This lack of racial solidarity meant, in the prevailing social 
structure dominated by Asian and European employers, a lack of 
working class solidarity. Because each tribe believed that it had 
special interests which it did not share with members of other 
tribes, there was little attraction in a trade union appealing to the 
common interests of all workers in the industry concerned. This 
also explains why tribal distinction provided the basic cleavage 
in the leadership structure of most of the unions discussed in the 
following case studies. 
The question of tribal distinctions can be closely related to the 
dominance of particular occupations in union leadership. As 
mentioned in the quotation from the Jinja social survey, there 
tended to be a partial correspondence between tribe and occupa-
tion. In turn, certain occupations have tended to be more con-
cerned with trade unions than others. Thus, in the case of Kilembe 
Copper Mines, the bulk of the labour force were short-term mig-
rants drawn from the neighbouring districts of Kigezi and Ankole, 
mainly employed underground, yet the union was started by a 
small group of Kenyans working as mechanics and clerks. In 
Lugazi Sugar Estate, most workers were employed as unskilled 
cane cutters on the plantation or milling machine operators in the 
factory, but the union executive at one stage was controlled by 
hospital orderlies. 
D. Union Leadership and Membership Control 
This phenomenon is perfectly understandable and helps to 
explain the prominence of certain tribes among the union leader-
ship. These mechanics, clerks and orderlies usually had better 
education, had served in the job longer and had more experience 
in dealing with members of other races in the course of their 
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work. Clerks, in particular, had more knowledge of the techniques 
of organisation needed to run a union, and often seemed to use 
union activity as a means of attracting the attention of management 
to assist their chances of promotion. The main drawback in the 
situation was that union leaders had little first-hand knowledge of 
the practical problems of most of their members and thus could 
not match the specialist knowledge of management when negotia-
ting on technical issues. There was also the problem of the differ-
ence in status between leaders and their members. Many union 
leaders seemed to regard themselves as very superior beings com-
pared with the mere unskilled labourers who had elected them to 
office. They had never shared the same humble background as 
their members and felt a class above them. This view of themselves 
tended to be reinforced by the attentions of international organisa-
tions which provided the leaders with such fruits of office as 
overseas trips and motor cars. This helped lo widen the gap 
between leaders and members in terms of both sophistication and 
standards of living. 
In one respect, however, the unions of Uganda were more for-
tunate than those in other areas. Reviewing union activity in 
South-East Asia, Daya noted that the leadership of trade unions 
"is laigely in the hands of people not connected with the industry" 
(Daya, 1955, p. 371). In India, to take another example, a full-
time union organiser may be in charge of a number of different 
unions without ever having worked in any of the industries con-
cerned. The same is true of African countries where unions could 
be organised by outsiders as vehicles for personal power. In 
Uganda, the 1952 Trade Union Ordinance required all but the 
Secretary to have worked for a period of three years in the industry 
being organised. This was probably the result of a despatch from 
the Colonial Secretary which stated: 
"Officials of trade unions should, with certain exceptions, be 
men whose livelihood depends upon their work in the industry 
concerned. I consider that the stability and value of the trade 
union movement depends to a large extent upon the degree to 
which leadership is developed from within its own ranks." (CO. 
1951 (a)). 
The intention to keep out "professional union organisers" was 
largely fulfilled in Uganda as there were remarkably few leaders 
who had not had experience as an employee in the fields organised 
by their unions. The only important exceptions were the officers 
of the short-lived and insignificant splinter group called the 
Uganda Federation of Labour (UFL) (see pp. 138-142). 
32 Problems of Union Organisation 
A number of writers have pointed to aspects of traditional 
behaviour such as the lack of class tensions and the habit of 
settling disputes by the arbitration of elders which seem to lend 
themselves to the modern concept of trade unionism. Nevertheless, 
as the Report of the Uganda Labour Department stated in 1950: 
"There is nothing in the background of the African worker 
which lends itself to an appreciation of the meaning of trade 
unionism — nothing approaches its intimate form of democracy." 
(LDR, 1950, p. 14). 
I t is inevitable that workers bring to the workplace relationship 
a set of attitudes based upon traditional conceptions of status and 
authority very different f rom those prevailing in modern industry. 
A detailed analysis of the decision-making process among Tanga-
nyikan trade unions noted that members exercised only minimal 
control over the union officials, so that union government took 
on "a plebiscitarian rather than a representative form." (Friedland, 
1961). 
Observations at a number of meetings of different unions in 
Uganda revealed that much the same applied there, with meetings 
poorly attended and members very passive unless serious disagree-
ment existed between the leaders themselves. If a single leader 
had the backing of his own executive, he was in a position of 
unassailable authority. 
This passivity can largely be explained by the lack of union 
education and high rate of illiteracy among the mass of the 
members and the wide social gap which had been allowed to 
develop between leaders and the rank and file. There was a total 
absence of the informed membership upon which effective democ-
ratic control depends. The only check upon individual irresponsi-
bility was exercised by other members of the union hierarchy who 
might or might not have a better grasp of the intentions and needs 
of the mass of the members. Unions did not appear to be the 
democratic force that they are sometimes expected to be. They did 
provide a training for future leaders in other fields but this was a 
training in the techniques of organisation rather than in the specific 
mechanics of democratic government. Inadequate participation 
by the members in the making of policy — an inescapable condi-
tion in countries where illiteracy was high and trade unionism 
new — meant that trade union policies were what the leaders 
made them. 
C h a p t e r Four 
THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF COLONIAL LABOUR POLICY 
To assess the impact of colonial labour policy on the develop-
ment of trade unions in Uganda, it is necessary to say something 
about the general policies pursued by the Colonial Office policy 
makers (for a detailed study, see Roberts, 1964). 
Unions had established themselves as legitimate organisations 
in a colonial setting as far back as 1930. A despatch from Lord 
Passfield accepted that trade unions were the most desirable method 
for protecting colonial workers f rom the abuses and exploitation 
which tended to accompany rapid industrialisation and also 
advocated some form of compulsory registration to protect the 
workers from the limitations of their own leaders. 
Passfield's views were reinforced by the findings of the 1931 
Royal Commission on Labour in India, on which Lord Citrine 
served as an influential member. However, once the Labour Party 
fell f rom power, the policy of encouraging trade unions was 
shelved. Economic depression led to a curtailment of the activities 
of the existing Labour Departments and the more conservative view 
that trade unions were too far in advance of the general level of 
economic development was allowed to prevail. 
Interest in trade unions revived with the start of the Second 
World War. A growing labour shortage and the presence of 
Labour Party ministers in the Coalition Government caused pres-
sure to be exerted upon the various colonial administrations. Under 
the terms of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts from 
1940 onwards, funds were made conditional upon satisfying the 
Colonial Office that adequate provision had been made for the 
development and protection of trade unions. Assistance was pro-
vided in the form of sending out former British trade unionists to 
act as special advisers attached to the Labour Departments of the 
more industrially advanced colonies. 
However, results in the immediate post-war period were con-
sidered disappointing. A United Nations Report noted that : 
"While the initial growth of trade unions has often been strik-
ing, as soon as the legal provisions permit them to operate effec-
tively, when the novelty wears off or rapid results are not achieved, 
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some of the unions tend to disintegrate or lose membership; or 
trade unions' membership does not increase as rapidly as regular 
wage earning increases." (UN, 1956, p. 43). 
As a result, attention was directed towards developing statutory 
machinery such as joint consultative committees and wages councils 
in order to protect the majority of workers who still lacked the 
protection of effective trade unions. The view that trade unions 
would be an automatic response to industrialisation and needed 
only legal protection in order to flourish gave way to the idea that 
the State needed to play a more positive role in the protection of 
colonial workers. 
Before the Second World War, labour administration in Uganda 
had a precarious existence. The first appointment of an officer 
specifically concerned with labour was made in 1919, but his only 
concern was with the organisation of the supply of migrant labour. 
In 1925 a separate department was formed for the two purposes 
of recruiting labour (particularly for the building of the railways) 
and for supervising general employment conditions. The staff of 
six was assisted in a part-time capacity by officers in the district 
administrations in the course of their general duties. 
In 1931, as a consequence of the world wide depression, the 
department was virtually disbanded. A single inspector of labour 
struggled on, settling local disputes and attempting to maintain 
transit facilities for migrant labour. A full department was not 
re-established until 1943, under pressure from Britain, and there 
continued to be a serious shortage of staff until 1948. 
During this period, Colonial Office policy statements had been 
noted, but local administrators were dubious about their relevance 
to Uganda. The Protectorate Government complied largely as a 
matter of fo rm: 
"The Government has undertaken as soon as conditions permit 
to pass legislation on the lines of the Trade Union (Amendment) 
Ordinance of Jamaica (on picketing, intimidation and protection 
f rom damages actions) . . . To begin with, this legislation is not 
likely to be of appreciable effect or value; and it is open to doubt 
whether the formation of trade unions will be encouraged by provi-
ding these statutory rights. They have, however, been provided in 
Kenya and Tanganyika and in matters of this kind uniformity is 
regarded to be expedient." (LDR, 1939, pp.2-3). 
In 1942, Colonial Office pressure was made more positive 
through the special provisions attached to the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Acts. To meet the requirements of the Act, the 
Uganda Trades Union and Trades Disputes Ordinance was passed 
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in 1943. This incorporated minimum legislative requirements laid 
down by the Colonial Office before a colony became eligible for 
Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. During the war, the 
Department was concerned mainly with the direction of scarce 
labour into essential services, especially agricultural production. 
With peace came "a growing realisation . . . of the need to keep 
pace with the times and to move forward with the rest of the world 
in improving labour conditions." (LDR, 1946, p. 2). Serious 
disturbances, including a general strike, had occurred in 1945. 
Although a Commission of Enquiry suggested political motives, 
Orde-Brown remarked that : 
"The Labour Department is at present constituted on a very 
modest scale, and this undoubtedly formed a contributory cause in 
events leading up to the recent disturbances." (Orde-Brown, 
1946, p. 93). 
The 1947 Labour Department Report noted that "Uganda is 
about to embark on the initial stages of limited industrialisation 
in certain areas." (LDR, 1947, p. 3). It was noted also that the 
present weak labour administration would be unable to guide and 
supervise these changes and that "considerable ill-informed interest 
was being taken in the possibility of the formation of unions." In 
1948 the Assistant Labour Adviser at the Colonial Office visited 
Uganda and, on his advice, the activities of the Labour Department 
were widened to include townships outside Kampala. In 1949 the 
first "Labour Officer (Trade Unions and Training)" took up his 
post, but the Department 's report for that year noted that little 
use was made of his services. 
In 1950, the first of the two basic trade union ordinances was 
passed: the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) 
Ordinance. This was a relatively simple piece of legislation, based 
upon a model circulated by the Colonial Office. The machinery 
was set in motion by the notification of a trade dispute by either 
party. After the Labour Commissioner had been satisfied that 
genuine attempts had been made to settle the matter without out-
side intervention, he appointed a conciliator. The conciliator, 
invariably the local labour officer, then tried to reach an amicable 
solution by discussions with each side separately and then bringing 
both sides together at a meeting under his chairmanship. If the 
dispute remained unresolved after fourteen days of conciliation, 
the Labour Commissioner was empowered to offer arbitration. If 
the Labour Commissioner's offer was accepted by both sides, he 
could then ask the Minister of Labour to appoint (either a single 
arbitrator or an arbitration tribunal including representatives of 
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both sides. 
Special provisions were included to cover workers in services 
considered essential to the health and general welfare of the com-
munity. The Minister possessed the power to intervene where 
there was undue delay in reaching a settlement by negotiation or 
where the two parties would not both agree to accept arbitration. 
He could direct that the dispute be referred to an arbitration tri-
bunal which was required, where practicable, to deliver its decision 
within twenty-eight days. Workers and employers covered by the 
Essential Services schedule could be forbidden to participate in 
strikes or lock-outs, and anyone counselling such action could also 
be liable to heavy penalties. 
The second legislation of importance was the Trades Union 
Ordinance of 1952. This was also closely modelled on general 
colonial practice and followed, in particular, policies outlined in a 
circular despatch from the Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths 
(CO, 1051, (a)). The new ordinance provided for compulsory 
registration as had the 1943 Ordinance which it replaced. The 
Registrar of Trade Unions had the right to refuse registration if the 
union was used for unlawful purposes or if any other trade union 
already registered was considered sufficiently representative of the 
interests involved (Section 16). Unregistered trade unions were 
denied the right to operate and their officials could be prosecuted. 
The ordinance also introduced greater supervision over the finances 
of unions. The Griffiths' circular had emphasised the need for 
financial control: 
"There is much evidence of laxness in financial matters on the 
part of officials and some degree of supervision and control would 
seem to be essential if the interests of union members are to be 
adequately safeguarded." 
The objects to which trade union funds could be applied were 
specified and the union executive was required to render financial 
statements and an annual return detailing changes in membership. 
The Registrar of Trade Unions was given wide powers of inspec-
tion, including the enforcement of a schedule of rules to be included 
in the constitution of each union. 
Chapter 2 explained how the earliest unions were used as 
instruments of political protest. The 1952 Ordinance tried to ensure 
that this did not continue. Section 29 laid down that all the 
officers of the union except the secretary should have been employed 
for not less than three years in the industry or occupation with 
which the union was directly concerned. I t was forbidden to hold 
office in more than one union or for an official to have been 
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convicted of fraud or dishonesty. Changes of name and amalga-
mations were discouraged by requiring a high percentage of 
approval in a secret ballot and, in addition, the special sanction of 
the Governor in Council. Union Constitutions were required to 
provide representation for separate sectional interests of members, 
a provision often interpreted to discourage the growth of 
amorphous general unions. 
Finally, the ordinance introduced an important amendment to 
existing legislation by making provision for probationary trade 
unions. This had been recommended by the Griffiths' circular des-
patch to allow a period of stabilisation in less advanced areas. 
Part two of the ordinance made provision for "employees' asso-
ciations" and "employees' organisations" to be established as pro-
bationary trade unions. An association was defined as any com-
bination of six or more employees in the same trade or industry 
and an organisation as any combination engaged in the same type 
of employment but who work for different employers. Although 
the principal object of both combinations was the regulation of 
industrial relations, they were not deemed to be full trade unions. 
Instead of regular subscriptions, only an annual contribution was 
permitted, and this was to be devoted only to office expenses and 
welfare purposes. Provision was made for associations and orga-
nisations to be registered as trade unions and the Registrar also 
possessed the power to require this change where he was satisfied 
that the combination concerned was "conducting its affairs in such 
a manner that it should be regarded as a trade union" (Section 6). 
The official rationale behind this innovation was stated in the 
1952 Labour Department Report. It was admitted that compulsory 
registration meant that "any combination of workers, however 
simple their aims, had to conform to the somewhat onerous condi-
tions of Trade Union legislation or go out of existence." (LDR, 
1952, p. 18). If the gap between no organisation and a fully 
fledged union was allowed to continue, it was feared that all spon-
taneous organisations would be suppressed. These new bodies were 
intended to be a simple introduction to industrial relations, a half 
way stage to allow workers to build up experience and a reasonable 
degree of organisation. Although these provisions would have 
allowed the Registrar to satisfy himself about the quality of union 
leadership prior to full registration, this system of probationary 
trade unions was never put into practice. 
In 1958, Uganda received an ICFTU Visiting Mission which 
reviewed the Protectorate's trade union legislation. The general 
conclusion of the Mission was that : 
c 
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"There is altogether too much legislated for; it tends to force 
trade unions into a mould based on the United Kingdom p a t t e r n . . . 
the administrative formalities required are generally beyond the 
capacity of small young unions with inexperienced officials with a 
minimum of education . . . Opinions differ greatly regarding the 
motives behind the over-elaborate labour legislation in East Africa. 
Some allege that it is deliberate government policy to interfere in 
union affairs all along the line. Others declare that it is aimed at 
protecting the unions f rom themselves in fact by preventing their 
own excesses . . But even if we accept the most charitable inter-
pretation of the government's intentions, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that they are mistaken. Unions cannot grow into strong 
independent organisations firmly rooted in the collective will of the 
workers if the government is perpetually cossetting them and 
holding them by the hand." ( ICFTU, 1958, p. 28). 
The Mission found that it was freely admitted that many pro-
visions on inspection were never enforced, but still thought that the 
existence of unnecessary details hindered union efficiency. I t also 
considered that provisions on voting rights and purposes for which 
funds might be used had no place in an ordinance but should be 
decided by the constitution makers of the union. The Mission 
objected to the wide powers entrusted to the Registrar, especially 
the resistance to general unions and the tendency to push any 
embryonic grouping into registering as an association when it might 
have progressed more quickly as a union. In general, however, the 
Mission accepted that the burdensome administrative provisions 
were protective rather than restrictive. 
Predictably perhaps, the British Trades Union Congress took 
exception to the Mission's complaint that colonial unions were 
being forced into the British mould. The T U C General Council 
pointed out that British law allowed the formation of any kind of 
union provided its rules established the democratic rights of its 
members. The General Council preferred that colonial legislation 
should be brought even closer to the British structure which allowed 
this flexibility. In this way, African unions would be given free-
dom to develop according to the demands of their particular situa-
tion (TUC annual report, 1959, p. 228). 
The other possible criticism of the Mission is that it made the 
same error as the early policy makers in the Colonial Office. 
Both groups refused to believe that unions would not develop 
spontaneously to meet the challenge of industrialisation. Earlier 
chapters point out the considerable difficulties which an African 
environment places in the way of rapid unionisation of the work 
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force. The Colonial Office accepted the lessons of experience when 
it changed its policies in 1951. Perhaps the ICFTU Visiting 
Mission did not stay in Africa long enough to appreciate the value 
of the essentially benevolent authoritarianism of colonial labour 
legislation. It certainly offered little in the way of constructive 
suggestions for amendments. 
To complete the survey of Uganda's legislative framework, two 
other ordinances must be mentioned. Neither was of much signifi-
cance in the development of trade unions. An Employment Ordin-
ance, passed in 1946 and revised in 1955, specified conditions of 
service such as hours of work, leave entitlement and housing 
standards but, where unions existed, conditions were usually above 
the minimum requirements prescribed by the ordinance. 
In 1949, a Minimum Wages Ordinance was passed which pro-
vided for statutory fixing of wage rates for any part of the Protec-
torate. It was first used in 1950 to set minimums for the urban 
areas of Kampala and Jinja. In addition, under a new Employ-
ment Ordinance, provision was made for a Central Labour Advi-
sory Board and a series of provincial boards which were to act 
as its area sub-committees. These boards were given power "to 
fix the minimum wages to be paid to any class of workmen in the 
Protectorate as a whole, or in any part of it, subject to the appro-
val of the Governor." But, before 1959, there seemed little justifi-
cation to extend the use of these devices. The 1951 Labour 
Department Report explains why: 
"So long as the demands for labour exceed the supply, the 
somewhat cumbersome system of the legal minimum wage could 
be avoided and wages kept at reasonable levels by adjustment to 
government wage rates. As the government is the principal emplo-
yer in the country, any changes in its rates directly influence the 
\v;iges paid by private employers." (LDR, 1951, p. 17). 
In 1957, a Minimum Wages Advisory Board and Wages Coun-
cil Ordinance was passed which brought the older ordinance up to 
date and specified the membership and powers of the boards and 
councils. A modest minimum wage was instituted by statutory 
order following the report of a special commission of enquiry in 
1959. The change drew most opposition from other public emplo-
yers — the local governments and municipalities. Most large 
scale private employers were already paying above the minimum, 
and the smaller concerns probably considered that it would not be 
too difficult for them to evade the legislation. The unions seem 
to have taken little interest, although the Uganda Trades Union 
Congress issued a press statement opposing the move because it 
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would lead to retrenchment in labour and so to further unemploy-
ment. The Railway African Union objected to the idea of area 
differentials and wanted a single minimum to discourage the flow 
of labour into Kampala and Jinja. 
The idea of Wages Councils for separate industries was taken 
over f rom Kenya with the intention of building up negotiation 
machinery under official sponsorship to compensate for the lack of 
organisation on both sides. It also had the effect of overcoming the 
competitive disadvantages suffered by more liberal employers when 
they agreed to negotiate with their workers. The idea came to 
nothing at that time because of the lack of effective employers' 
organisations and the chronic shortage of Labour Department staff 
to set the new machinery in motion. Wages Councils Orders were 
made for the Road Transport Industry in 1959 and the Printing 
Industry and Cotton Ginning in 1962. In general, however, Uganda 
made little use of statutory wage fixing before independence, and 
the unions were not much affected by attempts to enforce a national 
minimum wage. 
A discussion of the legislative framework within which unions 
have developed would not be complete without reference to the 
important role of works committees. In the statutes, there is no 
direct provision for contact between the two sides of industry, but 
such contact is clearly assumed. The 1951 Colonial Labour Advi-
sory Council Memorandum emphasised the need for action on this 
assumption : 
"A sound legislative basis for trade union activity is clearly 
essential but in our view it is equally important to promote the 
development of organised machinery, whether voluntary or statu-
tory, through which workers and employers can co-operate." (CO, 
1951(b)) . 
Works committees or joint consultative councils were intended 
to provide such machinery in Uganda. The Labour Department 
intended that they should: 
"Provide not only a safety valve for the airing of grievances, 
but also a valuable channel of communication whereby manage-
ment can explain changes in conditions of employment." (LDR, 
1950, p. 14). 
In addition, in the absence of unions, the workers' representa-
tives would gain experience in methods of negotiation and the 
conduct of meetings. With the passing of the 1952 Ordinance, 
the workers' side of the works committees were permitted to 
register as employees' associations: 
"They have none of the usual trade union privileges, only the 
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legal right to exist and by such existence to acquire experience by 
which they can qualify for registration as trade unions." (LDR, 
1953, p. 18). 
Few works committees seemed to have reached this degree of 
formal organisation. The Labour Department first began advocat-
ing works committees in 1950. By 1952, 43 were in existence as 
representatives of 29,000 employees. Labour Department Reports 
claimed that, after an initial period of mutual suspicion, both sides 
realised that the committee could perform useful functions. A wide 
range of matters were discussed, covering not only welfare and 
production but also hours, leave, sick pay, wage differentials and 
other such subjects excluded from joint consultation in Britain be-
cause they are covered by other machinery. In 1951, it was noted 
that "in the early stages, the employees' side tends to concentrate on 
wages alone". (LDR, 1951, p. 16). The 1952 Report boldly asserted 
that : 
"I t would seem safe to say that joint consultation has come to 
stay and will be a permanent feature of industrial life in Uganda." 
(LDR, 1952, p. 19). 
In 1955, works committees were made compulsory in all depart-
ments employing more than 50 people in one centre. Heads of 
Departments were required to inform their members that disagree-
ment at committee level could be raised for conciliation under the 
Trades Disputes Ordinance. 
In the same year, Uganda's works committees received powerful 
support from an East Africa Royal Commission on land and 
population problems. In their report, the Commissioners claimed 
that attempts by Government to promote a system of industrial 
relations based on trade unions had not met with much success 
and were a waste of effort (CO, 1955, p. 37). 
They added: 
"By way of contrast, we have been most impressed by some of 
the recent attempts to build up works councils and joint staff com-
mittees . . . I t would be premature to pass final judgement on these 
experiments but they should be encouraged and their results care-
fully watched." (Para 139). 
This view was challenged by all three East African governors 
in their commentaries on the findings of the Commission. AH 
made much the same point. They agreed that it was wrong to sti-
mulate union growth artificially where conditions were not suitable. 
But. to quote Sir Andrew Cohen: 
"Whether they are encouraged or not, it is quite certain that 
trade unions will grow; the people themselves will come to consider 
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that they are essential and will be unlikely to accept any lesser 
form of organisation. What is important is that the trade unions as 
they develop should receive the right guidance from the Labour 
Department." (CO, 1956, p. 132). 
By 1955, the Labour Department was also coming round to 
the same view of the works committee system. Perhaps the change 
in policy was affected by the appointment of a new Labour Com-
missioner with more specialised knowledge and long experience 
with the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia. The Report for that 
year recanted the earlier assertion that the works committee had 
come to stay: 
"While works committees continue to perform a useful function, 
the fact has not been lost sight of that they will never replace 
properly constituted trade unions and that probably as more 
advanced joint consultative machinery is established they will gra-
dually disappear." (LDR, 1955, p. 17). 
As union activity increased, less emphasis was placed on works 
committees and a more appropriate balance of functions developed. 
They were no longer relied upon to prevent major disputes: 
"Experience shows that, while the committees continue to func-
tion satisfactorily when things are quiet, they tend to be by-passed 
and to have no authority over workers at times of stress when 
events lead suddenly to a strike." (LDR, 1958, p. 16). 
Some works committees still existed in 1963, mainly in govern-
ment departments. In many places, they had been restricted to 
domestic or welfare functions by the competitive growth of unions. 
Where a young union was trying to build up support f rom workers, 
it was Labour Department policy to allow the works committee 
to run down and allow the union to claim the credit for the succes-
ses of joint consultation. Once established, a young union often 
seemed to resent the existence of a competitive organisation and 
attempted to conduct all business on the basis of collective bargain-
ing with the union executive. Only in isolated cases did the union 
co-operate by having local union officials stand for election to the 
committee and then using it as a consultative arm of the union. 
I t is difficult to evaluate the importance of works committees 
in relation to the general development of trade unions. Elkan's 
detailed investigation of the operation of two works committees 
showed that the members of the workers' side tended to be repre-
sentative of only a small group so that the mass of workers made 
little use of the device to bring forward grievances or discuss 
improvements in their conditions. This experience seems to have 
been common to most committees in Uganda. Few private emplo-
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yers claimed that their efforts at joint consultation had been 
successful apart f rom isolated cases where the union co-operated. 
Perhaps this weakness is inherent in the system of entrusting 
works committees with wider activities left elsewhere to unions. 
Fawzi points out that, in this hybrid institution fulfilling the dual 
functions of joint consultation and collective bargaining: 
"The qualities required for the first set of functions are not 
necessarily those required for making a success of the second, and 
works committees would have disintegrated because of their own 
internal contradictions." (Fawzi, 1954, p. 46). 
In Uganda, as in the Sudan, the works committees did not 
disintegrate. They shed the contradictory function of collective 
bargaining when unions developed. 
The difficulties involved in the policy of sponsoring works com-
mittees were voiced at a conference of the heads of colonial labour 
departments: 
"Experience has shown that it is easier to create these local 
committees than to keep them running effectively and it might be 
thought useful in commending their formation to emphasise that 
there are certain preconditions for success — (a) a genuine desire 
on the part of the employer to make the procedure work; and (b) 
recognition by the workers that the committee is not merely a body 
for airing grievances." (CO, 1951 (c) ). 
In Uganda, the supporters of works committees seem initially 
to have lost sight of these prescriptions. The Labour Department 
went on record in favour of works committees as a permanent 
feature of industrial relations; employers tended to regard them as 
a permanent substitute for unions rather than a training ground; 
and workers certainly regarded them mainly as a body for airing 
grievances. In the absence of trade unions in most industries, this 
was probably inevitable. However, experience in many parts of 
the world has shown that works committees established by emplo-
yers do not win the same confidence of workers as unions, and 
will never receive their support if they are designed to forestall 
unionism. With the start of union activity in Uganda, the entrenched 
support for works committees proved a force which hampered 
rapid growth of voluntary collective bargaining. New unions had 
the difficult task of proving to the workers that it was in their 
interests to give them financial support instead of receiving free 
the apparently similar services of the works committees. 
This is not to deny the value of works committees in educating 
workers and employers in techniques of negotiation. Because the 
works committee could exercise no sanction against the employer, 
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an aura of paternalism was always present. Yet it was still a 
unique experience for an African employee to sit down at a table 
for negotiations with his European or Asian boss. The worker 
could learn much about the conduct of meetings, the presentation 
of argument and the techniques of bargaining in the western style. 
A number of union leaders admit that they gained valuable expe-
rience as members of the works committees they now despise. 
In retrospect, it seems that the sponsorship of works commit-
tees was a necessary and valuable Labour Department contribution 
to the early development of trade unions. The most pertinent 
criticism might seem to be that the policy was allowed to entrench 
itself and to hamper the growth of true collective bargaining when 
unions finally matured. 
In his classic study of colonial policy, J . S. Furnivall notes 
tha t : 
" In British colonies numerous regulations bear witness to the 
benevolent aspirations of government; many of them have a com-
mon characteristic — they avoid laying down definite standards ... 
and leave a considerable discretion to inspecting officers so that 
their effect depends upon the machinery for supervision." (Furni-
vall, 1948, p. 350). 
This is fair comment on Uganda's labour legislation, so it is 
necessary now to consider the personnel side and the execution of 
policy. 
The duties of members of the Labour Department related main-
ly to the enforcement of the various ordinances. A t the lowest 
level of responsibility were the labour inspectors who were con-
cerned mainly with the enforcement of the Employment Ordinance 
and not with industrial relations. They had only limited discretion 
in dealing with labour disputes but, because they visited outlying 
areas, they were useful in bringing such disputes to the notice of 
district labour officers. The labour officers were responsible for 
the first attempts at conciliation once a dispute was reported and 
for keeping the Labour Commissioner informed on subsequent 
developments. They were in close contact with both sides of 
industry and often solved problems informally before a dispute was 
reported officially. For example, they were often asked to certify 
the extent to which a union was representative of the total work 
force as a preliminary to discussion on recognition. The unions 
feared that management would victimise union members if it had 
access to their names and the management was often unwilling to 
accept the union's estimate of its own strength. Finally, the Labour 
Department officials were responsible for enforcement of official 
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policy. This once meant sponsorship of works committees by re-
commending them to employers and then attending as an observer 
to give advice. Later it involved assisting the development of 
voluntary collective bargaining and recommending, where appro-
priate, recognition of the union. 
The Registrar of Trade Unions was also involved in labour 
administration. He was concerned with the enforcement of pro-
visions of the Trade Unions Ordinance mentioned earlier relating 
to financial and administrative supervision. The Ordinance itself 
imposed certain obligations on unions such as the submission of 
annual returns and the conduct of elections by secret ballot. In 
addition, the rules of each union had to be submitted for the appro-
val of the Registrar to see that they conformed with provisions of 
the Ordinance. A schedule of the Ordinance details: "matters 
for which provision must be made in the rules of every trade 
union". Provision 13, for example, requires tha t : 
"In the case of a trade union consisting of persons engaged or 
working in more than one trade or calling suitable provision (be 
made) for the protection and promotion of each trade or calling's 
respective industrial interests." 
Throughout the period of colonial labour administration, the 
powers of the office of Registrar were rarely used. The ICFTU 
Visiting Mission in 1958 reported tha t : 
"We have been assured that in practice no inspection has taken 
place except at the request of the union itself. Though the keep-
ing of books has not been as adequate as could be wished, or as 
is prescribed by the Ordinance, the cause seems to have been 
rather bad administration than bad faith." ( ICFTU, 1958 (b), p. 4). 
This ineffectiveness was caused by grossly inadequate staffing. 
The office of Registrar came under the direction of the Adminis-
trator General who was also responsible for a diverse range of 
other functions. For many years, there was no officer who was 
able to specialise solely in trade union affairs. This meant that 
many of the safeguards written into the Ordinance had no practi-
cal effect. Unions were able to register freely without investigation 
or subsequent supervision. Demarcation disputes went unchecked 
and there was plenty of opportunity for unreal membership claims 
and financial maladministration. Employers complained that their 
workers were not being protected from irresponsible union officials 
and that there was no supervisory check to counterbalance the 
Labour Department's effort to accelerate the growth of trade 
unions. 
After a formal protest from the Federation of Uganda Emplo-
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yers, the situation improved during 1962. The Administrator 
General's Report for that year records tha t : 
"The section of the Department dealing with Trade Unions 
was considerably strengthened by the return of an officer from a 
study course on Trade Unionism in the United Kingdom who has 
since been appointed an Assistant Registrar of Trade Unions, 
together with the appointment of two full time staff in this Registry. 
Investigations can now be undertaken in the field, primarily with 
a view to assisting officials to observe the law and the provisions 
of their constitutions." (UG, 1963 (a), p. 3). 
This led to increased activity on the part of the Registrar, par-
ticularly in the supervision of union accounts and the conduct of 
elections. A number of prosecutions were instituted and there was 
a general tightening of control under statutory powers which had 
long existed but rarely been used. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the "stormy petrel" in the 
history of Uganda's labour administration — the specially appoint-
ed Industrial Relations Officer. In 1942, the Colonial Office began 
the experiment of appointing experienced British trade union offi-
cials as labour officers in the various colonial labour departments. 
They were given the task of fostering union growth and advising 
the administration on trade union affairs. In the early years, the 
system was judged to be highly successful, particularly in West 
Africa and the West Indies (TUC annual report, 1945, p. 144). 
As the plan was adopted in less developed areas, tensions in the 
system became apparent. The main difficulty lay in adjusting union 
loyalties to official responsibilities. Leading figures in the interna-
tional trade union organisations were suspicious of the arrange-
ment and an adviser to Kenya was attacked by the labour press 
and the T U C in Britain for appearing to identify himself too closely 
with official attitudes (TUC annual report, 1952, p. 351). By 
contrast, in Uganda a similar official had his contract termi-
nated because his close identification with the local union leaders 
led him into trouble with the administration. 
The heart of the problem was the lack of definition in the 
terms of appointment. The extent to which the Industrial Rela-
tions Officer was allowed "to take sides" was never made clear 
enough. The main function of the Labour Department was to play 
the role of an impartial broker in disputes between labour and 
management and the Industrial Relations Officer was normally 
attached to this department. At the same time, the Industrial 
Relations Officer had a task which specifically concerned him with 
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problems of labour organisation and brought him into close con-
tact with union leaders. Roberts points out that diplomatic skill 
was needed much more than mere union experience if the adviser 
was to retain the confidence of employers, union officials and his 
own senior officers (Roberts, 1957, p. 392). 
The experience of Uganda seems to bear out these criticisms. 
The first former trade unionist to be sent to the Uganda Labour 
Department, L. Nicklin, arrived in 1949. A tour of the coun-
try on his arrival revealed little scope for his activities so he con-
cerned himself with workers' education and the sponsorship of 
works committees as the basis for future union growth. He later 
turned his attention to technical and apprenticeship training. 
In 1958, James Brandie was appointed Industrial Relations 
Officer when his predecessor was transferred. As a former senior 
official in the mammoth Transport and General Workers Union, 
he brought with him a wealth of union experience. However, when 
he accepted the appointment, he seems to have envisaged consider-
able freedom of action rather than being subjected to the authority 
of the Labour Commissioner. 
Much of the subsequent trouble developed f rom this attitude. 
In opposition to the Labour Commissioner, Brandie held that, to 
do his job, his first loyalty must continue to be to the trade union 
movement rather than to the local colonial administration. This 
inevitably led to a series of clashes with his superiors whenever he 
attempted to undertake independent action which conflicted with 
established policy. Brandie did much valuable work in setting up 
and strengthening the machinery of collective bargaining in a num-
ber of industries. Yet his presence rapidly became intolerable to 
those in authority. His close identification with union interests 
at the expense of his official role finally led to the termination of 
his probationary contract. This touched off vigorous protests f rom 
local union leaders and politicians, but Brandie failed in his appeals 
for support from the British Labour Party and the British TUC. 
A high ranking Ugandan civil servant termed the Brandie epi-
sode a major disaster for the trade union movement in Uganda 
because it confirmed the conservatives' instinctive fear that all trade 
unionists were dangerous and unreliable. This seriously compli-
cated the task of later advisers, financed from non-government 
sources, who carried on work which Brandie had begun. The use 
of non-official advisers was clearly much more satisfactory as there 
was a clear cut separation of functions. 
Walter Bowen, perhaps unconsciously, points to the basic 
weakness of the system when he claims that "these trade union 
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advisers within the limits of their official position have done a good 
job." (Bowen, 1954, p. 8). Their official position was the very 
fact which tended to reduce their effectiveness. For as long as a 
trade union adviser remained a member of the administration, he 
would continue to be torn by two sets of loyalties. The Industrial 
Relations Officers drawn from the British union movement 
undoubtedly gave considerable assistance to the developing trade 
unions, but Ugandan experience seems to indicate that they might 
have done a better job if they had not been directly associated 
with the Labour Department. 
A survey of labour administration in Uganda during the colo-
nial era shows that policy tended to respond both to Colonial 
Office pressures and to the empirical demands of the moment. The 
Colonial Office provided the models for the legislative framework, 
but lack of local staff meant that many provisions were not enforced 
for some time. The Colonial Office warned that works committees 
~ould only serve as a temporary substitute for unions, yet some 
employers were allowed to try to make them the permanent basis 
for industrial relations. The Colonial Office advised the use of 
British trade unionists as specialist advisers, but in Uganda one 
of these officers was removed when he threatened the harmony of 
the administration. Out of this, two salient features emerge. The 
first is that, for better or for worse, Uganda's trade unions have 
been guided along the same lines as those in Britain and in other 
British territories. The second is that British colonial policy cons-
tan t ly aimed at encouraging the growth of unions. This aim may 
not a lwayshave been elnfliusiasticafly accepted T>y local adminis-
trators, but it is ridiculous to blame any weakness in Ugandan 
trade unions upon the repressive activities of the colonial regime. 
If unions in Uganda were weak at the time of independence, poli-
tical suppression was not to blame. 
C h a p t e r Four 
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES 
One of the striking features of trade union development in 
Africa has been the extent to which attitudes and structures have 
been shaped by external influences. The effect of more than half 
a century of colonial administration was the most important de-
monstration of this in Uganda and led to the adoption of a basical-
ly British pattern of union organisation. 
However, a number of other international and national agencies 
have also exerted considerable influence over developments. The 
earliest of these was the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
founded in 1919 with a set of objectives which included the estab-
lishment of internationally accepted conventions or standards of 
employment. Before the end of the Second World War, the I L O 
exerted little influence outside Europe. A report in 1944 on the 
so-called "dependent territories" concluded that this was due to 
the absence of any machinery for co-ordination between the I L O 
and the colonial administrators (ILO, 1944, p. 56). Each colonial 
power was left free to decide whether international conventions had 
any relevance to the various areas under its control. 
The process of decolonisation and the emergence of new nations 
changed this after the end of the War. Thus the Philadelphia 
Declaration of 1946 specifically related the principles of the ILO 
to the dependent territories and a series of conventions were drawn 
up to cover minimum social standards for "non-metropolitan de-
pendent territories". These covered topics such as migrant labour, 
forced labour, the employment of women and juveniles, workers 
compensation and national tripartite collaboration. For the future 
development of trade unions, the three most important were Con-
vention No. 84 concerning the Right of Association and the 
Settlement of Labour Disputes in Non-Metropolitan Territories, 
1947; Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948, and Convention No. 98 
concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Orga-
nise and to Bargain Collectively, 1949. 
There is disagreement over the extent to which British colonial 
policy was in fact influenced by these standard-setting activities 
of the ILO. At one extreme is the view of the Secretary of the 
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Overseas Employers' Federation: 
"The acceptance of these conventions for application to the 
British colonial territories . . . produced a flood of legislation de-
signed to bring the colonial laws into line . . . it is true to say that 
today the bulk of the labour law enacted in the British colonies 
owes its origin to the ILO." (Hyde-Clark, 1958 (a), p. 9). 
Roper, however, believed tha t : 
"The conventions were too minimal and general concerning 
whatever principle was being asserted; they were rarely in advance 
of Colonial Office thinking on the subject." (Interview with author, 
March 1962). 
This does not mean that the conventions were considered irre-
levant by the Colonial Office. The clear basic standards which 
they embodied were probably useful source material on which to 
base new ordinances and, as a major colonial power concerned 
to justify her administration, Britain was sensitive to the moral 
authority exercised by the ILO. Thus, in a review of the influence 
of the ILO on Nigerian legislation, the conclusion was reached 
tha t : 
"In a number of important fields, national law and practice, 
while corresponding wholly or substantially to I L O standards, have 
developed independently of the latter . . . However, in guiding colo-
nial governments, the British Colonial Office repeatedly stressed 
the importance which it attached to the implementation of ILO 
standards." (ILO, 1960, p. 43). 
As in other matters, a Colonial Office directive did not mean 
practical implementation. Many administrators believed certain 
conventions were unrealistic in view of the low level of economic 
and social maturity or because of the difficulty of enforcement. 
As a result, conventions were often noted to exist then shelved as 
"aims of policy for the future". Even this could be valuable in 
some circumstances, as argued by the reviewer of Nigerian 
legislation: 
"Though certain measures may not, at the time of their enact-
ment, have affected many people, their very acceptance meant that 
(the Government) will have tackled some of the major problems of 
an industrial society while they are still in embryo." (ILO, 1960. 
p. 26). 
In Uganda before independence, Colonial Office pressure was 
not able to persuade local administrators to ratify all the conven-
tions relating to industrial relations. In 1958, a Colonial Office 
Report to the I L O noted the extent to which the Ugandan legisla-
tion infringed the convention on Freedom of Association (No. 87), 
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mainly because of the wide powers of supervision given to the 
Registrar of Trade Unions. This failure to accept Convention 87 
in its entirety had important after-effects as, after independence, 
the new government was able drastically to curtail the influence 
of the Uganda Public Employees' Union without provoking inter-
national protests. In any case, the ILO had by then changed 
in character and was showing little desire to criticise the newly 
independent countries on the same basis as the colonial powers. 
The new states of Asia and Africa held a majority in the Annual 
Conference and the business of the conference tended to be domi-
nated by anti-colonialism and a competition for influence between 
the United States and the Communist bloc. 
A more potent influence on union development than interna-
tional standards has been the provision of financial assistance. 
This has been appreciated by the I L O itself, which has led to the 
inauguration of a wide-ranging technical assistance programme. 
In East Africa, this programme has been started by the estab-
lishment of an ILO Field Office in Dar es Salaam and the 
sending of local union officials and others to training courses in 
Geneva. Among other benefits received, Uganda also had assist-
ance from the visit of an ILO training mission for union leaders 
and another for government labour officers. 
However, the ILO was a new and relatively small donor of 
foreign aid when compared to other national and international 
organisations. This reflected the extent to which aid was moti-
vated by a desire to exert political influence, especially to win 
support for one side or the other in the ideological struggle 
between the West and the Communist bloc. In addition, 
"Underlying this ideological commitment is often a narrower 
search for national prestige and influence. Within both major 
blocs, it seems that individual national centres compete with each 
other and disagree over fundamental questions concerning the 
nature and direction of aid. Further research may show this to 
be as true of China and Russia as it is of the United States and 
Britain." (Scott, 1964 (d), p. 12). 
Predictably perhaps, the British Trades Union Congress was 
the first organisation to exert influence over developments in 
Uganda. Because the unions in colonial territories were based 
upon what can loosely be described as a "British model", the 
TUC claimed to enjoy a special relationship with them. Profes-
sor Fischer points out that, unlike the French, the British T U C 
never sought to assimilate the colonial unions into a single com-
prehensive organisation but "in practice, the TUC's influence over 
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colonial union federations is perhaps greater than would at first 
appear." (Fischer, 1961, p. 149). This influence was mainly 
exerted at the centre by contact with the policy makers at the 
Colonial Office on such bodies as the Colonial Labour Advisory 
Council. In addition, prominent unionists served on important 
commissions of enquiry and were also sent to East Africa and 
other places to serve as Labour Officers. The T U C also spon-
sored its own aid programme and did much to assist the early 
unions in Uganda through material gifts and by bringing leaders 
to Britain for training on T U C courses. 
During these early days, the American Federation of Labour 
also had an adviser present in East Africa. In keeping with 
American policy on aid, he seems mainly to have tried to win over 
key leaders with a political future and to have spent little time 
in the relative backwater of Uganda. However, this presence of 
two competing advisers was a reflection of the general disagree-
ment between the British and American leaders over the question 
of the direction of aid. A compromise was finally reached by 
which both Britain and America agreed to channel the bulk of 
their future aid through the ICFTU and its associated organisa-
tions. 
As a result, the ICFTU has been the most obvious external 
influence on union development in Uganda. It was quickly rea-
lised that the most effective assistance was that given in the form 
of on-the-spot advice and education, and full-time advisers were 
posted to Nairobi with responsibility for East and Central Africa. 
Uganda received less attention than the more highly industrialised 
areas but Mboya pays tribute to one of the advisers for his work 
in Uganda, selecting officials for overseas training and giving 
training lectures himself. (Mboya, 1963, p. 198). In 1961, an 
internal split in the Uganda T U C led to the emergence of an 
anti-ICFTU national centre at Jinja and ICFTU interest was 
increased. An American negro was posted to Uganda and was 
successful in defeating the threat of a permanent split in the 
movement. In other fields he was less successful. 
When he went home on leave, he was not permitted to return 
by the Uganda government and his place was taken by an able 
and more diplomatic African, who subsequently entered the 
Ministry of Labour in Malawi. 
A more significant influence on union growth was the presence 
of the ICFTU's African Labour College in Kampala. As far back 
as 1951, the Colonial Office had accepted that localised education 
was the most efficient method of union training, but the idea was 
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adopted by the ICFTU only in 1957. In May 1958, it was decided 
that the site should be Kampala, because "Uganda is indisputably 
African", "is well served by rail and air communication", and 
"is close to the multi-racial University of East Africa." (Ham-
merton, 1961, p. 9). In fact, no close links have been develop-
ed with the university despite the obvious value of collabora-
tion to both sides and Uganda is not especially well placed for 
communications. A n important motive not cited for diplomatic 
reasons, was that the movement in Uganda was one of the weakest 
in English-speaking Africa and would thus derive most benefit 
f rom the presence of the College in terms of prestige and access 
to advisers. 
The College begun operation in November, 1958, and conduct-
ed a constant series of training courses varying in length from a 
week-end to six months. The curriculum aimed at a basic techni-
cal education for lower-range union officials such as branch secre-
taries, rather than concerning itself with full-time national leaders. 
A Research Section of the ICFTU African Regional Organisation 
was attached to the College and helped in the preparation of 
claims and the production of relevant statistics. 
Initially the College staff were drawn on short-term secondment 
from larger European and North American unions. The diversity 
of their experience at first gave rise to a considerable problem of 
co-ordination as each country had its own solution to offer to 
African problems, and lecturers often did not stay long enough 
to find out whether or not their own theories had any relevance 
to an African situation. This problem eased as the staff came to 
be drawn mainly from Africans. In its place, another appeared. 
Under the terms of the agreement with Government on the setting 
up of the College, the staff were forbidden to use the local unions 
as a testing ground for their theories and were required to steer 
clear of involvement in local affairs. The first Principal realised 
that the College would not survive if it lost its reputation for 
impartiality and refused to involve himself in such issues as the 
Brandie case. In practice, it proved difficult to restrain the staff 
from involving themselves in domestic issues, especially the non-
Europeans. Since independence the more radical members of the 
governing party have expressed hostility towards the College and 
the belief in free collective bargaining for which it stands. As 
pressure continued to be exerted to cause the Ugandan movement 
to disaffiliate f rom the ICFTU, the position of the College and its 
staff became more difficult and there were even doubts about its 
continued existence (Scott, 1964 (b) and 1965 (b)). 
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The influence of the ICFTU, and the College in particular, was 
readily apparent to the most superficial observer. All unions of 
any significance boasted at least one member of the executive 
who had been on a College course and this experience was often 
shared with the African ex-unionists on the other side of the 
bargaining table. In addition, union leaders were coached for 
key negotiations by the ICFTU adviser and used information pro-
vided by the Research Department. The College allowed African 
leaders to draw upon experience in more developed societies with-
out the wasteful process of actually sending the leaders to the 
countries involved. The effect of this training is seen in the 
increasing use of comprehensive collective agreements modelled 
on those in use in Sweden and North America and a greater 
willingness to accept a system supported by legal sanctions. The 
training at the College was sometimes criticised for being con-
cerned too much with the mechanics of organisation and direct 
action without paying enough attention to the union's wider res-
ponsibility to the employer and to the State. This criticism is 
probably valid but, on balance, training is preferable to ignorance 
and training in Africa had been shown to be preferable to train-
ing elsewhere. Because the ICFTU was quick to realise this they 
were able to develop an institution which proved an important 
influence on union development in Uganda. 
Associated with the ICFTU, but significantly different from it, 
were a group of organisations known collectively as the Interna-
tional Trade Secretariats (ITS). An ITS is an international fede-
ration of unions concerned with a specific field of activity. Of 
the seventeen associated with the ICFTU, nine have been active 
in Uganda: Building, Petroleum, Plantations, Transport, Posts 
and Telegraphs, Civil Service, Teachers and Clerical Workers. The 
structure of these organisations is basically similar to that of a 
large national union. Policy is determined at a Congress, usually 
tri-ennially, and administration left to a General Council meeting 
annually and to an Executive Committee which controls a small 
full-time secretariat. In addition to overseas organisational activi-
ties, an ITS acts as a clearing-house for the exchange of new 
information among its affiliates and represents their views on other 
international organisations such as the ILO. The established 
organisations such as the International Transportworkers Federa-
tion and the Public Services International have a history going 
back to the turn of the century, while the newest is the Interna-
tional Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers, 
founded in 1960. 
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In Uganda, the earliest ITS in the field was that of the 
transport workers. From 1957 onwards, the President of the 
Railway African Union was receiving both financial and material 
aid and was also able to call upon the services of a permanent 
adviser in Nairobi. In Chapter 6, it will be seen that the inter-
vention of a mission from the International Transportworkers 
Federation and the promise of strike funds exercised a key influ-
ence over the settlement of the major strikes of 1960. 
One of the two most active ITS's in Uganda was the Public 
Services International (PSI). Following a Visiting Mission to 
East Africa, advisers were dispatched to all three territories. In 
Uganda, Charles Franken from Holland set about the task of 
creating a single national public employees union from a few weak 
staff associations and a handful of enthusiastic leaders scattered 
in different organisations all over the country. The account of 
his efforts is given in Chapter 10. 
A similar task faced the advisers sent by the International 
Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers. This 
international was an outgrowth of the ICFTU Plantation Com-
mittee dealing with the ILO and, because most of its potential 
affiliates were in under-developed areas, the finance for the venture 
was found by the ICFTU itself. Ugandan plantation unions were 
beginning to emerge separately in the tea estates of Fort Portal 
and the sugar estates near Jinja when the first adviser arrived. 
An amalgamation was arranged and the union was set upon its 
feet by the ministrations of a number of advisers and the discreet 
use of financial assistance and overseas scholarships. 
The other ITS's have been less active in Uganda, sometimes 
because their affiliates elsewhere cannot afford to finance long-
term assistance or because African countries do not give much 
scope for the recruitment of new affiliates. A most striking 
example of what can be achieved with the right people was given 
in 1963 when an adviser from the building and woodworkers 
international appeared in Uganda and created a viable union out 
of the shell of two defunct organisations, thus reshaping the whole 
employment structure of the building industry. 
The most pressing problem facing aid organisations was the 
need for co-ordination to prevent wastage. At the top level, rela-
tions between the ICFTU and the ITS's were often strained. The 
ITS's have a long tradition of vigorously defended autonomy and 
this sometimes interfered with plans to co-ordinate and rationalise 
plans for overseas aid. This was particularly so when it was felt 
that the ICFTU was exercising absolute control over a special 
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aid fund to which all organisations had contributed. On the spot 
in Africa, relations between the various organisations were gene-
rally better. Advisers were interchanged between organisations or 
shared responsibilities, although strife occasionally developed 
where there was a clash of personalities which could be translated 
into organisational rivalry. 
Nevertheless, the main problem actually 'in the field' was not 
between the various internationals aligned with the ICFTU but 
the meddlings of other outside organisations, mainly the national 
centres of non-African countries trying to make their mark in the 
field of international goodwill. In practice, these "outsiders" 
often mis-directed their aid or disrupted the comprehensive pro-
grammes of the more experienced organisations. For example, 
the adviser sent out by the Woodworkers and Builders Interna-
tional complained that the Uganda T U C had allocated a Bulga-
rian scholarship to the key official of the newly-formed union, just 
when that official was going to be most needed. Other chapters 
indicate how a rapid decline can occur once the leading figures 
have departed on an overseas jaunt and much of the blame for 
providing these trips lay with the smaller organisations and nation-
al centres. Perhaps they felt that it was some return for an 
investment in foreign aid if the African leader could be brought 
back home as a show-piece and, at the same time, made to see 
how superior was the particular system of union methods used 
in the donor country, whether Israel or Austria, or anywhere else. 
The allocation of these "scholarships" was frequently left to the 
local national centre in the mistaken belief that this would lead 
to fair distribution. In fact, the local T U C leaders tended to 
regard overseas trips as a form of patronage to be distributed for 
personal advantage even though the unions concerned might suffer 
as a result. Because both donor and recipient were motivated by 
these attitudes, it was not possible to dissuade organisations from 
continuing this uneconomic and inefficient type of aid activity. 
A problem, second only to co-ordination, was the difficulty of 
finding the right men to act as advisers. Most union officials 
in Europe and America could not easily take time off for a period 
in Africa which might exceed a year, and the prospect of working 
long hours under primitive conditions was usually unattractive. 
The result was that advisers were often nearing retirement when 
they visited Africa and lacked the necessary vigour and adaptabi-
lity. In addition, they faced problems of basic organisation on a 
mammoth scale never encountered in their home countries and 
complicated by factors such as tribalism quite outside their experi-
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ence. Tact was also a quality sometimes found lacking among 
the advisers. Some organisations suffered because their advisers 
could not come to terms with the social environment within 
which the unions functioned. Attitudes shaped by the doctrine of 
class warfare were not calculated to ease the delicate task of pro-
moting the growth of a new union. However, in general, the 
advisers sent by overseas organisations realised that the most 
effective way of making progress was to try to win the confidence 
of both sides and to convince the employers that concessions to 
strengthen unionism were in their own interests and not a sign 
of weakness. 
Nothing has so far been written about aid from non-Western 
sources. Because no statistics are available, the extent and nature 
of aid from the Communist bloc can only be guessed at on the 
basis of visual evidence. In Uganda, the impression was that aid 
tended to be concentrated in the hands of individual leaders who 
had little backing from any industrial organisations. Thus leaders 
of the unsupported "splinter organisation", the Uganda Federa-
tion of Labour, went on frequent visits to China and Eastern 
Europe and returned with control over funds and transport with 
which to challenge the monopoly of the ICFTU and the Uganda 
TUC. Would-be union leaders from the Youth Wing of the 
Uganda Peoples Congress also went on similar courses. 
Pan-Africanism is a much stronger counter to ICFTU influence, 
and this fact has been noted by leaders of the pro-Communist 
World Federation of Trade Unions. Because this latter organi-
sation had few affiliates in Africa, it realised that the objective 
of defeating the ICFTU could best be served by backing a neutra-
list Pan-African organisation. This organisation, the All-African 
Trade Union Federation, was founded in Ghana because many 
African leaders resented the extent to which the ICFTU retained 
financial control over its regional organisation. At a conference 
in Casablanca in 1961, it was laid down that all members of 
the All-African Federation must sever their links with all other 
internationals, a move clearly directed against the ICFTU and its 
affiliated secretariats. This led to protests from the East African 
leaders and the Nigerians that this was an infringement of the 
right of each national centre to decide upon its own affiliations. 
Because East African leaders resisted pressures to break their 
connections with the ICFTU, the All-African organisation made 
little progress in this area. In Uganda, the 1961 split in the 
UTUC was related to the attendance of two leaders at the inaugu-
ral conference of the All-African Trade Union Federation, but as 
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Chapter 11 shows, the foundation of the breakaway organisation, 
the Uganda Federation of Labour, was related to personal and 
regional jealousies rather than genuine ideological differences over 
the role of the ICFTU. Nevertheless, the split was fostered by 
the All-African Trade Union Federation and attempts were made 
to recruit discontented and ambitious leaders looking for an 
alternative outlet for their energies. 
After independence, the situation changed as the ruling party 
began to take an active interest in the relations between the 
Ugandan union movement and international organisations. A new 
national centre emerged which challenged the monopoly position 
of the U T U C and affiliated itself with the Ghana-based A A T U F . 
The extent of financial aid from A A T U F to the new body 
remained secret but was clearly not of the same magnitude as aid 
received from the ICFTU and its associated organisations. This 
accorded with the aims of the political leaders in Uganda who 
resented the degree of outside interference in the union movement 
made possible by this financial assistance. International aid had 
played a key role in union growth before independence but it 
seemed likely that the future trend would be towards greater gov-
ernment intervention to force the unions to rely upon their own 
limited resources. 
C h a p t e r S ix 
THE RAILWAY AFRICAN UNION 
The first of the case studies of particular unions is concerned 
with the Railway African Union (RAU). This was not only the 
oldest but also the most consistently active union in Uganda. 
The history of the union demonstrates a number of features com-
mon in Uganda unions — particularly the divisive effect of tribal 
loyalties, the value of international assistance and the problem of 
irresponsible leadership. 
There were also two special problems associated with the 
growth of the RAU. The first arose f rom the inter-territorial 
character of the railways administration. The East African Rail-
ways and Harbours Administration was under the direction of 
first the East Africa High Commission and later the East African 
Common Services Organisation (EACSO). As all trade unions 
were required to comply with territorial ordinances regarding 
registration, there was no provision for inter-territorial organisa-
tions. Thus, in the railways, three African unions dealt with the 
same employer but could not legally amalgamate into a single 
body. 
This anomalous situation would have been more tolerable 
for the unions had all three territories been governed by similar 
labour legislation, but this was not the case. Wide variations 
existed between the labour ordinances, particularly concerning 
the area of government activity classified as essential services. The 
1949 Ordinance in Uganda had a relatively short list of essential 
services, but both Kenya and Tanganyika had a much more com-
prehensive list including dock and railway services. In 1958, the 
International Transportworkers Federation adopted two resolu-
tions at their Annual Congress which deplored this legislation 
which restricted strike activity among the unions of their affiliated 
workers by making all disputes subject to compulsory arbitration. 
Before the legislation was changed in 1959, the ludicrous situa-
tion existed in which one of the three unions dealing with the 
same employer could back its demands by threats of direct action 
while the two other unions representing precisely the same grades 
of employee could not. 
The continuing absence of inter-territorial registration was a 
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constant source of irritation and criticism. As far back on 1956, 
all three unions were pressing for some form of joint recognition 
and common negotiation machinery. In January, 1957, it was 
reported that the Colonial Secretary was investigating the pos-
sibility of introducing legislative reform to facilitate inter-territo-
rial industrial relations. In July, 1957, Sir Arthur Kirby, cn 
vacating the post of railways general manager, publicly criticised 
legislation requiring separate registration and claimed that 
employers would prefer to negotiate with a single inter-territorial 
union. However, nothing was done, and there seems to have been 
a general reluctance on the part of management to concede full 
negotiating rights to the unions. In January, 1957, an All-line 
Joint Staff Advisory Council was set up but received little support 
f rom the African unions because its functions were purely 
advisory. 
A Commission of Enquiry in 1960 strongly supported the 
unions' case for an inter-territorial labour department and joint 
negotiation machinery with the management of the common 
services. The Commissioner agreed tha t : 
" In the circumstances surrounding an inter-territorial service, 
it is essential that provision be made for the speedy settlement 
of industrial disputes. I find it difficult to understand why, having 
set up inter-territorial services such as the railways, the three 
Governments cannot provide them with the essential inter-territo-
rial machinery required for the settlement of disputes". (EAHC, 
1960, p. 28). 
The second problem hampering the development of the com-
mon services' unions was the existence of three racially exclusive 
associations in each territory. Because trained local personnel 
were not available, the railways were originally constructed and 
operated by expatriate Asians and Europeans. This in turn led 
to the growth of a salary scale structured according to race and 
to non-African associations pledged to retain the differentials in 
the interests of their members. This meant that management dealt 
with not one, but with nine organisations representing the labour 
force. Where specifically African interests were involved, any 
African representatives could be defeated by a combination 
between management and the other races. 
In Uganda, the European Association was never very powerful 
as its relatively few members were widely dispersed. Most Euro-
peans were employed in management and maintained informal 
contact on personnel matters through a liaison officer based in 
Kampala. Because the association no longer elected formal office 
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bearers, it was later excluded from joint negotiation procedures. 
The Railway Asian Union, like its African counterpart, first 
existed in Uganda as a branch of the Kenyan organisation. It 
registered separately as an autonomous union in 1948, and reached 
a peak membership of more than 250 in 1958. During the 1959 
strikes, the Asians made themselves unpopular in Uganda by 
staying at work and siding with the Europeans instead of following 
the example of their counterparts in Tanganyika and refusing to 
carry out duties normally assigned to Africans. Since independ-
ence a few Asians transferred to the African union, but the bulk 
were discouraged by the militant racialism of the African leaders. 
This contrasted with the amalgamation undertaken voluntarily 
between the two racial unions in the Ugandan postal services and 
the general non-racial structure enforced under labour legislation 
in Tanganyika. The Uganda Government, despite pressure from 
the Railway African Union, refused to copy Tanganyika with 
regard to the continued racial separation in the railways. The 
Government argued that amalgamation would eventually occur 
without being forced and that the African leaders could speed 
it up, if they wished to, by adopting less racialist policies. 
Earlier, it was noted that the railwaymen in Uganda continued 
to be members of a union based in Kenya until 1955. This 
meant that Kampala, the only centre of organised activity, was a 
branch of the Kenya and Uganda Railway African Staff Union. 
It also meant that the Uganda branch was covered by the Kenyan 
labour legislation which became increasingly restrictive during the 
period of the 'Mau M a u emergency. In 1952, Humphries Luande 
rose to the leadership of the organisation in Uganda, which he 
has directed ever since. He later sought the advice of the new 
Government Industrial Relations Officer, Nicklin, and with 
his help set about establishing a separate organisation. In May, 
1955, the "Railway African Union (Uganda)" was registered. The 
choice of name reflects three intentions: dropping "staff" from 
ihe title emphasised that this was not merely an advisory asso-
ciation for higher groups; "Afr ican" reflected a conscious racial 
exclusiveness to match the Asian union; and the structure of 
•he wording was intended to facilitate any change to a Railway 
African Union (East Africa). 
At first the union developed slowly under the moderating 
guidance of Nicklin and a full-time industrial relations officer 
appointed by the railway management. It seems to have confined 
itself mainly to conducting individual grievances as management 
declined to engage in wage negotiations. Because of the nature 
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of railway employment, the workers are relatively easy to organise 
because they are concentrated on housing estates and easily reach-
ed in outlying areas by the railway itself. At the time of first 
registration, the union claimed 951 members and this had 
increased to 1,500 by the end of the following year. Very few 
members paid any subscriptions because a collection system had 
not been organised, and no branch organisations existed outside 
Kampala. 
Yet the R A U seems to have compared favourably with other 
union organisations. The 1956 Labour Department Report noted 
that the R A U continued to be the biggest and most active union in 
Uganda (LDR, 1956, p. 16) and a unionist f rom Kenya noted 
in 1957 that "none of the workers' organisations deserve credit, 
with the exception of the Railway African Union." (Uganda 
Argus, 27 February, 1957). In the same year, the union first 
became aware of the possibility of taking advantage of interna-
tional funds. Following a visit f rom executives of the Interna-
tional Transportworkers Federation, the R A U announced its affi-
liation and was rewarded with a grant of £100. This allowed 
the establishment of an office in a disused garage provided by 
management and the first moves towards forming branches in 
workshops outside Kampala. 
During 1958 and 1959, the union made considerable progress 
with the help of overseas aid. A memorandum submitted to 
Walter Hood of the British T U C detailed the obstacles the union 
faced. These included the illiteracy of most workers, their ignor-
ance of trade unionism because of the lack of information, the 
lack of social security to encourage stability in the work force, 
and the obstruction by management in transferring able leaders 
and refusing time off for training. 
Financial and material aid came to the union from the inter-
national and also from the British T U C which provided salaries 
for two full-time officials — Luande as President, and an organis-
ing secretary. This aid continued spasmodically until December. 
1960 when the British T U C announced the termination of its 
grant and congratulated the Ugandan union on its financial self-
sufficiency. 
In 1958, on the advice of the Labour Department, a system 
of dues collection by a band of travelling officials was introduced 
but was not immediately successful. At the end of 1959, the union 
claimed over 4,000 members, but the accounts submitted to the 
Registrar reveal that only 540 were fully paid-up. By 1960, the 
system was working with a reasonable degree of efficiency. Month-
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ly newsletters were duplicated and circulated which showed col-
lections f rom each branch. A maximum of 15 branches collected 
monthly amounts varying between Shs. 1,800 and Shs. 2,400. 
At the end of 1960, the union secured a valuable concession 
when management permitted collectors to travel with the pay train 
to rural areas. This allowed the union to collect dues when 
workers received their wages. In 1962, the management finally 
agreed to a check-off method of subscription collection after long 
negotiations in which safeguards against victimisation of non-
members were demanded. This greatly relieved the administra-
tive burden of the union and full-time collectors could be replaced 
by clerical staff at headquarters. 
An important influence on the development of the union from 
1958 onwards was James Brandie, the trade union adviser attach-
ed to the Labour Department. Brandie quickly summed up the 
potential in Uganda and saw that the R A U and Luande offered 
the most hope for effective union activity. He admits to giving 
intensive unofficial coaching to Luande — against the wishes of 
the Labour Commissioner — and certainly many of the RAU's 
press statements bear witness to the influence of Brandie's sophis-
ticated prose. In a press statement answering objections by 
management about his relationship with the union, Brandie stated 
that he : 
"Attended R A U meetings by invitation as an observer and was 
available to give advice . . . The union was supported financially 
by the British T U C . . . As a British T U C officer working in 
Uganda, the T U C normally relied on (him) to see that the money 
was properly spent." (Uganda Argus, 6 August, 1959). 
The bulk of union members, and a high percentage of the 
railway work force, came from the Western tribes of Kenya and 
ethnically related groups in the east and north of Uganda. As 
all workers were subject to transfer among all three territories, 
when the railway extended to Uganda the skilled and experienced 
workers were all drawn from Kenya. Because they had had more 
experience with union activity, Kenyans provided all the early 
leaders in the R A U and only recently have any Ugandans reached 
high executive posts. In common with other unions, most branch 
leaders come from clerical rather than mechanical occupations be-
cause of their better command of English and general organisation 
techniques. 
More than any other union in Uganda, the history of the R A U 
was dominated by one man — Humphries Luande. Although a 
Samia, born just over the border in Kenya, Luande is revered as 
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the father of the union movement in Uganda. His experience in 
the railways as a clerk and telegraphist stretched f rom 1941 until 
1958, when he resigned to accept a full-time post in the union. 
This move virtually assured his security in office as, unlike his 
competitors and opponents, he was no longer subject to sudden 
transfers to other areas. It will be seen that, where management 
wished to avoid a leadership split, the use of a transfer proved 
a valuable device. 
Continuing resistance to Luande's leadership came from mem-
bers of the Luo tribe. In the railways, the Luo were the largest 
single group of employees but, perhaps in reaction to Luo solida-
rity, the other Kenyan tribes, especially the Samia and the Luhya. 
combined to keep the Luo group from taking control of the RAU. 
On three occasions, the Luo tried to assert themselves without 
success. On each occasion, a basically tribal rivalry could be 
concealed beneath more legitimate complaints about the union 
leadership. The first split (1959) developed initially out of one of 
the many disputes between the R A U and the Uganda TUC, and 
a personal quarrel between Luande and Peter Okatch, the R A U 
Vice-President and TUC General-Secretary. Okatch was finally 
pushed out of the union because he refused to back the R A U 
withdrawal f rom the Uganda TUC. 
In the meantime, Omolo, another Luo, had resigned as Trea-
surer on the grounds of Luande's financial mismanagement and 
general inefficiency. As Treasurer, Omolo tried to suspend pay-
ment of the President's salary and allowances (from the British 
TUC) pending an enquiry into alleged financial irregularities. He 
was not backed by the executive and resigned with the threat 
of founding an alternative union. Okatch backed these allega-
tions but refused to support the projected new union, the Uganda 
Railway Workers Congress. Although management announced 
its refusal to recognise any split f rom the RAU, Omolo claimed 
widespread support for his organisation and other Luo branch 
leaders in the R A U pledged their support. After an incident in 
which rival groups fought to control a union meeting, manage-
ment seem to have decided to act to prevent large scale tribal 
disturbance. A month after the foundation of his new organisa-
tion, Omolo was transferred to Kisumu and the union lost its 
impetus. 
The second split occurred later in 1959 during the major 
strike of that year which is discussed in detail later. Another 
Luo, Aguttu-Dullo, had disagreed with Luande's decision to strike 
because there had been no consultation. He caused his suppor-
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lers at Namasagali Branch to continue working until Luande him-
self appeared and won them over. Dullo had resigned and 
sought an opportunity to challenge Luande again. This chance 
came in January 1960, when a management circular suggested the 
reformation of the existing employees' associations on the basis 
of four non-racial unions based on salary gradings. Luande 
objected to the management's interference which aimed at weaken • 
ing the solidarity of the single union for Africans. However, Dullo 
took up the idea with a proposal for a non-racial National Union 
of Railwaymen to cover the middle salary range of supervisory 
staff, leaving only the lower grades to the RAU. Luande objected 
violently to the proposal but the management seem to have favour-
ed what was in essence their own suggestion and the proposed 
registration of the new union was gazetted. The Registrar must 
have disagreed with the management, however, because two months 
later the request for registration was refused because it was held 
by the Registrar that, in the terms of the 1952 ordinance: 
"Another trade union already registered was sufficiently repre-
sentative of the whole or a substantial proportion of the interests 
in respect of which applicants sought registration." (Section 16). 
The R A U applauded, the management refused to comment, 
and Dullo applied without success for readmission to the union 
he had previously opposed. 
The final tribal disagreement never reached the proportions of 
the earlier disputes. At the Jinja annual delegates conference in 
December, 1960, the Kampala executive were expelled for threaten-
ing to secede if Luande was not removed f rom office. They 
subsequently refused to recognise Luande's election because of his 
previous unconstitutional behaviour and sought intervention from 
the Uganda T U C and the International Transportworkers Federa-
tion. A circular was sent from Kampala to all branches, again 
charging misuse of union funds by the President. Luande's response 
was to threaten to ask the much maligned management to dismiss 
them from employment as troublemakers. Subsequently Luande 
called a branch meeting at Kampala himself and effectively res-
tored his authority. 
Since 1961, tension has continued to exist between the Luo 
and other Kenyan tribes. Where a Luo succeeded in getting 
elected to a branch executive post, this trouble sometimes came 
out into the open and allegations were made publicly about anti-
Luo discrimination in the union's activities. It was this fact, 
more than any other, which explains the apparently extremist 
position adopted by Luande in his later dealings with manage-
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ment. After the 1959 strike and the resulting change in negotia-
tion machinery and management attitudes, the threat to the union 
leaders came not f rom management but from tribal pressures 
within the union. 
The 1959 strike in Uganda, and the associated disputes in 
Kenya and Tanganyika, was the turning point in the history of 
the railway unions in East Africa. 
Union co-ordination had increased after the 1958 reform of the 
essential services legislation in Tanganyika and Kenya. During 
August, 1959, all three African unions withdrew from the Joint 
Staff Advisory Committee to exert pressure for improvement in 
the machinery. In a letter to the Uganda Regional Representa-
tive of the railways management, Luande gave three reasons for 
the union's dissatisfaction: the lack of recognition of full bar-
gaining rights; the delays arising from the over-centralisation of 
decision-making in Nairobi; and the refusal of management to 
follow the lead of the Uganda Government by producing a clear 
policy statement in favour of Africanisation. 
A month later, the leaders of the three East African unions 
attended a conference at Mwanza which christened itself the 
National Congress of Railwaymen. The leaders pressed for a 
reform in the railways' industrial relations machinery which would 
allow regional disputes to be settled without reference to the 
General Manager and inter-territorial disputes to be settled by a 
joint negotiating committee under an independent chairman. 
Resolutions of the Congress also criticised the weakness of the 
non-African staff leaders and expressed a lack of confidence in 
the General Manager. In retrospect, it seems likely that the 
leaders also decided on a policy of co-ordinated strike action 
through deliberate provocation. 
After the Mwanza conference, all the unions took a much 
stronger line in their dealings with management. When manage-
ment withdrew recognition of the branch secretary at Namasa-
gali, for an abusive and insulting letter, the union declared a 
dispute on the grounds of "this unwarranted interference into 
the domestic affairs of the union". (Uganda Argus, 29 September, 
1959). Amid strike threats, the dispute dragged on for a month 
with the union refusing to compromise by withdrawing the offensive 
letter and guaranteeing the official's future behaviour in return 
for re-instatement of recognition. 
At the October General Meeting, the union began collections 
for a strike fund and threatened direct action if its wage claim 
was not immediately met. When the Regional Representative 
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pointed out that no claim had been submitted, one was hastily 
prepared. The union also declared a dispute when management 
began circulating questionnaires to stationmasters for a study of 
variations in work intensities between central and remote stations 
with the intention of adjusting the length of spells of duty. The 
management held that this idea had been approved some time 
ago by the union delegates at the advisory council and, in any 
case, the issue fell within the management's own prerogative until 
conclusions were reached. Nevertheless, the union declared a 
dispute because it had not been consulted before management 
communicated directly with union members. In a fiery press 
statement at the end of October, Luande could thus threaten strike 
action over three issues — refusal to negotiate on a wage claim, 
victimisation of a union official and interference in the internal 
communications of the union. 
Similar tactics were being adopted in Kenya, and the gathering 
storm broke there first. The union had called for an independent 
enquiry into the activities of an over-conscientious European 
supervisor. When this was refused, the union went on strike and 
23,000 men stayed home. In Uganda, Luande had pressed the 
Uganda TUC to back his own demands with the threat of a 
general strike. This failed when three major unions threatened 
to withdraw rather than support such a move. When the Kenya 
R A U went on strike, Luande agreed to bring out the Ugandan 
union in support, but again failed to carry others with him. 
Branch leaders refused to co-operate because the issue was insigni-
ficant and local and did not involve questions of policy affecting 
other areas. 
On November 19th, 1959, the Uganda railwaymen finally came 
out on strike in pursuit of their own demands for a pay increase. 
Management refused to begin negotiations until the workers 
returned and appealed for support against the misleading activi-
ties of the union officials. However, on the first day of the strike, 
the Labour Department estimated that 5,500 men were absent, 
in a total labour force of 6,000. With the strike so well supported, 
Luande felt strong enough to reject the compromise offer arranged 
by Brandie, his mentor in the Labour Department. As the union 
had proved its solidarity behind the leaders, Brandie suggested 
that an offer be made to return to work if pay negotiations began 
immediately. Luande rejected this because of the continuing 
success of the strike and his hopes for wider support from other 
unions. 
Brandie showed himself a better judge of events than Luande, 
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as two days later newspaper reports told of the beginning of the 
collapse of the strike. Two stations had re-opened with African 
workers and support was growing for the splinter organisation 
started by Dullo with the backing of management. Events in 
Kenya also played a part. When the Uganda union came out to 
back a wage claim, the Kenyans also added pay demands onto 
their original list of grievances without making any pretence of 
negotiation beforehand. This lost the union the sympathy of 
government and the strike finally collapsed completely just as the 
strain was beginning to tell in Uganda. 
By December 1st, the majority of workers were back in Uganda 
also, and Luande offered the compromise suggested a week earlier 
by Brandie. On December 4th, work was resumed and manage-
ment began the long delayed negotiations on the wage claim 
submitted two months earlier. Editorial comment in the local 
newspaper pointed to the general public apathy regarding the 
strike and the way in which the strike had weakened the union's 
case by demonstrating the low productivity of the African workers. 
A skeleton staff had managed by hard work to keep the majority 
of services functioning efficiently. The commentary concluded 
that "The strike was considered by many people to be misguided 
both in its conception and in its execution." (Uganda Argus, 28 
November, 1959). This ignored the fact that attention had been 
focused on the shortcomings of the industrial relations machinery 
in the railways and that the bulk of the workers were ready to 
support the complaints of the union leaders. I t was nearly a 
year before the benefits of the strike became apparent. 
In the meantime, the discussions on wage claims broke down 
after the union refused to accept an offer of a Shs. 6 / - per month 
increase in the minimum rate. This increase was later passed 
on unilaterally by the railways management at the same time as 
a joint union meeting in Nairobi submitted a demand for a 
uniform increase over all three territories. I t was left to Tanga-
nyika to back up this claim by direct action as the leaders in 
Uganda and Kenya realised that their members could not partici-
pate in a second strike so soon after the first. At this point, 
representatives of the ICFTU and the International Transport-
workers Federation intervened and offered to act as conciliators 
in the Tanganyika dispute. 
In Uganda, the deadlock in negotiations was broken by this 
move and both sides agreed to go to conciliation also. Sensibly, 
it was later agreed that all three disputes be referred to the same 
conciliator, Professor Walker of Makerere College. At a meeting 
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held in Nairobi, the union leaders were persuaded to accept a 
Shs. 10/- rise in return for a small cut in leave. This was later 
repudiated by Luande who encouraged the R A U executive to 
override his own decision. Apparently this was instigated by the 
Tanganyikan union and the international advisers who wished to 
press for a totally independent enquiry into the railways' negotia-
tion machinery. They finally had their way at a further confer-
ence in Dar es Salaam in April. The Shs. 10/- increase was 
accepted together with the management's agreement to an enquiry 
commission appointed by the Colonial Secretary. 
On August 16th, 1960, the Colonial Secretary announced the 
appointment of Mr. H. A. Whitson as Commissioner of Enquiry. 
Whitson had acted as secretary to the Guillebaud Enquiry in Bri-
tain and was also a senior conciliation officer in the British Minis-
try of Labour. His terms of reference were: 
"To carry out an enquiry into the state of industrial relations 
in the East African Railways and Harbours Administration, with 
particular reference to the nature and suitability of the machinery 
needed for sound industrial relations." 
Each union submitted evidence in the form of long memo-
randa in addition to a joint submission which dealt with 
general problems, especially the need for some form of inter-
territorial union co-ordination and negotiation machinery. The 
Uganda submission was a long and detailed document. It made 
six general points which repeated complaints made during the 
strike — the weakness of advisory machinery dominated by a 
non-African majority, the demand for full negotiation rights, the 
abolition of a racial wage structure, a clear policy statement, on 
Africanisation, the recognition of the union's right to present 
individual grievances to management, and a more equitable 
distribution of profits through increased wages for African emplo-
yees. These complaints were backed up by a long recitation of 
specific abuses, covering promotion policy, housing, pensions and 
productivity. A call was made for regional Joint Industrial 
Councils to supersede the advisory structure in existence and the 
management was criticised for allegedly sponsoring a splinter 
organisation to weaken the union. In contrast to the original 
wage claim lodged a year earlier, this submission was carefully 
thought out, skilfully drafted and backed by a wealth of verifiable 
evidence. 
The Whitson Report seems to have been much influenced by 
these memoranda, but placed the issues they raised into a more 
rational perspective. On the whole, the Report favoured increased 
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union activity and laid the basis for a new industrial relations 
structure based upon genuine collective bargaining. 
Discussing the existing situation, the Report noted that irres-
ponsible union behaviour had discouraged management from 
accepting the full implications of the growth of a strong organisa-
tion. This was deplored and management was urged to work 
with rather than positively against the union, showing tolerance 
for the inevitable lack of experience and training. Whitson also 
urged that the unions themselves should help pay for expenses 
involved in the operation of new industrial machinery instead of 
expecting management's assistance on costs as an automatic right. 
Regarding this machinery, the Report complained of over-centra-
lisation of management responsibilities, the lack of a specialist 
personnel department and the gap between the inter-territorial 
advisory council and the departmental works committees. The 
unions' claim for territorial councils and negotiation rather than 
merely advisory functions was also supported. 
The issue of African advancement was discussed in relation 
to the earlier recommendations of the Lidbury Commission (CO, 
1954, Para 609) in favour of a non-racial salary structure. The 
management were criticised for not maintaining adequate commu-
nications with the union which would have eased criticism about 
specific grievances. The Report called for a modification of the 
attitude of the management and a formal structure for the investiga-
tion of specific complaints regarding salary gradings and promo-
tion. 
The second section of the Report recommended the complete 
renovation of the existing industrial relations machinery. An 
inter-territorial Central Joint Council was suggested as the peak 
of the pyramid, with full negotiation powers subject only to 
authority of the inter-territorial political body. Beneath this. 
Territorial Councils were to deal with disputes of a more local 
nature, and, beneath these, Local Staff Committees were to possess 
consultative functions and act as a channel for specific grievances 
up to the territorial level. Two union objections were overruled 
— the Central and Territorial Councils remained multi-racial, and 
the Local Staff Committees were to be elected by all workers 
rather than nominated by the union. Detailed disputes proce-
dures were laid down and the union was urged to accept respon-
sibility for avoiding unofficial strikes before the procedure had 
been exhausted. Arguments for compulsory arbitration were reject-
ed and the introduction of some form of inter-territorial Labour 
Department was urged. In the absence of an East African Industrial 
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Court the High Commissioner was urged to appoint an arbitra-
tion tribunal to help such a Labour Department in the settlement 
of inter-territorial disputes. Finally, the Report recommended a 
recasting of the single salary structure into four sections specialised 
by occupation to remove the appearance of racial discrimination. 
Whitson concluded his report with an appeal for co-operation 
and mutual goodwill. Even within the staff side, considerable 
effort would be necessary to reach a common approach to pro-
blems after a long tradition of viewing issues in racial terms: 
"New machinery will not, in itself, produce 'sound industrial 
relations' . . . It will be the leaders of the employees' organisations 
and the representatives of management who will, in the last resort, 
determine the state of industrial relations." (EAHC, 1960, p. 34). 
In March, 1962, representatives of management and employees' 
associations signed a collective agreement which introduced most 
of the machinery recommended by the Whitson Report. The 
Central Joint Council and Staff Tribunal were set up, and proce-
dures laid down for the settlement of trade disputes and individual 
grievances. Models were agreed upon for the territorial and local 
bodies which have since been set up in Uganda. Local Staff 
Committees met monthly, and passed on disputes, where neces-
sary, to the Territorial Council which met at three monthly inter-
vals. Thus the machinery was introduced and it remained for 
the individuals concerned to find the goodwill to make it work. 
After the acceptance of the Whitson Report in October, 1960, 
there was no major dispute in the railways. The changes which 
followed the Report placed the railway workers in a much 
stronger position. An International Bank Report (The Economic 
Development of Uganda, 1962), stated that : 
"In the mission's view, the general level of wages and the 
standard of housing prevailing in 1961 and the minimum wages 
paid by the railways administration were already well above the 
levels being paid in other industries in East Africa or in other 
countries with the same magnitude of per capita income." 
(p. 308). 
Predictably perhaps, this was not accepted by the union leaders 
who continued to press for more wages and better conditions. 
However, the extremism and intensity in this opposition to ma-
nagement must be explained not in economic terms but in relation 
to tribal and sectional pressures within the union. 
Because Luande most needed the backing of the higher paid 
and best educated groups to secure his leadership role, Africanisa-
tion was the most pressing demand. The union case was sum-
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marised in their memorandum to the Whitson Commission: "The 
present organisation puts too much emphasis upon profit and not 
enough on the advancement of the African Community." (RAU, 
1960, p. 2). Against this, management argued that, while accept-
ing the ultimate aim of Africanisation, 
"No sudden and spectacular change could be expected since 
there could be no drop in standards. Employees must come up 
to existing standards; the standards should not be dropped to 
them." (Uganda Argus, 3 February, 1962). 
Commercial efficiency was in conflict with a desirable political 
and social aim. 
Although Whitson noted with approval the fact that the 
African unions had not asked for members of other races to be 
prematurely discharged to make way for Africanisation (EAHC, 
1960, p. 12), this often occurred later when the unions still felt 
that Africanisation was progressing too slowly. Luande could 
immediately follow up a statesmanlike speech to the workers in 
Kilembe Mines — warning workers that they should not expect 
to take over non-Africans jobs immediately and urging hard work 
to demonstrate their abilities — with a fierce attack on his own 
employers and a threat of vigorous action if total Africanisation 
was not achieved within four months. When the Ghanaian head of 
the Common Services Organisation seemed to be delaying publica-
tion of reports on salaries and Africanisation, his dismissal was 
demanded, as was that of the Labour Commissioner for refusing 
to accept Africanisation as grounds for an industrial dispute. 
Amid all this intemperate shouting, nothing in fact was done. 
However, the constant complaints seemed to indicate that manage-
ment had not followed the advice of the Whitson Report and 
reached an understanding with the union on Africanisation policy. 
Whitson was aware that "to do so may well require a considerable 
modification in management's approach to the problem. It may 
even require, for a time, some reduction in the high standards they 
have thought necessary to qualify for certain non-technical posts." 
Whitson predicted, accurately it seems, that : 
"The alternative is a continual state of unrest which may 
reach very serious proportions." (EAHC, 1960, p. 12). 
Luande was also casting around for other issues to attract 
general support for his leadership, which he showed to be highly 
active if not always responsible. At the beginning of 1962, he 
submitted a minimum wage claim of Shs. 250/- per month and 
refused to accept management's argument that this would bank-
rupt the railways. He also complained about the management's 
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policy of employing educated "school leavers" in higher grades in-
stead of promoting from within the service. Finally, he appealed to 
Ugandan parochialism by complaining that the majority of pro-
motions and training courses were being offered to Kenyans and 
Tanganyikans. He even called for separate territorial manage-
ment and refused to attend talks with the other two unions in 
Nairobi. 
Backing all these disputes, Luande issued dire threats of start-
ing "industrial war", even talking in a press statement of touring 
the future strong points in the approaching campaign. (Uganda 
Argus, 14 July, 1962). These threats of violence served to 
establish the impression among union members that their leaders 
were taking the strongest possible line against management and 
were uncompromising in the defence of their interests, an impres-
sion which was required to gloss over tribal and sectional dissen-
sions within the union. However, because nothing in fact happen-
ed despite the threats, there was a danger that the leadership 
would cease to be taken seriously by outsiders. As one observer 
noted: 
"Luande has threatened so often to paralyse the Railways 
and to wage industrial war that his threats are in danger of losing 
their potency. The risk is that one day when he really means 
to do what he says no-one will believe him and a costly strike will 
result which might have been avoided." ( Reporter, 24 August, 
1962). 
At the end of 1963, the R A U was still the powerful union in 
Uganda, with sound finances and firmly established machinery for 
collective bargaining. Events in 1959 and 1960 had shown that 
it was capable of winning concessions from management by effec-
tive direct action, a feat not often successfully performed in 
Uganda. Later events showed that the most pressing problem 
for the leaders then became the preservation of their own power. 
Bluster and abuse were used to outflank their competitors in the 
struggle for the loyalty of the union membership. 
C h a p t e r Seven 
GENERAL UNIONS 
The second case study deals with the history of general unions 
in Uganda. In most African countries, general unions serving a 
number of employers and a wide variety of workers have been 
important because of their association with nationalist politics. 
In Uganda, party political activity was a minor influence on the 
development of trade unionism and consequently general unions 
were of relatively little importance. Unions associated with the 
transport industry were of political rather than industrial import-
ance before 1955 but the only important general union was con-
cerned with the clerical and non-manual groups in the commer-
cial and distributive trades. 
As the Ganda was the dominant African tribe involved in 
non-manual work in Kampala, it was natural that the first union 
leader should come f rom this tribe. Charles Makayu, like many 
other Ganda unionists, was both a Roman Catholic and political-
ly conscious. The fact of his Roman Catholicism may have 
placed him, and others like him, outside the formal structure of 
leadership in Buganda which is dominated by a "Protestant 
hierarchy" controlling opportunities for promotion within the 
government system. Also characteristically, Makayu was prevent-
ed from completing his education by financial difficulties, but he 
held responsible positions first as a college librarian and then in 
a bank. 
In 1953 he called a meeting to discuss the formation of a bank 
workers' union. He claimed to have stirred up considerable 
enthusiasm initially, but the employers acted swiftly to discourage 
the idea and the most "troublesome" employees, including 
Makayu, were dismissed. 
Two years later, Makayu tried again, and the General Clerical 
Union was registered in February, 1955. At the end of the year, 
union membership was officially stated to be 150, although no 
more than a handful of subscriptions were regularly paid. The 
union's main functions were stated to be finding jobs for un-
employed clerks and settling individual grievances. Africanisa-
tion of posts at the same pay as the non-African predecessor was 
a firm principle of policy, but the union was too weak to take 
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positive action on this or on wage demands. The union lacked 
any office facilities and probably had no active membership out-
side the holders of executive office. 
By 1956, Makayu had brought himself to the notice of the 
1CFTU as one of the few local union leaders. He became 
Uganda T U C President when that body was founded by Mboya, 
and was invited to represent Uganda at an international confer-
ence in Accra and then to attend a three-month training course 
in Belgium. In his absence, he was removed f rom office and 
subsequently lost interest in union affairs. The leadership of the 
Clerical Union passed to Mr. Francis Pulle, an able and mode-
rately prosperous insurance clerk, who identified himself with the 
Ganda despite his part-Asian background. Pulle, like Makayu, 
found it impossible to make much progress with the expansion 
of the clerical union and concentrated his interest on the Uganda 
TUC. The union itself, a paper organisation, remained dormant 
until 1960. 
In addition to the general problems of organisation already 
mentioned, two factors combined to prevent the Clerical Union 
making headway. The first was the separatist attitudes of the 
Asian community who provided the bulk of the clerical employees 
in Kampala at this time. Rapid Africanisation did not start in 
earnest until the idea of political self-government became a con-
crete reality. In general, the Asians held the more senior clerical 
posts beneath European administrators, and were the most imme-
diate barrier to the advancement of educated Africans. The Asians 
still clung to the concept of their separate interests being more 
important than the interests of clerical workers as a whole. In 
other fields this led to racially exclusive unions among the rail-
ways and postal staff. In commerce, the Asians ignored the 
Clerical Union and later the bank workers set up their own union 
which tended to be exclusively Asian in membership. 
The second hampering factor was the policy of the Labour 
Department. Under the Trade Union Ordinance, the Registrar 
had wide powers over the scope of any union's activities and the 
title of General Clerical Union was interpreted as narrowly as 
possible. The Department seem to have feared that a mammoth 
general union would be unwieldy and give rise to jurisdiction 
disputes as well as develop into a dangerous political vehicle. 
They preferred to sponsor a neat pattern of industrial unions, with 
each group of leaders confined to their own specified area of 
activity. This restricted the General Clerical Union to the inter-
stices between the large blocks of industrial workers and, within 
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this small field, to strictly clerical workers. Commenting on this 
situation, the ICFTU Visiting Mission of 1958 stated tha t : 
"A little more elasticity is called for, especially when it is 
obvious that the workers in question have no union of their own 
and trade union organisation in general is still at an elementary 
stage." 
The Mission's Report then advised: 
"The unions should see to it that they have from the beginning 
a sufficiently wide field of registration for them to be able to build 
an adequate organisation." (ICFTU, 1958 (b), p. 3). 
It was three years before this sound advice was applied by the 
General Clerical Union and, even then, it was only accepted by 
the Registrar after a considerable constitutional wrangle. On 16 
September, 1961, the National Union of Clerical, Commercial and 
Technical Employees (NUCCTE) was inaugurated. The new name 
was a conscious imitation of the title of the international trade 
secretariat to which the new union looked hopefully for assistance. 
To a large extent this hope was not fulfilled. The Interna-
tional Federation of Clerical, Commercial and Technical Employees 
(IFCCTE) was not in a financial position to match the aid of the 
ICFTU and the more prosperous organisations, although this was 
not appreciated in Uganda. The IFCCTE derived a comparatively 
small income from affiliates restricted to Western Europe and had 
considerable commitments in South America. When the Swedish 
Distributive and Commercial Workers Union offered the services 
of an adviser in East Africa for a short time, the international 
could not afford his salary, only the costs of his transport. The 
Ugandan unionists also resented the fact that the General Secre-
tary of the international failed to visit them during his mission to 
Africa in 1961. 
Ghana also made overtures regarding the setting up of a Fede-
ration of African Commercial and Industrial Workers Unions, pre-
sumably as a trade secretariat to be associated with the All-African 
Trade Union Federation. L. Senkezi, the N U C C T E General Secre-
tary, attended an inaugural meeting of this body and expressed 
support in principle for Pan-African institutions. However, he 
rejected the condition for membership that all organisations wishing 
to become members of the Federation should show proof of non-
affiliation to any foreign trade union grouping. Following Mboya's 
logic in rejecting the same A A T U F membership provision, Senkezi 
argued that each national centre should retain the absolute right 
of determining the extent of its own international affiliations. 
The change of name marked the revival of activity in the union 
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under the stimulus of younger leaders who were less concerned 
with merely using the union as a basis for Uganda TUC mano-
euvrings. The new name meant that the union could legitimately 
recruit more widely and it built a solid foundation among the 
employees of garages and motor traders as well as in shops and 
insurance offices. At the same time, attitudes among employers 
were changing as a result of the growth of a strong employers' 
association, increased union activity in other fields, and the 
approach of political independence. 
Throughout 1962, the expansion of the union continued, so that 
its membership claims came to be measured in thousands. In 
September of that year, a great fillip was received when the Bank 
Workers Union agreed to dissolve itself and transfer its members 
to the NUCCTE. The Asians at last realised that their interests 
under an independent African government would best be guarded 
by identification with African institutions rather than by continuing 
to exist separately. The N U C C T E thus became one of the few 
genuinely multi-racial unions and the first African-dominated union 
to elect an Asian office-bearer. The up-country branches of the 
banks also served as a useful base from which to extend the activi-
ties of the union to urban centres outside Kampala. 
The new national leadership came from the Ganda Catholic 
group as before, but they were younger and better qualified than 
the original leaders. Pulie, by then Treasurer of the Uganda TUC, 
remained as President but played a relatively minor role as an 
elder statesman. The General Secretary, Senkezi, had turned to 
union affairs after a few unfruitful years as a political organiser 
in the now defunct Uganda National Congress. When the Congress 
experienced one of its periodic splits, he was left out of a job 
and returned to employment in commerce. Encouraged by Pulle, 
he attended a Labour College course and was employed afterwards 
in the office at the College when he was unable to regain his 
previous job. After his course (1961) Senkezi also took over the 
part-time post as union organiser. He succeeded Paul Kanyago, 
one of the most able of the young unionists in Uganda. Forced by 
financial difficulties to accept a clerical rather than an academic 
education, Kanyago had become a highly qualified shorthand-
typist. Again through contact with Pulle, he had joined the Clerical 
Union and had risen quickly to executive office. After a course 
at the Labour College, he was selected for a two-year scholarship 
to Ruskin College, Oxford. On his return in 1963, he accepted an 
appointment to the Labour College's Research Department and 
continued to take an active part in the affairs of the union. The 
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third key figure in the National Executive, Nkuuti, joined the union 
only in 1959 but rose quickly to high office because of his skill 
as an accountant. After College training, he became the union's 
second full-time official and also held the post of Education Secre-
tary with the Uganda TUC. 
The main weakness of the union was that its sectional leaders 
could not keep up with the relatively high standards set by the 
national executive. The N U C C T E claimed to represent many 
different technical and commercial occupations, but branch leaders 
continued to be drawn mainly from the clerks. Employers explain-
ed this in terms of their superior command of English and the 
formalities of written communication rather than any inherent ca-
pacity for leadership. There was also the problem of tribal rival-
ries. In mechanical and technical sections, the dominant and most 
active group were often Kenyans because few Ganda were found in 
these occupations. At first, the new N U C C T E accepted a number 
of Kenyan leaders into the national executive but after independ-
ence the Kenyans were again pushed into the background. These 
two facts led to complaints that the union leadership was unrepre-
sentative because it was dominated by clerical and Ganda groups 
and did not give expression to the interests of the non-clerical and 
non-Ganda groups. The workers themselves, and the employers, 
argued that the union was not capable of representing the interests 
of many of the workers. This was emphasised when the union 
proved unable to match management's grasp of technical questions 
in negotiations on issues such as job classification in the motor 
trade. The national leadership had no specialist knowledge and 
was not helped by shop stewards who were also clerical workers. 
From its inception, the N U C C T E did not give rise to the rash 
of jurisdiction disputes ominously predicted by the Labour Depart-
ment. The only other general union, the Amalgamated Transport 
and General, had lost most of its impetus in Kampala by the time 
the N U C C T E appeared and was content to deal solely with workers 
associated with the transport industry. An amicable transfer took 
place in some industries where individual shops had been organised 
by the Transport and General before the N U C C T E appeared. At 
the end of 1963, the N U C C T E also "acquired" the remnants of 
the Ginnery and Millworkers Union. This union had operated 
spasmodically in Buganda and Busoga among cotton and coffee 
ginnery workers until its leaders lost interest. In a factory near 
Masaka, the local N U C C T E organiser took up a dispute on behalf 
of members of the former union and applied for recognition by 
the National Coffee Growers Association. After a delay while the 
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Labour Department was consulted, this recognition was granted. 
This set a precedent for allowing unions to fill in gaps created by 
defunct organisations and could conceivably lead to the emergence 
of omnibus unions as in West Africa and other parts of the world. 
The N U C C T E began oy concerning itself mainly with the 
settlement of individual grievances, as had the Clerical Union 
before i t . It was not until employers' associations began to emerge 
that it could make much progress in the negotiation of general 
wage demands. Attacked in isolation, even the largest firms resist-
ed moves by the union to secure recognition. With the revival 
of the Federation of Uganda Employers, attitudes began to change, 
The larger companies had joined the Federation as individual 
members and were encouraged by the Secretary of the Federation 
to form specialised "trade associations" to deal with unions on an 
industrial basis. By the end of 1963, five such associations had 
emerged, covering motor traders, banks, plantations, merchants 
and distributive employers, and building and civil engineering con-
tractors. Only the banks had a full-time official, based in Nairobi 
and responsible for all of East Africa. Other Trade Associations 
were run on a part-time basis by the personnel managers with the 
help of the Federation's own secretariat. 
The formation of these associations boosted the growth of the 
NUCCTE. In the motor trade, for example, a recognition and 
procedural agreement was signed in February 1963 which set up 
a three-tier negotiation structure. This was followed by detailed 
industry-wide agreements on terms of service, job classification 
and general principles governing contracts and redundancy. The 
introduction of formal machinery allowed the union to pursue indi-
vidual grievances more vigorously and this led in turn to most 
firms introducing a tightly documented system of disciplinary pro-
cedure. Although the union did not officially recognise the system, 
it found that its work was made much easier by having documen-
tary evidence upon which to judge whether a particular case was 
worthy of action. In the same way, the signing of industry-wide 
collective agreements reduced the need for union leaders to spend 
time and effort negotiating with each employer separately. 
The weakness of the system was the same that affected the 
operation of collective agreements in other industries. The union 
was content to exploit those employers who made the initial con-
cession of joining the Trade Association and did not exert itself 
to organise the employers who stayed outside the association. This 
was particularly a problem where the Association consisted of a 
few large-scale employers and a number of smaller businesses, as 
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in the motor trade. If the small operators outside the association 
could escape paying the collectively established rates, those in the 
association were likely to leave rather than accept membership 
which placed them in an uneconomic position vis-a-vis their com-
petitors. By refusing to act against the groups outside the trade 
associations, the union was taking the path of least effort and it 
was also in danger of defeating its long-term interest in preserving 
the existence of the associations. Their main hope for the future 
lay in the Government's plans to extend a system of wages councils 
to these industries under which collective agreements signed by a 
representative majority would be binding on the whole industry. 
Finally, it is necessary to note a significant development which 
occurred during 1963 and cast a shadow over the future of the 
union. A number of unofficial strikes were called against members 
of the motor traders' association, led not by N U C C T E but by the 
Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) Youth Wing. The workers, 
although covered by a collective agreement signed on their behalf 
by the union, chose to follow the Youth Wing rather than the 
union leaders and refused to accept union instructions to return 
to work. In one case, the employer went so far as to recognise the 
right of the Youth Wing to represent the workers involved and to 
negotiate with the aid of a U P C politician. These incidents gave 
rise to speculation on wider questions of the Government's attitude 
to disputes called by political organisations. They also underlined 
the deceptively weak control that the nominally powerful union 
could exert over its members and the ease with which outsiders 
could disrupt its conduct of industrial relations. 
Two other general unions can be discussed briefly by way of 
contrast. The first is the Amalgamated Transport and General 
Workers Union. The origins of this union can be traced back to 
the first Ugandan-inspired union of all, the Busoga Motor Drivers' 
Union. In 1954, the activities of this union were extended by 
changing its name to the Eastern Province Transport and Allied 
Workers Union. In 1959. the union amalgamated with other minor 
organisations to form the existing union which claimed to cover 
all areas of Uganda. Its main centre of activity remained the 
Eastern Province, where it organised the Kilembe Smelters. With 
the formation of the Uganda Federation of Labour in Jinja. the 
unity of the organisation was shattered, with the Kampala branch 
electing separate office bearers and continuing to support the 
Uganda T U C against the Jinja branch leadership. 
A semblance of national unity was restored after the collapse 
of the Uganda Federation of Labour in 1961, but the union never 
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functioned as a single coherent organisation because of the instabi-
lity and weakness of its national leadership. An agreement between 
the Labour Department and the Uganda T U C permitted the union 
to operate in areas where no other union had taken an interest, 
so weakly organised branches grew up in outlying urban centres 
such as Fort Portal, Mbarara, Gulu and Masaka. Their effective-
ness depended upon the varying energy of the constantly changing 
local leaders, so the branches functioned spasmodically and without 
any central direction. The Fort Portal branch, confined originally 
to bus workers, contented itself with following the lead of the Kam-
pala union by negotiating its own increases every time an increase 
was secured in Kampala. In Lira, with a tradition of independent 
political and union activity, the Lango Transport and General 
Workers Union maintained a separate and active existence and 
refused to be associated with the inefficiencies of the central body. 
The strength of the union was found in the Kampala and Jinja 
transport workers, mainly bus drivers. Well supported strikes over 
trade disputes had been conducted in both towns in July, 1962. In 
the Eastern Province dispute, the Government upheld the union's 
claim that certain dismissals were unreasonable and issued licences 
for rival companies to serve strike-bound routes as a means of 
forcing concessions from the company. In Kampala, the union's 
demand for a 60% wage increase and the dismissal of the General 
Manager provoked an opposite reaction. Onama, the Minister 
of Labour, intervened to warn the workers that they would be 
replaced if they did not return to work and to instruct the union 
to continue negotiations. At the same time, the Minister had also 
to threaten the employers before they would agree to withdraw 
offensive remarks and to pay a small interim increase until the 
wage claim was submitted to arbitration. 
Early in 1963, the A T G W U revived and its activities took on a 
different character. Trouble of a new sort occurred in two outlying 
regions. In Soroti, an area not previously organised, the publica-
tion of the recommendations of the National Minimum Wages 
Advisory Board in January 1963 gave rise to a wages dispute in a 
cotton ginnery. A local UPC organiser took up the strikers' case 
and the strike spread rapidly to other ginneries and to commercial 
employees in the township. On the strength of the testimony of the 
strikers, the ginnery owner was deported for abusive and insulting 
remarks about the Prime Minister. F. Onama, Minister of 
Labour, tried to clarify the situation by pointing out that the 
wages suggested by the Board were only recommendations and 
would not come into effect for four months, but the general strike 
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continued and took on the character of an anti-Asian demonstra-
tion. Although no union organisation existed, the party official 
claimed to be regional representative of the ATGWU. At first, 
the headquarters in Kampala denied this because they did not wish 
to be associated with an irresponsible general strike in which the 
union had taken no part, but later changed their minds. 
In Fort Portal a similar situation developed in March 1963, with 
a general strike taking on an anti-Asian character after workers 
had been misled to expect immediately the wage increases recom-
mended by the Minimum Wages Board. The same intimidatory 
tactic of trying to secure the deportation of the leading Asian busi-
nessman was not successful, but violence was only averted in both 
cases by the Labour Department persuading the employers to agree 
to a large interim increase until the new minimum wages were 
introduced. 
In contrast, the recently developed Uganda Building Construc-
tion Civil Engineering and Allied Workers Union is both industrial-
ly effective and outside party politics. The credit for this must 
go to John Thalmayer, an international adviser from North Ameri-
ca, financed by the International Federation of Building and Wood-
workers. The international had sent a mission touring all African 
countries which, in 1962, recommended that Uganda held sufficient 
potential to benefit from the services of an adviser. The choice of 
Thalmayer was fortunate, as a period of service in Turkey had 
acquainted him with many of the problems facing union organisa-
tions in under-developed areas. 
On arrival, Thalmayer found few effective unions in existence. 
Only one collective agreement existed — between Budongo Saw-
mills and the Bunyoro Building, Construction and Woodworkers 
Union. The Budongo Sawmills were situated deep in the Budongo 
Forest near Masindi, and were operated by European employers 
who realised that liberal working conditions must exist to compen-
sate for the extreme isolation of the work force. This same isolation, 
perhaps, explains the remarkably enthusiastic response to the idea 
of a union. During 1962, one of the leaders of the Uganda Fede-
ration of Labour visited Budongo on a fund-raising expedition. 
The management agreed to an access agreement but refused to 
recognise the U F L man as a valid union representative as he had 
just been dismissed from the National Union of Road Construction 
Workers and the Uganda Federation was not considered a legiti-
mate union organisation. Subsequently, the legitimately registered 
Secretary of a virtually defunct woodworkers union enrolled 75% 
of the Budongo employees and, after the collection of union dues, 
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prepared to stage a strike in support of a wage claim. At this 
point, a director of the company appeared from Nairobi and a 
hasty recognition agreement was concluded. From the beginning, 
the Federation of Uganda Employers advised caution in dealing 
with unionists of such dubious reputation. Their warnings were 
justified when the original organisers failed to put in another 
appearance at Budongo, apparently well satisfied with the initial 
finance collected. 
The other union in existence, the National Union of Road 
Construction Workers, had even less stability. It enjoyed a hand 
to mouth existence since its foundation in Jinja. Lacking any 
recognition agreements whatever, it existed on the basis of spasmo-
dic collections made after attempts to settle disputes in which it 
was able to involve itself. Quarry and clay workers were also 
nominally covered by union organisations. The Quarry and Mine-
workers Union had been inaugurated by Luande when he visited 
Kilembe Mines in 1962. When it became clear that no quarry 
workers were in fact members, first the order of the two names 
was changed and then the quarry section dropped altogether from 
the title of the Kilembe union. The clay workers' union had been 
registered but had made no progress with organisation beyond 
collecting subscriptions before its General Secretary lost interest 
and disappeared. 
From this meagre stock of resources, Thalmayer set himself 
the formidable task of building up and having accepted a nation-
wide amalgamation. First he drew the existing unions together 
under a complex constitution and set up a single national head-
quarters. Discussions with the Federation of Uganda Employers 
led to the formation of the Uganda Association of Building and 
Civil Engineering Contractors. Thalmayer then concluded recogni-
tion agreements with the 54 members of this cumbersome associa-
tion and also with nine other employers who refused to join it. 
On occasions, the demand for recognition led to strike activity but 
generally progress was peaceful. On January 27, 1964, the major 
step forward was taken when a comprehensive agreement was sign-
ed by the union and association. This sophisticated document 
covered normal topics such as redundancy, overtime, hours and 
leave; it also covered unusual items such as the distinction between 
permanent and site staff, job classification down to 45 different 
grades, and tied regional wages to the minimum wages differentials 
laid down in the Government Minimum Wages Ordinance. 
At the end of 1963, the executive was new and inexperienced. 
One member had taken over the Budongo union on behalf of his 
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work mates when it was abandoned by the UFL. Others had been 
selected by Thalmayer or recruited from the A T G W U when that 
union had been taken over by more politically minded leaders. 
While Thalmayer stayed, confidence in the union remained high on 
all sides, but many wondered what would happen when he left. 
It remained to be seen whether this impressive new union structure 
would hold together by itself or whether it would be allowed to 
lapse into the apathy which had prevailed before. 
This brief survey of the history of general unions in Uganda 
points out some of the worst features associated with trade union-
ism. The NUCCTE seemed the most effective union, but it still 
had a long period when it functioned in name only, and later 
events revealed that it had a very tenuous control over its members. 
The other general unions were cursed at times with leadership 
which was not only ineffective but often financially and politically 
irresponsible. All the general unions laid claims to a large mem-
bership by the end of 1963, but it was clear that this was often 
a "paper membership" and that many organisations were not con-
tinuously effective in their management of industrial relations. 
C h a p t e r E igh t 
COMPANY UNIONS—Textiles and Tobacco 
The history of two company unions is in sharp contrast to 
that of the general unions of Uganda. Since employees working 
for a single large company were easier to organise than those 
scattered in different areas under different employers, it was logical 
that trade unionism should make most progress in this field. Jinja, 
as the centre of most of Uganda's industries, naturally became the 
centre of union activity. The two unions discussed in this study 
were both based in Jinja but, while the first enjoyed a relatively 
peaceful evolution, the story of the second is marked by constant 
tension and a period of vigorous direct action. 
The Uganda Tobacco Workers Union 
The Uganda Tobacco Workers Union was recognised in 1958 
as the legitimate representative of the interests of the workers in 
the East African Tobacco Company. In addition to the main 
factory at Jinja, there was a subsidiary drying plant in Kampala 
and collection centres at Gulu and Arua in the main growing areas. 
However, the first moves towards the establishment of a union were 
made in Jinja and the other areas were organised much later. The 
character of the Jinja labour force is important in explaining the 
success of union activity in the tobacco factory. Because most 
of the jobs require specific skills not valuable in other industries, 
there were limited opportunities open to migrant labourers. The 
great majority of workers were locals (Ganda or Soga) or long-
term migrants f rom Kenya. At the end of 1963, over 80% of the 
employees had been working in the factory for more than five years. 
In later years, as the rate of turnover slowed down, this stability 
of the labour force even caused redundancy problems when new 
machinery was introduced. 
As a result of the company's wide experience overseas, the 
management of East African Tobacco realised very early that there 
was a need for some form of industrial relations machinery in their 
Ugandan factories. In January, 1952, the first experiment was 
made with Works Committees when a factory-wide committee was 
set up consisting of 16 workers' representatives, the Manager and 
the Assistant Manager. This failed to achieve any results of note 
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and, in his detailed study of this experiment, Walter Elkan points 
to three reasons why the committees never operated effectively: 
the exclusion of most members of management, the use of the 
committee as a lecture platform by the Manager, and the selection 
of workers' representatives by management (Elkan, 1955, Chapter 
6). 
In 1953, the factory at Jinja had its first strike. Significantly, 
the middle group of semi-skilled were the main activists and the 
lower, unskilled groups only joined in with great reluctance. This 
reflected the fact that this first group saw their future in terms of 
continuing employment in the same industry and would thus derive 
most benefit f rom an increase in wage rates. The skilled crafts-
men and clerks above this group gave little support to the strike 
because their future interests were less related to wage rates in a 
single factory and more to the removal of the general wide gap 
between their wages and the wages of other races who appeared 
to be doing the same job. 
As a result of the strike, a new system of joint consultation was 
introduced. The single factory-wide committee was replaced by a 
hierarchy of committees, based upon face-to-face meetings between 
workers and managers at all levels in the personnel structure. As 
in the first phase, the committees tended to be dominated by the 
semi-skilled groups, in particular the Ganda and Soga workers who 
lived close by and saw their future in terms of a long spell of wage-
earning. 
At first great difficulty was experienced in putting across 
the idea of joint consultation and workers tended to use the com-
mittee solely as a vehicle for submitting major wage demands. 
However, by 1956 the results were reported as much more reward-
ing, although the question of effective communications between the 
representatives and the mass of workers still had not been solved. 
For example, in 1956 a concerted attempt was made to use works 
committees to get across the idea that management had no hidden 
motive behind the introduction of free meals beyond providing a 
better diet to increase performances. The employees remained 
unconvinced and boycotted the first attempt to introduce the sys-
tem. 
Management 's readiness to welcome the growth of unions 
meant that there was no trouble over recognition. The appearance 
of the union in mid-1957 was followed by a recognition agreement 
in March, 1958, which accepted the fact that the works committees 
were no longer adequate. Before the union was recognised, it 
had successfully boycotted the committees which were seen as a 
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challenge to the right of the union to claim to represent the workers 
in their dealings with management. After recognition, the union 
agreed to work within the committee structure on non-negotiable 
matters but pushed constantly to increase its own area of respon-
sibility. The committees' power declined where the union was 
most militant because the leaders preferred to bargain with the 
implied threat of direct action rather than merely advise, even on 
issues not normally settled by collective bargaining. In the less 
militant areas, such as the northern region, the committees conti-
nued to do useful work on non-controversial issues such as health, 
safety and canteen facilities. 
The Uganda Tobacco Workers Union was first registered at 
the beginning of 1958 with Angelino Banyanga as its General Sec-
retary. Banyanga was a senior clerk at the factory in Jinja who 
had failed at the university and then gone into the public service 
for a short period. From an initial gathering of about 30 people, 
Banyanga organised the election of an executive committee and 
fiad his new union registered. This failed to attract the attention 
of management but did make available the advice of both the 
Uganda T U C President and the Labour Department's Industrial 
Relations Officer. With their aid, the union expanded until it 
could back a demand for recognition with a claim of 300 members. 
When this demand was turned down, a strike was held which was 
solidly supported by all but the Asian employees of the factory and 
led to a visit from the Company's directors. As a result of this 
visit, the union was recognised in accordance with general Com-
pany policy and the first recognition and procedural agreement was 
signed. 
After 1958, union membership tended to fluctuate according to 
the successes of the union in its dealings with management. A 
short, unsuccessful strike in 1959 over an issue of victimisation led 
to a fall in membership to only 30% of the factory force. Later 
it revived, with the aid of a check-off agreement in May, 1962, and 
an expansion of union activity to Kampala and the rural centres 
in the northern regions. At the end of 1963, the Factory Personnel 
Officer estimated that the union had a paid-up membership of 
475, of which 402 were covered by the check-off arrangements at 
the Jinja factory. 
Over the whole period, the leadership was always dominated by 
the clerical group. This was in marked contrast to the group most 
interested in the early works committees who tended to be the 
semi-skilled operatives. The interest shown by the clerical workers 
in the union reflected the extent to which the union could involve 
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itself in matters of general concern to them, not dealt with in a 
consultative committee. Thus the union actively advocated policies 
of more rapid "Africanisation" which particularly appealed to this 
group. These clerical leaders brought considerable organising 
skills to the union and were less worried by the prospect of victimi-
sation because they could find jobs elsewhere more easily. Like 
most unions in Uganda, the Tobacco Workers faced the recurrent 
problem of losing their most effective leaders through promotion. 
Some, like Banyanga and another pioneer unionist, Kasoro, went 
to other employers, but many were raised to the level of manage-
ment within the factory. This led the union members to believe 
that the Company had a conscious policy of weakening the union 
by removing its best men, whereas the Factory Manager maintain-
ed that it would be unfair to hamper the progress of an individual 
in the interests of retaining good union leadership. The problem 
remained that new leaders constantly had to be found and trained 
to replace those who left. 
In 1959, the Labour Department Report noted that : 
"There are refreshing signs of a start in the negotiation of 
wages by a process of collective bargaining. In one industry in 
particular which is blessed with an enlightened management and 
responsible union leadership, proper negotiation machinery has 
been established to deal with all matters concerning wages and 
conditions of service." 
The report then praised the "sympathetic but firm attitudes of 
the Company representatives", and the "sensible outlook of the 
Tobacco Workers Union leaders." (LDR, 1959, p. 16). 
It is interesting to note that the dispute referred to was con-
cerned not with wages but with establishing the union's right to 
consultation by management on issues of concern to the workers. 
The list of union grievances included the implementation of new 
working rules without consultation, the refusal to publish the salary 
scales of all employees as demanded by the union, the intention to 
introduce aptitude testing despite union opposition and the general 
Company policy of non-consultation before taking decisions affect-
ing union members. Higher wages were not an issue because the 
level of wages in the Tobacco industry was always ahead of the 
general rate prevailing in Jinja and the union was concerned mainly 
with establishing a wider area of authority in order to increase 
its appeal. 
Between 1959 and 1963, there were no major disputes in the 
Company and the new Factory Manager at Jinja publicly praised 
the union leadership for its co-operative attitude in negotiations 
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which introduced a national collective agreement. This quiescence 
was probably a reflecton of the superior working conditions pre-
vailing at the factory as much as it was a product of responsible 
leadership, but the situation changed rapidly in 1963. 
The character of the negotiation structure within the Company 
had an important influence on this growing unrest. At the shop-
floor level, minor disputes were settled by discussions between the 
union shop stewards and their immediate supervisor. Disagree-
ments were referred to the Branch Secretary and the Production 
Manager and then to a formal Branch Negotiation Committee. The 
Personnel Department acted only as consultants to both sides to 
allow freedom of action as conciliators. If a Branch Committee 
remained deadlocked for two weeks, the issue was referred to the 
National Negotiation Committee which included the full-time offi-
cials of the union and senior personnel management. In addition, 
all matters concerning more than one branch were also passed 
immediately to the national level. Disagreement at this level meant 
that the dispute was formally passed over to the Labour Depart-
ment for outside conciliation and, with the agreement of both 
parties to the dispute, submission to independent arbitration. 
The system revealed two weaknesses in practice. The first 
concerned the extent to which the interests of the rural areas were 
safeguarded. The two stations at Gulu and Arua were affected 
by similar problems as they performed the same functions and 
depended upon the same sort of local labour. Yet the nature of 
the negotiation machinery required that all common problems 
should be settled by a meeting of the National Negotiation Com-
mittee, at which full-time officials represented the union, rather 
than the local officials who were more in touch with the practical 
aspects of any question concerning these areas. It has already 
been noted that the Jinja factory was the most active centre of 
union activity, and inevitably most of the national leaders were 
drawn from this centre. The small membership in the rural 
branches felt that there was a tendency on the part of the national 
leadership to ignore their special needs and to refuse to back their 
demands with the same vigour as demands from Jinja. This 
charge seems to have been borne out in the last national wage 
negotiations, when the rises gained for the rural areas were less 
than half those gained for the Jinja and Kampala factories. While 
the negotiation machinery persisted unamended, and the central 
leaders failed to instil confidence, there seemed a real danger that 
the union would lose its following among the workers in the rural 
areas. With the growing experience and sophistication of this 
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group would come the realisation that the best way to safeguard 
their interests was to deal directly with the local management rather 
than through the half-hearted efforts of the central leaders. 
The second weakness was perhaps less a fault of the machinery 
itself than a result of its faulty functioning on one key occasion. 
This weakness was the tendency for the union to force disputes 
up to the highest possible authority before being willing to make 
any compromise. In general, this was due to a desire on the part 
of the national full-time leadership to appear active and efficient 
and, on the part of the lower ranks, to appear unyielding in their 
defence of the workers' interests. 
In the Tobacco Workers Union, this tendency was reinforced 
by the ludicrously successful result of going to arbitration over a 
particular wage demand. Because the Tobacco Company was 
already the most liberal employer in Jinja, both management and 
the Provincial Labour Officer predicted that no award would be 
made. However, to their surprise a significant wage increase was 
granted. The union based its case on the level of wages being paid 
in the Company's Nairobi factory although this ignored the very 
considerable difference between the costs of living in Nairobi and 
Jinja. The result of the arbitration puzzled and surprised many 
people. Some grades received a rate of increase half way between 
the Nairobi level and the existing level in Uganda: others received 
even more than the union had actually requested. 
It had been hoped by the Labour Department that an adverse 
arbitration might stem the general post-independence inflationary 
pressures and stop the widening wage gap between the liberal 
employers' rates and the rates paid elsewhere. Instead, the union 
was given the dangerously misleading impression that arbitration 
was the surest way of gaining in a dispute. 
Heartened by this unexpected success, the union leaders con-
tinued their policy of forcing disputes to the highest possible level 
with renewed vigour. Because the union refused to compromise 
on even the most minor issue, the Labour Department was snowed 
under with disputes reported for outside settlement. This "hard 
line" was partly related to the struggle for power within the union 
hierarchy at Jinja. A large but non-vocal group of moderates 
within the factory executive wished to return to a more co-operative 
attitude, while the radicals wished to justify their own position by 
providing concrete gains for the union members by forcing conces-
sions from management. 
Towards the end of 1963, the situation began to return to 
normal as a result of the Government's willingness to explode the 
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myth that arbitration was a sure way to win concessions. When 
the union pressed a new claim on leave and hours, and held out in 
the hope of forcing arbitration, the Government acted behind the 
scenes to discourage them. Understandably, the Company were 
reluctant to go to arbitration again and believed that it could easily 
resist any threat of direct action because the members of the union 
were not wholeheartedly in support of their leaders on this issue. 
Management changed its opinion when the Labour Commissioner 
made known that an arbitration tribunal would be appointed 
instead of a single arbitrator, that a non-political figure would lead 
it, and that the terms of reference would be submitted to both 
sides for verification and rigidly adhered to. The Company also 
took note of the precedent set by a decision covering the Tanga-
nyikan employees of the Company which accepted the 45 hour 
week, 21 working days' leave and a rate of severance pay below 
the current Ugandan level. 
Government's lack of sympathy with the union seemed reason-
able. The unions were asking for a 40 hour week, an increase in 
leave from 21 to 36 working days, and a more generous severance 
allowance. The previous wage rise had set up dangerous inequa-
lities at the time, but these would eventually have been removed 
as the general level of wages in the community rose. An increase 
in leave and a reduction in hours would have set an awkward 
precedent for Government and other employers as it would have 
led almost inevitably to a permanent decline in overall produc-
tivity. 
As they became aware of the attitude of the Government, the 
unions began to lose interest in forcing the dispute to a conclusion 
because the leaders felt it was better not to go to arbitration at 
all than to go and get nothing. They also realised that arbitration 
could no longer be regarded as the surest way to get what they 
asked for. 
Finally, the most radical of the union leaders, the General 
Secretary, led an unofficial strike in an attempt to secure the dis-
missal of three supervisors. A short stoppage followed but the 
great majority of the workers soon returned to work in defiance of 
the union. Aware that he was rapidly losing support, the General 
Secretary resigned and joined a number of other former union offi-
cials in the personnel department of one of the large sugar manu-
facturers. The more moderate members of the union executive 
who had opposed the strike and many of the policies of the former 
leader then took control and, by the end of 1963, amicable relations 
had been re-established between management and the union. 
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The Uganda Textile Workers Union 
The second union, the Uganda Textile Workers Union, had a 
shorter but more eventful history. Nyanza Textile Industries 
Limited began recruiting labour in 1955. The only firm of its 
kind in East Africa before 1964, it was managed by the Calico 
Printers' Association of Manchester and controlled by the Uganda 
Government through the Uganda Development Corporation. 
Much of the strife which developed at Nyanza Textiles can be 
attributed to the unwillingness of the management to adjust its 
ideas to the special circumstances of East Africa. In the beginning, 
the European supervisory grades were of necessity craftsmen with 
the high technical skill needed to operate complex machinery. They 
were adjusted to the high tempo of English production and, unlike 
local Europeans, did not have the experience which led to a realis-
tic assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the African 
employees. Tension between the two groups was particularly high 
during the initial building, with the presence of a highly specialised 
construction team which was motivated by rigid target dates and 
lacked any permanent interest in the country or the workers. Elkan 
has also pointed out that the source of ideas in the personnel de-
partment, the Johannesburg National Institute of Personnel Re-
search, was also likely to contribule to unrest as it was badly out 
of touch with conditions prevailing in East Africa (correspondence 
with author, 10 September, 1964). The use of aptitude tests, 
advanced job evaluation techniques and complex incentive bonus 
schemes all conflicted with traditional, highly simplified practices 
to which the African workers had become accustomed. The failure 
to establish adequate channels of communication with the workers 
often led to discontent when these systems were misunderstood and 
misinterpreted. 
Nyanza Textiles, like the tobacco factory, had little use for 
short-term migrant labour. The need for a period of training in 
specialised skills meant that an employee only reached his maxi-
mum efficiency after the first year of employment. A deliberate 
policy of encouraging stability was meeting with considerable suc-
cess by the end of 1963, with almost 90% of the workers beyond 
their first year of service. A tribal analysis of the work force 
(Table IV) revealed three significant groups — the local tribes 
from near Jinja (34%), the tribes from just over the Kenya border 
(18%) and the tribes from the north of Uganda (18%). The 
Samia, a sub-tribe of the Luhya, were of particular significance 
as they played a major role in the development of the Textile 
Workers Union. They constituted 11 % of the African work force, 
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most of them coming from just over the Kenya border, despite 
their claims to the contrary in official records. No Asians were 
employed because, by 1955 when the factory started, it was clear 
that this would only cause future problems of "Africanisation". 
Thus there was not the normal buffer between European supervi-
sors and African unskilled labour which existed elsewhere, a fact 
which may have contributed to the early period of racial discontent. 
Table IV 
T R I B A L A N A L Y S I S , 1963 
Nyanza Text i les W o r k Force 
Locals Others 
Soga . 19 .2% Nyankole, Nyoro • 4 . 7 % 
Ganda . 15 .0% Teso • 3 . 7 % 
Gishu • 2 . 5 % 
Kenya Border Kigesi • 1 -7% 
Samia, Uganda • 9 . 4 % others less than • 1 . 0 % 
Samia, Kenya • 1 - 5 % 
Luo, Kenya • 7 . 1 % 
North 
Acholi . 7 . 4 % 
West Nile . . • 7 - 1 % 
Madi • 2 . 5 % 
Lango • 1 -5% 
Source: J. Cockburn, Personnel Adviser, Nyanza Textiles Limited. 
Until 1961, the pattern of industrial relations was very much 
the brain child of management. At the time the factory opened, 
the Labour Department was strongly advocating the use of advisory 
works committees as a stop-gap until unions developed. This was 
rejected by the management, although local personnel officers later 
regretted this decision as it meant lost opportunities for contact 
with the workers. 
The Uganda Textile Workers Union was formed in 1958, as 
soon as legally possible under the terms of the Trade Union Ordin-
ance. (See The Trades Union Ordinance, 1952, Part IV, Section 29; 
and Chapter 4, p. 60). This appears to be the only case in Uganda 
where union development might have been hampered by the res-
triction requiring three years' service in the industry before holding 
union office. Nyanza Textiles was in a special situation with an 
entirely new work force and a management determined to sponsor 
the growth of unions as quickly as possible. Management stated 
that "the union was formed under the guidance of senior African 
employees who had previously been selected for training for pro-
motion to management." (Uganda Argus, 25 November, 
1961). The main outside assistance for the union came from the 
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Labour Department's specialist Industrial Relations Officer, 
James Brandie. In 1959, the union executive was deemed by 
management to be "a responsible body". A simple recognition and 
procedural agreement was signed, based upon a model supplied by 
the Labour Department. 
In as much as there were no serious strikes, the union maae 
sound progress until 1961. The most active group, initially, were 
the clerical workers. Because they were literate and possessed 
knowledge of the whole industrial process, they tended to become 
union shop stewards even in non-clerical sections. Apart from this 
group, there was greater attachment to sectional loyalties. The 
workers, new to a factory community, preferred to work in small 
gangs, often composed on a tribal basis. Each cell displayed little 
interest in any other cell, and there was no co-ordination by the 
union central executive. Weakness in communication and union 
discipline meant that each cell could conduct its own minor stop-
pages. This meant not involving the rest of the union's executive 
super-structure, and also not seriously challenging the absolute 
authority of management. 
It is against this background that the events of 1961 must be 
viewed. All the ingredients for conflict and misunderstanding were 
present. Uncompromising non-African supervisors were in 
charge of inexperienced and tribally divided Africans. Modern 
personnel techniques were at odds with traditional ideas. Senior 
union leaders were as responsible to the management as to their 
own members. Beneath them existed a large number of irresponsi-
ble and independent work cells. 
The strain began to tell towards the end of a second unsettling 
period of factory expansion. A carefully balanced Africanisation 
plan came unstuck, through no fault of the management, and dis-
rupted union leadership. The intention was to promote only half of 
the management trainee unionists so that the remainder could con-
tinue to direct the union. When they had built up a responsible body 
of successors they, too, would be promoted and the process conti-
nued. The balance was destroyed by the international trade union 
movement. Three of the remaining six management trainees were 
removed for union training overseas and at the Kampala Labour 
College. This meant that the 1961 union executive was immature 
and untutored, easy prey for ambitious "outsiders". The manage-
ment "hoped that the few long-service union members would be 
able to guide the new executive along responsible lines . . . the re-
verse proved to be the case." (Uganda Argus, 25 November 1961). 
The combined effect of promotions and scholarships had drained 
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the union of both talent and moderation. Management complained 
of "an intensifying campaign against normal factory discipline, 
against expatriate staff and, more particularly, against their own 
African colleagues recently promoted." ( Uganda Argus, 25 
November, 1961). This seems to have been fomented mainly at 
shop-floor level by the shop stewards. The new executive was too 
weak to exert its authority on behalf of greater moderation. Up 
to September there was a marked decline in discipline, constant 
time-wasting and infringements of common-sense regulations. In 
defiance of negotiated disputes procedure, there were no less than 
eighty-eight unofficial stoppages. 
The prime mover in this rebellion was A. H. W. Mugala. 
Mugala had reached a high level in secondary school before his 
education was curtailed by financial difficulties. Then he worked 
first as an auditor's clerk, later as an assistant in the medical 
department and finally taught in a small school in Bukedi owned 
by his uncle. He was active in Bukedi politics as the secretary 
of the Uganda National Congress and a local councillor. In 1960 
his school was closed down and he was forced to leave the district, 
perhaps because of his role in the Bukedi tax riots. 
In Jinja he became a self-appointed adviser to a number of the 
local unions. In November 1960, he applied to Nyanza Textiles for 
a position as a laboratory assistant and was later engaged. On 
arrival he decided that union activity was too much dominated by 
management, and, after one month's compulsory probation, became 
a shop steward. 
In June, elections were held to replace departing members of 
the executive. This touched off a serious internal dispute which 
relieved the pressure on management. A three-way split developed 
in the union between Wandera, the current General Secretary, 
Okumu, who had replaced Wandera when he accepted a scholar-
ship to Israel, and Mugala. Violence occurred at the June meeting, 
when executive members refused to step down after a decision of 
dissolution had been taken. This was followed by a series of 
meetings and press statements in which each leader claimed to 
have secured the dismissal of the other two. The Registrar had 
refused to recognise the elections because of unconstitutional pro-
cedures, and the General Secretary of the Uganda TUC failed in his 
attempt to heal the split. All three leaders may have had their 
eye on a scholarship to the United States which was to be offered 
to the General Secretary elected in August. Ironically, the strike 
prevented anyone from taking it up. In the meantime, manage-
ment had successfully backed an informal organisation at shop 
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steward level, devised by the Uganda TUC General Secretary when 
the top leadership had virtually ceased to function. Communica-
tions improved, productivity and bonus earning rose and breaches 
of discipline were halved — but this was only the calm before 
the storm. 
At the August Annual General Meeting, Mugala succeeded in 
establishing himself in complete control. Management seem to 
have had grounds for their assertion that the election was engineer-
ed. Only 300 attended, of whom over half were Samia like Mugala, 
and the remainder Kenyan Luos. Procedures seemed closer to 
mob rule than democracy. Of Mugala's opponents, Wandera 
became an industrial relations officer with the Uganda Company 
together with other disillusioned trade unionists; and Okumu, a 
Luo, later moved into Nyanza Textiles management as a super-
visor. 
After August, the campaign of disruption resumed. Shop 
stewards were countermanding the orders of foremen. Unofficial 
stoppages continued, with union officials refusing to try and get 
men back to work even where no dispute had been notified. A 
wages claim was presented demanding increases ranging between 
60%—85% as part of a reaction to an altered bonus system which 
management had introduced without explanation. A strike was 
called in support, then called off when management agreed to talks 
on a smaller increase. The threat was renewed on October 30, after 
management failed to see any justification for the union's claim. 
In the meantime, Mugala had been dismissed by Nyanza Tex-
tiles for threatening to strike an African supervisor. The Labour 
Department advised reinstatement in the belief that Mugala would 
be more responsible if he remained an employee of the company. 
This advice was rejected by management, but they could not pre-
vent him continuing to hold union office as General Secretary. 
Mugala's policy was not lacking in opponents within the union. 
On October 16, Kasumba (President of the union) publicly dis-
owned the more extreme claims and later resigned, together with 
four other members of the executive. But this merely removed a 
restraining influence, and Mugala continued undaunted. 
The management had lost patience by the end of October. A 
formal letter had been sent to emphasise earlier warnings that the 
union's disruptive tactics were a constant breach of the 1959 Re-
cognition and Procedural Agreement. This went unheeded and 
management concluded that "it was faced with an organisation 
determined to undermine the authority of management and prevent 
it carrying on its proper function within the industry." (Uganda 
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Argus, 25 November, 1961). The point had been reached where 
management considered the union to be a threat to its existence, 
and felt that for its own survival it must humble the union. 
On Saturday, October 31st, the storm broke. A month later, 
The Reporter commented tha t : 
"This strike will be quoted to future leaders of labour and 
industry as a classic example of how labour-management relations 
should not be conducted." (25 November, 1961). 
Without knowing the long history of unrest, the immediate 
point of issue seems ludicrously insignificant. The financial stake 
involved was only two fines of 90 cents. The dispute was touched 
off by an African supervisor finding two machine operators asleep 
in the lavatories. In accordance with established discipline proce-
dure he imposed the normal punishment of cancelling their daily 
bonus. The men complained to their shop steward who called a 
stoppage, despite contrary advice from a more senior union official. 
Management promptly dismissed the shop steward, and the whole 
shift went out on strike. 
At this point, Ed Welsh, ICFTU adviser for East Africa, 
intervened. He had participated earlier in wage negotiations, 
securing a moderation in the union's 85% claim, but failing in his 
attempt to introduce a comprehensive agreement based upon his 
North American experience. Welsh encouraged the union to par-
ticipate in talks with management, and a conditional form of 
agreement was reached. If the union President could guarantee 
the ending of the unofficial stoppages, management would agree to 
reinstate the shop steward pending an independent enquiry. 
Once again, union communication and discipline failed. The 
workers regarded the reinstatement as a great victory over manage-
ment. The hedging conditions were either not known about, or 
ignored. The morning shift jubilantly returned to work, but the 
afternoon shift worked for only ten minutes before they, too, went 
on strike. 
Conflicting accounts have been given of the reasons for this 
second dispute. The union version, as confirmed in press reports, 
is that the men struck as a result of another dismissal. After 
serving a two week prison sentence, a worker had reported with 
the shift and was told he had been dismissed. The management 
version claims that the strike began at 4.10 p.m., that the man did 
not report for work till 4.30 and that only management were 
aware of his dismissal before he reported. 
But work had certainly stopped again. Management invited 
a member of the union executive to address the men to urge them 
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to return to work. He failed, and other leaders did no better. 
Finally the whole shift was dismissed under factory regulation 
16 (g) "for refusing to obey a reasonable order". 
In the Sunday breathing space, the Management Executive 
Committee met. After long discussion, it was decided to withdraw 
support for the 1959 Recognition and Procedural Agreement. They 
undoubtedly had strong legal and moral grounds for their decision. 
The union had long since ceased to feel bound by the procedures 
accepted in this agreement, and the agreement itself was so simply 
worded that it gave unlimited breadth in interpretation, and so 
constructed that it was not possible to abrogate one section without 
withdrawing recognition at the same time. It had been drawn up 
at a time when it seemed impossible that the current situation 
could develop. Nevertheless, the decision to withdraw union recog-
nition complicated the ensuing negotiations, and hampered a final 
agreement. 
On Monday, November 2nd, management maintained its strong 
line. It was feared that the dismissed shift would attempt to 
create disorder by reporting for work at the same time as the 
Monday morning shift and that non-dismissed workers would be 
victimised. Police aid was enlisted to restrict the activities of 
Mugala and other union officials by placing them on bonds of 
good behaviour. When large numbers of workers were absent, 
notices were posted requiring men to report within 24 hours or 
be dismissed. Later they were paid off. 
On Tuesday, the first of innumerable negotiations began. 
Francis Pulle, the Ganda President of the Uganda TUC, was invited 
by both sides to assist in reaching a settlement. A joint press 
release records that amicable discussions took place. Of all the 
negotiators who became involved, only Pulle seems to have appre-
ciated the management's intransigence concerning its present union 
executive. He advised the workers to accept the dismissal of eight 
key figures, demanded by management as a condition for settle-
ment. He failed to convince management to restore union recogni-
tion under the 1959 Agreement, but did receive a promise of a 
new agreement when work was resumed. 
But the advice of the honest broker from Kampala was rejected 
by the union. This was partly because he was from Kampala, 
and a Ganda, while the Nyanza Textiles leaders were Samia. The 
Uganda T U C had long been guilty of ignoring Jinja interests and 
exerted little authority over Jinja unions. The Nyanza Textiles 
unionists felt little loyalty or responsibility to the T U C as such, 
and it seemed that Pulle was acting treacherously in dealing with 
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a management which refused to recognise its own union. The vital 
first chance for a quick settlement was therefore lost. As in any 
dispute, conciliation became more difficult as attitudes were allowed 
to harden. 
On the same day, the Uganda Argus carried a damaging edito-
rial. It called on the Minister of Labour to use his power to inter-
vene personally. "As an elected Minister he is credited with the 
confidence of all the people and should by his authority be able 
to call both sides together." (Uganda Argus, 2 November, 1961.) 
That statement would have been true of the later UPC 
government. But it was decidedly not true of the Democratic 
Party government at the end of 1961. Benedicto Kiwanuka's 
administration was based on a majority of seats won at the March 
elections with a minority of votes, and the aid of an electoral 
boycott. It could only hope to be returned at the April elections 
by attracting support away from the more radical Uganda Peoples 
Congress. Ministers in this government certainly did not enjoy 
"the confidence of all the people", but they were ready to seize any 
opportunity to create that impression. 
Yet it was the UPC and not Kiwanuka's Democratic Party 
which came onto the scene first. According to his own press 
release, Humphries Luande "answered an SOS from the textile 
workers and flew back from London." (Uganda Argus, 6 Novem-
ber, 1961). In fact he was already on his way back when the 
strike began. As well as being the most prominent unionist 
in the UPC, Luande was also full-time organising secretary of the 
Uganda TUC. He and Pulle were involved in a struggle for influ-
ence in the TUC. Pulle's intervention in the Nyanza Textiles dis-
pute was interpreted as an attempt to widen his TUC support. 
Luande was in a stronger position in Jinja because of his fiery 
personality, his long experience in the Uganda-wide Railway Union 
and his close tribal links with the Samia union leaders. When the 
Democratic Party government later intervened to try to boost 
their popularity, Luande's UPC interests also became involved. 
While posing as conciliator, he realised that political advantages 
would attach to the role of an uncompromising champion of the 
workers. 
Luande was accepted by both sides as a liaison officer. This 
was needed to overcome negotiation difficulties arising from man-
agement's non-recognition of the union. The critical issue from 
management's viewpoint was the assertion of its prerogative of 
deciding whom to employ. It refused to re-engage all its former 
workers automatically, but wished to act as if recruiting new 
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labour. In this way it would assert clearly its dominance over 
the union. 
Management and independent observers claim that Luande 
twice signed agreements permitting restaffing on management terms, 
in return for concessions on recognition which would have ended 
the dispute. On both occasions, Luande publicly repudiated the 
agreements by encouraging the strikers to stay out. His liaison 
activities during negotiations also seem to have led to misunder-
standings on both sides. At the end of a week, management 
were fed up. Pulle was recalled "to help them solve difficulties 
they were experiencing in dealing with Mr. Luande." (Uganda 
Argus, 25 November, 1961). At this meeting with Pulle and 
management, Luande demanded unconditional reinstatement of all 
workers and later included the dismissal of members of the per-
sonnel department in his terms of settlement. 
By November 13, it was clear that no progress was being made. 
The Chief Minister, Kiwanuka, now intervened. This was 
soundly applauded by the Uganda Argus, pointing out that "a 
powerful outside mediator had become essential." (Uganda Argus, 
13 November, 1961). Kiwanuka acted as a go-between with more 
success than Luande, even persuading management to sit down 
at the same table as the union leaders they no longer recognised. 
This eased the communication problem. A marathon 13-hour 
meeting followed. At midnight, the mentally exhausted nego-
tiators believed that some sort of agreement had been reached. 
But, at the signing of the formal draft next day, it was repudiated 
by management because new clauses had been introduced which 
challenged prerogatives they were determined to preserve. 
This decision led to attacks on management by both Kiwanuka 
and by Luande. After a fortnight without pay, however, the bulk 
of the workers were fed up with negotiations. The strike began to 
collapse. Recruitment figures began to climb, and by November 
16, over half the workers were back. Luande attempted to reopen 
negotiations with more moderate demands, but management stood 
firm on non-recognition and no re-engagement. The next day, 
Luande advised returning to work although most workers had 
already done so. The union had capitulated. 
The failure of the strike left a curious situation in the factory. 
The management used its established prerogative not to re-employ 
68 of the leading unionists. A number were later allowed to filter 
back, but the hard core of troublemakers were removed perma-
nently. 
Mugala was already outside the factory when the strike began. 
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He remained a most active General Secretary, and continued to 
exert influence through the personal following he had built up 
within the factory. Union membership naturally dropped after the 
strike, and the remaining members continued to be fiercely loyal 
to Mugala at two successive elections. The management continued 
its policy of non-recognition while Mugala remained in office. The 
elections which confirmed his position were once again considered 
suspect because of the actions of tribally-based pressure groups. 
However, the fact of his election and his stated desire to sign and 
abide by any recognition agreement won Mugala influential sup-
porters. In August 1962 he could still claim the backing of both 
the Uganda T U C and many Labour Department officials. It was 
considered high handed of management to refuse to recognise a 
duly elected and apparently co-operative union official. 
Management refused to be swayed by hostile public opinion. 
Unsuccessful attempts were made to insulate the provisional union 
leadership from Mugala's influence. Later the management suc-
ceeded in building up and strengthening the lower ranks of the 
union structure by regular consultations with former shop stewards. 
A period of industrial peace followed, in which management gave 
informal recognition to all the union officials except Mugala. The 
policy had clearly begun to pay off when Kasumba, at the head 
of a caretaker executive, claimed to be the only effective General 
Secretary. Then the Kasumba group of moderates, tacitly backed 
by management, almost won the August elections. They were 
defeated by the intervention of Mugala, backed by another Samia, 
the TUC organiser in Jinja. Three weeks later, Kasumba claimed 
that the union could make no progress while Mugala stayed. He 
attacked the TUC's interference in union affairs and threatened 
that the union would leave the T U C and even join the Uganda 
Federation of Labour. 
The threats were unnecessary. After August, Mugala's stocks 
began to decline. The success of management's isolationist policy 
weakened his control over the still provisional executive. He had 
been able to contact union members after work, but he was unable 
to visit the factory itself and influence the day-to-day conduct of 
business. His salary as absentee full-time General Secretary was 
considered an unnecessary luxury. Mugala himself began to take 
up other interests. He associated himself with the Uganda Fede-
ration of Labour and this further divided him from the rest of the 
executive and also lost him the backing of the T U C and the Labour 
Department. At yet another election, in February 1963, he was de-
cisively defeated and allowed to concentrate on these new activities. 
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The union leadership which succeeded him was headed by one 
of those originally not re-employed because of his union activities 
during the strike. Over half the executive had previously supported 
Mugala but later responded to appeals for greater responsibility. 
The number of disputes declined, perhaps aided by the rapid re-
placement of many of the skilled but tactless European supervisors. 
Expatriate technicians by then were concentrated in non-supervi-
sory positions such as maintenance and quality control. The union 
had negotiated a more flexible comprehensive agreement on recog-
nition, disputes procedure and terms of service. A check-off 
arrangement for subscriptions gave greater financial stability and 
the executive's period of tenure was extended to avoid the lack of 
continuity arising from frequent elections. This boom period of 
productivity and industrial peace would seem to indicate a return 
to the original pattern of a "company union", with the executive 
under the influence of management. However, it seems impossible 
that some lessons had not been learnt from the experience of the 
previous year. 
Nyanza Textiles has been treated in detail because it demon-
strates so many features present, usually in a lesser degree, in the 
general structure of industrial relations in Uganda. 
The first relates to the actual structure of the negotiating ma-
chinery and the agreements which give it constitutional expression. 
Refusal to experiment with works committees merely because they 
had not proved useful in other overseas areas seems a short-
sighted failure to appreciate the different environment of Africa. 
The 1959 Agreement was drawn up to fit a particularly docile 
situation, but the comprehensive agreement advocated by the union 
during the strike was based on an equally unreal premise. A 
finely detailed and legalistic document of the North American type 
has no relevance to a single-factory union in Africa. There are 
no lawyers and highly trained officials to put such an agreement 
into effect there — only an overworked personnel department and 
an amateur, often semi-illiterate, union executive. A solution was 
finally found in a simple yet flexible structure, adapted to what 
experience had shown to be the requirements of the particular 
situation. 
The second lesson is that tribal loyalty remained a potent 
factor in a Jinja work force. It is clear that Mugala exerted 
influence over the union through his tribal affiliation with its most 
active group of members. The Samia and, to a lesser extent, the 
Luo gained control of the union. The management explained this 
partly in terms of outright intimidation but also because these 
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Kenya-based groups had more experience in industry elsewhere and 
fewer outlets for their energies than the local Soga and Ganda. At a 
lower level, work cells also tended to form on a tribal basis. These 
two aspects of tribalism taken together introduced tensions which 
supplemented the inevitable instability of an inexperienced and 
rapidly expanding work force. Other tribes felt that they were 
not being represented in the top ranks of the union and also were 
in a position to act independently of it. The personnel reshuffle 
after the strike destroyed much of the solidarity of these tribal 
cells, but the potency of tribal loyalties remained a constant factor 
in dealing with employees. 
The strike also emphasised the difficulty of managing a tightly 
controlled company union. The idea of basing a union upon 
management trainees will secure a responsible leadership for the 
moment, but it may pose as many problems as it solves. There is 
a danger that the leaders will cease to represent the rank and file 
in their desire to impress management and confirm their promo-
tion chances. What management regard as responsibility may be 
regarded by the workers as subservience. Radical leaders, perhaps 
more in tune with the masses, will be frustrated by their inability 
to reach controlling positions in the union. 
It the case of Nyanza Textiles, the radicals did manage to 
break in. This was caused by a lack of co-operation between 
senior management and the numerous international union organisa-
tions canvassing support in 1961. Those union leaders left by 
management to maintain continuity were snapped up for union 
training away from the factory. This defeated management's pur-
pose and wasted the funds of the internationals. The outburst 
which followed eventually re-established unionism on a sounder 
footing, but it proved costly to both sides. Perhaps it could have 
been avoided if management had been aware of the possible limi-
tations of their promotion policy and had established closer contact 
with outside union organisations. 
Finally, the strike indicated the dangers of introducing politi-
cal considerations into the settlement of an industrial dispute. It 
is clear that all the outside parties who involved themselves in the 
attenuated negotiations did not act with disinterest. At first only 
the leadership of the Uganda T U C was at stake. Then national 
party politics intruded with the advent of the Chief Minister. 
In an editorial which applauded this decision, the Uganda 
Argus unwittingly pointed out the attendant danger: 
"Any harshness on the part of the employers will inevitably 
make the workers feel that the government sided with management 
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to rob them of a victory which they might otherwise have won 
by a continued strike." (13 November, 1961). 
This comment was directed towards the employers, but it was 
no concern of theirs if the ruling party lost popularity. But the 
logic of the situation was not lost on others. One of Luande's 
later press statements worked its way round to accusing the (Demo-
cratic Party) government of "backing the 'lock-out' as part of their 
policy of obstructing the aims of the working people." (Uganda 
Argus, 15 November, 1961). One of the few unbiased commen-
taries on the strike concluded that "it began to look as though 
some people might be interested in prolonging the dispute in order 
to make political capital f rom it." (Reporter, 25 November, 1961). 
This could almost be regarded as a legitimate opposition tactic 
once the ruling party has given the lead, but it is no way to conduct 
industrial relations. The Labour Department existed to provide 
impartial assistance in the settlement of industrial disputes. It 
may have been inexperienced and under-staffed. It may have 
made a number of serious errors of judgement in this dispute. 
Yet the Labour Department was the only truly disinterested party. 
It was inviting trouble to have politicians intervening over the 
heads of their civil servants. The invitation was accepted. 
C h a p t e r N i n e 
THE NATIONAL UNION OF PLANTATION WORKERS 
The National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW) was poten-
tially the largest union in Uganda, as plantation workers constituted 
over one-third of the enumerated work force in private employ-
ment. Yet, despite a period of strenuous effort by the Interna-
tional Federat ion of Plantation and Allied Workers ( IFPAAW), the 
N U P W remained one of the least efficient organisations among 
the Ugandan unions, and never fulfilled its early promise. 
There are several reasons why this union should have proved 
so difficult to organise. The vast major i ty of plantation workers 
were migrants f rom Rwanda , Sudan and the outlying Ugandan 
regions of Kigezi and West Nile. They were unskilled, illiterate 
and still deeply attached to their tribal environment. Many of the 
larger concerns encouraged them to stay longer than the usual 
twelve months to develop skill and efficiency, but met with little 
success. The rapid turnover of labour was the main difficulty in 
the way of organising these workers into an effective union organi-
sation. Without any experience in such sophisticated transactions 
as regular subscriptions to a protective organisation, the workers 
saw little value in short-term union membership. 
The task of union organisers was also complicated by the com-
munication problem. Cotton and coffee were grown by peasant 
cultivators or by small Afr ican plantations employing only a hand-
ful of labourers. Tea and sugar were the main plantation crops and 
estates were widely separated. The tea estates were in a wide 
area around Fort Portal in the Western Province and scattered 
through Buganda. Sugar estates were confined to Buganda and 
Busoga, the two largest being at Lugazi and Kakira, 35 miles 
apart. The creation of a single plantation union involved co-
ordinating union activities among the workers in these widely 
separated areas. 
Finally, a plantation workers ' union was confronted by a much 
wider range of responsibilities than most unions. The sugar estates 
and the larger tea estates provided housing, food, education and 
medical and welfare services for their workers. They were self-
contained and self-sufficient communities, complete with shops, 
schools and hospitals. This meant that a union found itself 
106 The National Union of Plantation Workers 
involved in disputes on services which elsewhere would be the con-
cern of public authorities. It also posed problems for organisa-
tion activities and strengthened the power of employers. Because 
the employees were housed on private property, the employer could 
regulate the passage of outsiders into the plantation. It will be seen 
that this necessitated the negotiation of access agreements to allow 
union organisers to approach the workers, even outside working 
hours. 
Mention must be made of the situation on the smaller tea 
estates in the Western Province. The larger company-owned 
estates employed full-time plantation labour on the same basis as 
the sugar estates. The smaller growers, sometimes called out-
growers because they usually do not process their own tea but 
send it to a central factory, have a different labour structure. To 
economise on production overheads, they employed locally rec-
ruited Toro labour on a part-time basis, usually a three-hour daily 
task. These Toro labourers did not consider themselves workers 
in the usual sense as their wages acted only as a supplement to 
their subsistence and cash-crop agriculture. For this reason they 
were much more difficult to organise, although their wage-rates 
were very considerably lower than that of the full-time plantation 
employees. 
After independence, the African government sponsored a third 
group of employers in the tea industry — the small-scale African 
outgrower. Being dependent on government loans and working a 
small virgin acreage which would not reach maturity for five more 
years, this group was unable to pay the same level of wages as the 
established growers. This was appreciated by officials in the 
Labour Department as well as the other employers, and the union 
was encouraged to concentrate on the non-African employers and 
the large companies. 
As recently as 1950, the International Labour Organisation's 
Plantations Committee noted that : 
"The trade union movement among plantation workers, where 
it exists, is still at a very early stage and receives little if any 
encouragement from employers or from public authorities." (ILO. 
1950, p. 152). 
Reasons suggested for the slow development were widespread 
illiteracy, inexperience of migrant labour, tribal and racial differ-
ences and lack of support from industrial unions. Employers also 
preferred direct relations with their employees, but the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation Report believed that relations con-
ducted through representative unions would be more durable and 
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efficient. 
Even by these world standards, Uganda development was re-
markably slow. No effective union activity existed before 1960 
and even then the union would have made little progress without 
the assistance of the IFPAAW, a newly formed international 
union organisation backed by the ICFTU. Perhaps the slowness 
in Uganda can be explained in general terms by reference to the 
immaturity and late development of the union movement as a 
whole. It will also be seen that some plantation employers were 
difficult to deal with. 
The larger and newer tea-growing concerns, such as the Uganda 
Company, were quick to adopt a modern approach once unions 
established themselves in 1960. This led to a system of industrial 
relations based upon the recognition of full union rights. Opposing 
this were, on the one side, the two Asian "sugar barons" and, on 
the other, the established smaller scale European growers whose 
ideas had scarcely changed since their arrival forty years ago. 
This compares closely with the situation in Grenada as des-
cribed by S. Rottenberg: 
"Within the planter community a division has developed bet-
ween an intransigent bloc and a compromising bloc. The former 
approaches the problem of planter-worker relations with great and 
absolute principles; the latter approaches it pragmatically and is 
motivated by the maximising objectives of the western entrepre-
neur. Planter policy in labour relations is being forged out of the 
clash of these positions." (S. Rottenberg, 1952, p. 257). 
Before December, 1960, separate developments occurred in the 
sugar and tea plantations without any co-ordination. Prior to 
amalgamation the two areas will be discussed separately. The 
earliest centre of activity was at Lugazi, the larger but less centra-
lised of the two sugar plantations. Following serious rioting in 
1956, the Labour Department had urged the introduction of a sys-
tem of works committees to prevent further unrest. These seem 
to have operated to the satisfaction of management for a few 
years, but were regarded by the workers as one-way means of 
communication of little benefit to them. 
In 1958, a local Labour Department official, Tom Sebuyira. 
encouraged his brother-in-law, a clerk in the factory, to draw up 
plans for a Senior African Workers Union. He was aided by offi-
cials of the Uganda TUC, but when the President of the TUC pre-
sented the union's constitution to management, the clerk was fired. 
Labour Department pressure caused him to be reinstated, but he 
was effectively discouraged from continuing his plans for a union. 
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Instead he received management encouragement in the formation 
of a staff association for African senior employees. Membership 
was limited to those earning more than a monthly wage of 125 
shillings and the association possessed no sanctions against man-
agement actions. Nevertheless the association was paraded to the 
ICFTU Visiting Mission the following year as a demonstration that 
unions were not needed in the plantations. 
The Mission was apparently not convinced, as it encouraged a 
group of hospital orderlies to try and alter the structure of the 
association. Early in 1960, a mass meeting attacked the weakness 
of the association in its dealings with management and decided to 
set up the Uganda Sugar Factory Workers Union. Application was 
made for registration on probation and the leaders were advised, 
first by Luande and then by Sebuyira, to amalgamate with another 
union growing up in the Fort Portal tea estates. Luande gave no 
clue how this might be achieved but Sebuyira, who later became 
Industrial Relations Officer after the departure of Brandie, actually 
wrote letters on behalf of the union to the various parties con-
cerned. 
In May, 1960, a serious 'wildcat' strike occurred at Lugazi 
which threatened to destroy the union before it had begun. Subject-
ed to police interrogation, the union leaders denied that they were 
responsible for the disturbance and blamed political agitators. At 
this time, Buganda was unsettled by the anti-Asian commercial 
boycott and hostility was inevitably directed towards the largest 
Asian landowners and employers of labour. The strike was accom-
panied by wildly unrealistic wage demands. A personnel officer 
at Lugazi recalled that the new union leaders took a moderate 
line and advised a return to work after management offered a small 
general increase in wages. As a result of this strike, the leaders 
were forced to act cautiously and secretively to avoid giving cause 
for management action. That none were dismissed was a measure 
of their tact and careful approach in dealing with union business 
in their leisure time. 
The ICFTU Visiting Mission also gave encouragement to deve-
lopments in the Fort Portal area. The ICFTU East African Repre-
sentative, Albert Hammerton, had made an attempt to intro-
duce unions to the tea estates in 1958 but a constitution he drew 
up was shown to contravene the Trade Union Ordinance. Little 
interest was displayed by the Africans until a group of clerks be-
came aware of the limitations of the works committee when wages 
questions came up for discussion. The secretary of the works 
committee at the Uganda Company's Kijura estate, Romano 
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Imanyoha, applied for Labour Department assistance in founding 
a union. The personnel department objected on the grounds that 
effective works committees made unions unnecessary, and threaten-
ed to withdraw all fringe benefits if wages in future were to be 
made subject to negotiation rather than unilaterally determined by-
management. Nevertheless, the clerical group went ahead. They 
were aided by a visit f rom Uganda T U C officials who supervised 
the election of officers and the drafting of a constitution in late 
1959. On February 15, 1960, the National Union of Plantation 
Workers (NUPW) was registered, with its head office in Fort 
Portal. 
At the beginning of March, both plantations of the Uganda 
Company (Kijura and Kiamara) went on strike and serious rioting 
followed. At the end of February the union had held a mass 
meeting which led to the circulation of two conflicting rumours 
among the unsophisticated mass of migrant workers. One stated 
that the union had promised to secure an immediate pay increase, 
the other that management would be giving a wage increase to all 
those who had refused to join the union to show that unions were 
not a good thing. The monthly wage payments of normal rates 
showed that both rumours were false, but considerable unrest pre-
vailed as a result. When 2,000 field workers went on strike, the 
situation rapidly got out of hand and police opened fire. One 
man was killed, and a number wounded. The strike lasted a 
week and considerable attention was focused on the dangerously 
poor state of industrial relations in the plantations. In the parlia-
mentary debate which followed, the use of police against strikers 
was criticised, although the Chief Secretary claimed that they were 
facing "a riotous mob and not a group of employees seeking the 
redress of industrial grievances". (Uganda Argus, 13 March, 
1960). This was borne out by the press statements of George 
Ruguma, who had been elected as first General Secretary of the 
NUPW. He described the strike as unofficial, and made strenuous 
efforts to prevent violence (Uganda Argus, 3 March, 1960). 
After the strike, management denied that an industrial dispute 
had ever existed because no notice of grievances had been given 
and no attempt made to arrange for negotiations. The President 
of the union was transferred to the Kampala office of the company 
and Ruguma was dismissed. He was subsequently appointed full-
time General Secretary of the Lugazi branch of the NUPW. The 
union continued not to be recognised by the company and its sup-
porters dwindled. 
Nevertheless, the strike seems eventually to have had consi-
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derable impact upon the higher levels of management. The Gene-
ral Manager was transferred, and the personnel department was 
put under the control of a former Labour Commissioner in Fiji 
who openly accepted the value of trade unionism. This change 
coincided with a visit from Walter Hood of the British TUC. 
en route to Kenya, who led a top level delegation which persuaded 
the Uganda Company to recognise the union. From this point 
the Company began to take an often unpopular lead among the tea 
estates in fostering union growth and also indirectly putting pres-
sure on the two sugar employers. 
In September, 1960, David Barratt arrived in East Africa 
as the first of a number of advisers sponsored by IFPAAW. This 
marked the beginning of a year of intense efforts made by out-
siders to get the N U P W firmly established. Barratt had already 
gained wide experience in Malaya and West Africa and was able 
to establish closer contact with officials and employers than the 
original African leaders of the two embryonic unions. He also 
brought the leaders of both groups together into a single national 
organisation under James Ojambo from the Lugazi Sugar 
Factory as General Secretary. The communication problem was 
underlined by the fact that the headquarters of the new organisa-
tion had to be placed in Kampala as the only convenient point of 
common interest to both groups. Until the union could make 
itself financially self-sufficient, IFPAAW agreed to provide rent 
for office accommodation and the salaries of a full-time organiser 
and other officials. 
Unfortunately, Barratt was able to spend only a few weeks in 
Uganda and, when he left, his work was taken over by M 
Mpangala from Tanganyika. As an African, and lacking Barratt 's 
experience, Mpangala found it difficult to make much headway 
with the Asian and European employers. He also proved unreliable 
in his dealings with the new union executive. The 1961 IFPAAW 
Report (p. 4) noted that Mpangala, after a number of earlier acci-
dents, finally wrecked the union's vehicle beyond repair. The use 
of this vehicle was the subject of much criticism from the union 
leaders at the Lugazi sugar estate who asserted that it was used 
for Mpangala's personal use and not available for recruiting expe-
ditions around the scattered housing camps. After a second dis-
pute, the Lugazi executive passed a resolution dispensing with 
Mpangala's services in that area. He subsequently lost all interest 
in the union and returned to Tanganyika. 
He was succeeded by Dr. V. L. Allen, a lecturer at Leeds 
University engaged on academic research into Labour problems. 
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Allen retained the loyalty of the union but made himself exceeding-
ly unpopular with both employers and Labour Department officials. 
Because he did not wish to appear before the workers in the 
company of management officials, he refused to call on employers 
or request permission to visit their plantations. He was also highly 
critical of the Labour Department, which he asserted was inefficient 
in safeguarding the conditions of workers and unduly influenced 
by the opinions of the employers (Uganda Argus, 22 September, 
1961). His visit to Uganda helped the NUPW because of his role 
in key negotiations and for the new ideas he introduced, such as 
the use of the political type of rally to demonstrate popular 
support. He also perfected the technique of appealing to public 
opinion through the press, judging that non-African employers are 
more concerned about their public image than about the danger 
of a strike. Yet his outspoken criticisms aroused considerable re-
sentment among the two groups whose assistance was most needed 
it the union was to consolidate its hold on the workers. 
When Allen arrived, the stage seemed set for negotiations which 
would give some concrete gain to the union members. First, 
however, the NUPW had to face a serious challenge in the sugar 
estates. Its only branch was in Lugazi and from Kakira came 
news of a competing union, the Uganda Sugar and Allied Workers 
Union. This was organised by John Reich, the leader of the Jinja-
based Uganda Federation of Labour. This other union had the 
backing of both employers as it was designed to cater only for 
sugar workers and not for all plantations. It seems that Reich 
was trading on this desire of the employers to exclude themselves 
from a national union in order to build up the local following for 
the Uganda Federation of Labour (UFL). 
He was vigorously opposed by the NUPW and their advisers. 
Pressure was put on the Labour Department which, after much 
hesitation, decided not to accept Reich's application for registra-
tion. Reich's attempt to extend the union to Lugazi also met with 
limited success. The NUPW retained its hold there despite the 
employers' unconcealed preference for the smaller union. When 
the NUPW Annual Conference called for discussions with the sugar 
owners on wages increases, Reich's union lost face with most 
workers when it opposed such demands. The NUPW succeeded 
in showing that the Uganda Sugar and Allied Workers Union was 
a tool of management. By April, the U F L had collapsed as an 
effective organisation and Reich agreed to disband his sugar wor-
kers' union (Uganda Argus, 8 April, 1961). 
Once the possibility of a serious split had been averted, nego-
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tiations started with both sugar and tea estate managements. A 
recognition agreement had been negotiated with the Uganda Com-
pany before Barratt 's departure and it was left to Allen to follow 
it up with a wage claim. In July, this claim was submitted, asking 
for a 40% wage increase for tea pickers, a reorganisation of the 
wage structure and an acceptance of the principle of the check-off 
method of subscription collection. Although no wage increase had 
been granted in the last three years, the Company objected to such 
a stiff demand so soon after they had conceded recognition to the 
union. Management feared that a large immediate increase would 
make both the company and the union unpopular with the other 
estate owners. They offered instead the introduction of a task 
system to increase productivity, although Allen was able to show 
that this would lead in practice to a reduced income for the less 
productive pickers. 
The union adjourned the meeting and reported to their mem-
bers that the company offered only a reduction and not an increase 
in reply to their claim. This caused considerable unrest and the 
union leaders realised that their following would lose confidence 
unless some sort of increase could be secured. A strike was not 
feasible in view of the small following behind the union at that 
stage, and the earlier incident had shown that an undisciplined 
demonstration could easily degenerate into a violent riot. Instead, 
to impress the employers of their determination, a poster parade 
was organised in Kampala to publicise the union's claim. 
At the resumed meeting, according to the union delegates, ma-
nagement's attitude changed at the appearance of the parade 
because they wished to avoid the bad publicity. A mediator was 
appointed from the Labour Department and, after considerable 
debate and the publication of conflicting press statements, a com-
promise was accepted with management agreeing to an overall 
10% increase. Although much less than demanded, the union was 
able to represent this as a considerable victory as it was the first 
negotiated wage increase in the plantation industries. 
At much the same time, a Recognition Agreement was being 
concluded with the sugar estate owners as a prelude to a similar 
wage claim. Initially the owners had refused to recognise the 
NUPW because of their preference for Reich's union, but finally 
they registered the Uganda Sugar Manufacturers Association and 
agreed to start negotiations. An Access Agreement was drawn 
up by the personnel department at Lugazi in consultation with the 
NUPW General Secretary, Ojambo. Under protest it was accepted 
by Allen and the union executive, although neither had been con-
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suited and they considered it unduly restrictive. Under the terms 
of the Agreement, a four month pause would follow before the 
union would be given full recognition. The management also 
prescribed that the union should be backed by a majority of the 
work force as fully paid-up members. As this involved the recruit-
ment of 11,000 illiterate migrant workers, this was considered an 
insuperable obstacle to immediate recognition. 
Allen advised that the union should disregard the formal con-
ditions of management and demonstrate that the union had a mass 
following irrespective of the number of paid-up members. Kakira 
remained weakly organised as a result of Reich's abortive efforts 
and so the union organisers concentrated on Lugazi. The techni-
ques of a political campaign were adopted, with union leaders 
visiting camps to give rousing addresses and stir up enthusiasm 
with mass rallies. On the spot donations were called for rather 
than fixed monthly subscriptions and union interest rapidly increa-
sed. From representatives sent to supervise these activities, 
management learnt of the following being built up by the union 
and were ready to recognise the union much earlier than formally 
agreed. 
Allen had succeeded in putting the union into a strong bar-
gaining position against the employers. Unfortunately, at the same 
time, he encouraged the union leaders to adopt uncompromising 
tactics which they could not sustain without his assistance. Adopt-
ing the hard-hitting tactics of western trade unions brought imme-
diate gains but had the long-term effect of encouraging already 
difficult employers to resist any further strengthening of union acti-
vity in the future. When Allen left in September, 1961, the second 
phase of union growth came to an end. An IFPAAW adviser 
from Nairobi paid occasional visits, but he was not in a position 
to take the same continuous interest in the situation in Uganda. 
On the whole, the local leadership was left to its own devices, to 
build upon or to destroy the foundation laid in the previous year. 
At first, things went well. Following the recognition agreement 
with the sugar manufacturers' association, a general wage increase 
was negotiated and the check-off system of dues collection was 
accepted in principle. The Lugazi branch of the union also won a 
rare word of praise for its handling of a dispute concerning a dis-
missal after a shop steward refused to continue working under 
conditions that he judged to be dangerous. A short strike was 
followed by the union agreeing to accept mediation which subse-
quently recommended reinstatement. A local weekly magazine 
contrasted the reasonable behaviour of the union leaders with the 
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past strikes which had been "blind, headless and disorganised." 
(Reporter, 19 October, 1963). 
However, the union went into marked decline during 1962 and 
into 1963. Of the two sugar estates, Kakira remained weakly 
organised with leadership in the hands of a small clique who were 
out of touch with the views of the bulk of the workers. This led 
to ludicrous situations in which the union leaders negotiated 
changes in the prevailing situation only to have their actions repu-
diated by the mass of the workers once they realised what was 
happening. The personnel manager also complained that the union 
leaders consistently failed to follow through with detailed negotia-
tions after they had lodged and publicised their original claims. 
In themselves, the claims were sufficient to ensure the popularity 
of the leaders among the bulk of the union members and manage-
ment were blamed when nothing further occurred. This led to 
increasing discontent and a rash of unofficial strikes which the 
union leaders were powerless to control. On one occasion, a group 
of workers of a different tribe from that of the union leaders 
refused to go back to work until the President of the Uganda TUC 
offered to take up their case. 
At Lugazi, the original union executive was more experienced 
and had benefited more from the services of the international advi-
sers. Tribal distinctions were of less importance and a number 
of leaders had been trained either overseas or at the Kampala 
Labour College. But ambitious individuals outside the union 
leadership seem to have coveted the prestige enjoyed by the estab-
lished leaders, who came to be attacked as management stooges. 
At the annual branch elections, a major dispute over the leader-
ship developed and, on appeal f rom one of the interested parties, 
the union headquarters refused to accept the validity of the elec-
tion results. The personnel management did likewise, and the 
explosive situation occurred in which two groups competed for the 
support of the bulk of the union members by out-bidding each 
other in claims upon management. Anarchy and wildcat strikes 
prevailed until the Registrar of Trade Unions intervened. The 
elections were declared invalid on the grounds that proper regard 
had not been paid to provisions in the union's constitution requir-
ing balanced representation of the various sectional interests. New 
elections confirmed in power the less experienced of the two groups 
but the estate continued to be plagued by unofficial stoppages which 
demonstrated the weakness of the union's control over its members. 
This eventually led to the appointment of a Government Commis-
sion of Enquiry into the state of industrial relations in the sugar 
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industry. 
In the tea estates, the union also failed to fulfil its early promise. 
At the end of 1962, an employers' association was formed by a 
number of the larger and more progressive companies with the 
backing of the Federation of Uganda Employers. A comprehen-
sive agreement was negotiated with the union and unilaterally the 
Uganda Company also agreed to grant a check-off arrangement to 
facilitate the collection of union finances. However, the leading 
members of the association complained that the agreement was 
enforced in a most haphazard manner and particularly resented the 
fact that smaller companies nominally covered by the collective 
agreement were permitted by the union to continue paying much 
less without protest. 
The European outgrowers remained the most difficult to deal 
with. The Report of the 1962 Minimum Wages Advisory Board 
recommended that : 
"Legislative provision should be made to enable agreements re-
lating to minimum wages made between the National Union of 
Plantation Workers and Employers in the tea and sugar industries 
to be applied by law to all employees in these industries." (UG, 
1962, p. 19). 
It was appreciated that special provision would need to be made 
for African outgrowers who were just beginning to establish them-
selves on a small scale but the main aim was to place the large 
companies on a competitive footing with the European growers. 
Nothing came of this recommendation, probably because the union 
showed no interest whatever in organising this section of the indus-
try in the face of opposition. The outgrowers had indirectly taken 
account of the union's existence by unilaterally granting a 20% 
increase in wages, but their rates continued to be well below those 
paid on the larger estates. 
This third phase of development clearly showed a basic weak-
ness in union leadership which had been concealed previously by 
the presence of international advisers. In common with many 
unions in Uganda, the NUPW was plagued by internal dissensions 
and defections to management among the top leadership. The 
coalition of the tea and sugar employees into a single national union 
brought together two very different groups of leaders. On the 
Fort Portal tea estates, the early leaders were local Toro people 
engaged in clerical work rather than the short term migrants from 
Kigezi and Rwanda. On the sugar estates near Jinja, the clerical 
workers were mainly Ganda who at first considered union member-
ship as an activity beneath their status. Unions were started by 
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Kenyans employed as hospital orderlies and factory mechanics. 
In neither case was much interest shown in union activity by the 
bulk of the workers in the fields and, even at the end of 1963, it 
remained true that the majority of the union membership was 
drawn from the factory and administrative groups. At the Kakira 
sugar estate, the union had 553 fully paid up members in the 
factory labour force of 2,253 and only 230 among the remaining 
7,802 employed elsewhere. 
The division of offices between the two areas when the national 
union was formed in 1960 led to a rather uneasy alliance. The 
two sections had little in common beyond the basic fact of con-
cern with plantation agriculture. Each section dealt with emplo-
yers of a different race and with very different ideas on the con-
duct of industrial relations, so that there were few bonds of com-
mon interest. It was left to the national leadership to hold the 
new organisation together by forging personal links between the 
two groups. Ojambo and Zarabweji failed to do this. The Lugazi 
executive threatened to secede and Ojambo was forced out of 
office. He subsequently joined Reich in the personnel department 
of the Kakira sugar estate. 
The removal of Ojambo left a gap in the national leadership 
which was filled most effectively for a time by Eribankya, a former 
school-teacher and accounts clerk in Fort Portal. The IFPAAW 
adviser in Nairobi reported that Eribankya was the backbone of 
the union during his period in office but that he was receiving 
little support from branch officials who resented central control 
over their policies. Unfortunately for the union, Eribankya was 
seriously incapacitated as a result of a car smash at the end of 
1962. On his return, he finally conceded that the task of rejuve-
nating the union was beyond him and also crossed over to person-
nel management. 
This left the national leadership to two Fort Portal men, Zara-
bweji and Imanyohwa, a fact which might help to explain the lack 
of control that was exercised over events in the sugar estates. At 
the end of 1963, there was a general lack of confidence in the 
leadership of the union although nobody seemed prepared to do 
anything about it. Unofficial appeals had gone from the employers 
association to IFPAAW for renewed assistance, but the dynamism 
seemed to have departed from the union itself and the leaders did 
not agree that any assistance was needed. 
The history of the NUPW demonstrates the extent to which 
international assistance could stabilise and strengthen local unions, 
even in such a difficult area of organisation as the plantations. It 
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also demonstrates the way in which a decline can set in once the 
international stimulus is removed. Perhaps the basic mistake was 
that the international advisers attempted to create a single giant 
union covering all agricultural workers. This could only operate 
while the advisers themselves were present to help overcome the 
inevitable administrative difficulties involved in such an under-
taking. When the advisers left, the local leaders were not suffi-
ciently experienced or dedicated to carry on their work. The subse-
quent re-emergence of a separate sugar workers' union seemed to 
bear out this pessimistic prognosis. 
C h a p t e r Ten 
THE UGANDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UNION 
In Uganda, as in most developing countries, Government was 
the largest single employer of labour in colonial times. The rail-
ways and the postal service were under the control of the East 
African Common Services Organisation and had separate unions. 
The same applied to workers in public corporations such as the 
Uganda Electricity Board. The remainder, from central govern-
ment to municipalities, were grouped together into the Uganda 
Public Employees Union (UPEU). The story of the creation of 
the UPEU is largely the story of the efforts of one man, a volatile 
young Dutchman named Charles Franken. 
Franken came to Uganda on behalf of the Public Services 
International (PSI), an international trade secretariat. The official 
history of the PSI noted that : 
"In Africa the PSI has more affiliates than in other less deve-
loped areas. This accomplishment was originally achieved without 
any special representative, conference or mission. However, it may 
be assumed that some of the leaders of these unions had contact 
with the PSI while studying at universities in England." (US De-
partment of Labour, 1962, p. 67). 
No record exists of Ugandan leaders making any such contact. 
In 1958 a Visiting Mission was finally sent to survey the needs of 
public employees organisations in Africa. In general, the Mission 
found that : 
"African trade unionists wanted assistance and guidance from 
western unions, but under the condition that African unions retain 
the right to make their own decisions, whether these decisions are 
wise or unwise. The Mission also concluded that African unions 
have the same general problems as public employee unions else-
where, with the additional burden of being subject to government 
registration and control." (supra cit. p. 68). 
With regard to Uganda, the Mission concluded that the situa-
tion was so backward that no immediate action was felt to be 
warranted. In December, 1960, a second Mission was much more 
optimistic after a longer stay in Uganda. As a result of this visit, 
Franken was appointed. 
Before discussing the Ugandan situation on Franken's arrival, 
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something must be said of the general ideas behind the operation 
of the PSI. One idea in particular has special relevance to later 
developments in Uganda. Policy statements from the PSI execu-
tive were very guarded when referring to the rights of free collec-
tive bargaining and the use of direct action. This was inevitable 
in view of the wide variety of national practices in solving the pro-
blem of reconciling the rights of employees with the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Emphasis was laid mainly on the ILO 
Conventions guaranteeing freedom of association and on the need 
for government to recognise the reasonable grievances of its emplo-
yees. 
But, from interviews with the PSI Executive and from written 
sources, it was made clear that the PSI favoured the growth of a 
single comprehensive union to cover all levels of public employees. 
One large union would have a strong bargaining position, would 
simplify negotiation machinery and would allow most economic use 
to be made of financial and leadership resources. In a speech in 
British Guiana, the PSI General Secretary made this point when he 
showed how European workers had benefited from consolidation 
which pooled union resources: 
"The single union can not only do more than the numerous 
unions did before, it can do it better, and with less money from 
each member . . . because the single organisation can 'deliver the 
goods', the public authorities do business with it and seek its 
co-operation". (PSI Bulletin, August, 1962). 
Franken's experience in Holland would have confirmed this 
opinion. During the German occupation, union activity was com-
pletely dislocated. After the war, an effort was made to unite 
the various union factions and was initially very successful. But 
in 1954 a joint letter from the Dutch Roman Catholic bishops re-
sulted in the prohibition of Catholics from joining trade unions 
with non-Catholic members. Old schisms re-opened and, by 1960, 
no less than 117 civil service associations existed, with each cate-
gory of civil servant being catered for by five competing union or-
ganisations. Both Franken and the General Secretary of the PSI 
allowed their experience in Europe to dominate their thinking on 
problems in Uganda. The value of a single all-embracing union 
in their own countries led them to assume that the same would 
apply in Uganda. 
When Franken arrived in Uganda in 1961, he faced a mammoth 
task. Because of a decentralised structure of government, there 
were a large number of different public authorities responsible for 
the setting of wages for public servants. This situation became 
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worse after independence when the powers and responsibilities of 
the districts and native kingdoms were increased. No co-ordinating 
body existed to deal with staffing on a national scale although it 
will be seen later that the Central Government could effectively 
dictate minimum wage rates by direct legislation. 
On Franken's arrival, only three inactive staff associations exist-
ed in Kampala catering for Africans. Of these, Franken found 
that the oldest, the Kampala Local Government Staff Association, 
was only a paper construction. Attempts by its few African mem-
bers to dissolve the association in favour of a new union were 
resisted by its Asian and European members. 
In the Central Government there were staff associations divided 
on racial lines. The African body, the Uganda African Civil Ser-
vants Association, had been founded in 1955 to participate in 
joint consultative machinery modelled on the British practice of 
Whitley Councils. It was restricted to established employees and 
had a nominal membership in excess of 2,000. Franken admitted 
that it had a very low percentage of paid-up members, but des-
cribed it as the most important body of all. Its leaders were 
mainly in the highest ("super-scale") grade and the lower ranks 
lacked enthusiasm. 
Another African association was that of the Medical Assist-
ants, also founded in 1955. This was a rare craft organisation with 
branches in each of Uganda's eleven hospitals. The founder of the 
association had approached the 1958 Mission but was absent in 
1960 on an extended training course in Britain. The current leader-
ship was drawn solely from Mulago Hospital in Kampala. 
Outside Kampala, Franken found two genuine trade unions 
operating in Jinja, both founded in 1960. The first was called 
the Uganda Public Servants Union, a rather grandiloquent title as 
it catered for unestablished employees in the Ministry of Works 
and other allied manual workers. Its founder was Wangatia, an 
elderly Kenyan who had been in Jinja for seven years. Although 
he spoke no English he was obviously a dynamic and influential 
character. He told of being elected to the local works committee 
as representative of his section of mechanics, finding it to be in-
effective and then asking why the workers could not have a union 
instead. The local official told him that it was not justified but 
Wangatia then had a friend draft a letter to the Chief Secretary 
which established his legal rights. He then began his union by 
organising the mechanical section of the Ministry of Works. By 
the middle of 1961, he could claim 600 members, drawn from the 
mechanical and stores sections, housing estate workers and un-
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skilled workers in the Health Department. Only 20 were paid up, 
but the union was formally recognised. On first encounter, Franken 
commented that "it seemed to be an honest union led by simple 
men grateful of any help." (Interview, Haarlem, April, 1963). 
The second Jinja union was the Municipal and Township 
Employees Union, also led by a Kenyan, Absolom Mbwanga. 
Mbwanga had received a sound commercial education in Nairobi 
and held a number of responsible jobs before being forced to 
leave his job as assistant farm manager because of the Mau Mau 
Emergency. He ended up as an accounts clerk in the Jinja Muni-
cipality Offices and, aided by officials of the Uganda TUC, began 
to organise a union. He found that members feared victimisation 
and made little headway in his demand for recognition because a 
60% representation of the work force was demanded. Even so 
by 1960 he claimed 600 members on his books, with 50 fully 
paid up. 
Outside Jinja, four recently founded unions catered for workers 
in district administrations — Bugisu (230 members); Bukedi (270); 
Kigezi (100) and Lango (1,100). The last, centred in Lira, was by 
far the most important. In 1961, the union had eight branches 
throughout the district and its part-time officials went 'out into 
the field' every weekend. 
A factor which increased African enthusiasm for trade unions 
was the publication of the Fleming Report on salaries in the East 
African civil services (CO, 1960). This Report recommended 
various salary increases for the different grades and emphasised 
the value of uniformity among the different levels of government. 
It also introduced the system of an 'overseas addition' to the basic 
local rate to allow Africanisation of posts without the need to con-
tinue paying salaries at the expatriate level. A number of Dis-
trict Councils in Uganda were unable or unwilling to pay the 
increases recommended after the Report was accepted by the Cen-
tral Government. Employees in these administrations thus felt 
the need to increase their bargaining power by organising them-
selves into trade unions. By contrast, in Central Government, 
objections were made to the recommendations of the Commission, 
not the failure to enforce them. The principle of an 'overseas 
addition' was attacked as racially discriminatory because aspirants 
to the posts held by Europeans wanted to receive the same high 
pay when they were promoted. This concern for the top jobs per-
haps explains why many of the early leaders in the move towards 
unionism were super-scale employees. Africanisation was a surer 
way of enlarging their income than pressing for general wage 
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increases. Shortly after the publication of the Report of the Com-
mission the African Civil Servants Association announced its inten-
tion to transform itself into a union to be able to fight this case 
more effectively. 
Franken began his long task of welding together these unions 
by visiting Jinja to enlist the aid of the two unions there in a general 
recruiting drive. He was using the Kampala Labour College and 
his own house as the base for operations, but initially favoured 
the idea of a headquarters office in Jinja. 
His first concern was for the local government workers and the 
2,000 members already in separate unions. But there was no 
simple method of co-ordination. Unlike Kenya and Tanganyika, 
Uganda did not have an association of local authorities with which 
to negotiate. Franken preferred a single union to the dual structure 
separating local administrations from central government as in Bri-
tain, and worked towards this end. 
In August 1961, a conference of executives from nine unions 
was held in Kampala. This set up a series of committees to study 
the administrative and constitutional problems which hampered 
amalgamation. At this point, Franken went on a short leave. On 
his return, he was deeply disillusioned to find his work had gone 
to pieces during his absence. The paper organisation had dis-
solved. Without his driving personality, the union leaders had lost 
interest. He laboriously rebuilt his scheme and, after a second 
conference, personally supervised the drafting of a new constitu-
tion. 
The new constitution was circulated among all interested par-
lies including government officials in Uganda and at the Colonial 
Office. In the absence of adverse criticism, the provisional execu-
tive went ahead and held its Inaugural Conference on December 9, 
1961. The Uganda Public Employees Union was at last a reality. 
Although the Uganda TUC did not attend, the Deputy Labour 
Commissioner came and was impressed by the showing. Franken 
had reservations — 200 delegates attended but several unions did 
not appear, perhaps because the Conference unexpectedly clashed 
with Tanganyikan independence celebrations. 
After the inauguration, problems increased and Franken re-
ceived an extension of his visit to cope with them. The decision 
to amalgamate, formally approved at the conference, proved diffi-
cult to put into practice. The provisions of the Trade Union 
Ordinance required an awkwardly high percentage of approval 
from the members and also involved the complicated process of 
dissolution of the constituent unions. Dissolution also called int? 
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question collective agreements concluded between each union and 
its employing authority. Finally, there was the problem of recon-
ciling leaders of the small unions to subordination in a wider orga-
nisation. 
Dealings with the Busoga Local Government Employees Union 
illustrate many of the problems. This union had been founded at 
the beginning of 1961 by a group of senior clerks to replace the 
defunct staff association. The failure to implement the Fleming 
Report was one of the incentives to form a union. In addition, 
there was a special motive limited to Busoga. Posts in the local 
administration were being turned into family patronage for the 
local chiefs. Friends and relatives were being hired in excess of 
the number for which finance was available and then retrenchment 
was taking the form of dismissal of other employees of long stand-
ing. 
The Busoga union approached the UPEU in September 1961, 
ostensibly to investigate the possibility of joining. It was given 
access to documents such as model recognition agreements which 
were confidential drafts for use in negotiations with the Labour 
Commissioner. Then, instead of joining the UPEU, it used its 
newly acquired expertise to apply for recognition by the Local 
Government as a separate organisation. It also joined the Uganda 
TUC separately and the leaders were suitably rewarded. The 
General Secretary was allocated a place by the T U C on an over-
seas training course. Understandably this episode disgusted 
Franken, but he was powerless to prevent it. Relations between 
the TUC and the UPEU were very tense at the time for a number 
of reasons which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. 
In an interview, an official of the Busoga union explained his 
reasons for staying out of the UPEU. Having investigated the 
structure of the UPEU he claimed not to be satisfied that local 
interests were sufficiently protected. He pointed to the experience 
of the central government's African Civil Servants Association, 
where the dominance of super-scale employees had meant that the 
interests of lower paid groups were ignored. This had led to dis-
satisfaction and a threat to secede. If the Busoga union dissolved 
itself, there could be no effective safeguard against maltreatment 
or inefficiency by the central executive. 
Throughout the first half of 1962, Franken toiled with these 
administrative problems. He was able to open an office in Kam-
pala, which was the true hub of official activity, and had recruited 
two full-time officials. These expenditures were financed out of 
a loan made from the PSI until the Ugandan union made itself 
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financially self-sufficient. Finance remained a problem because 
of the unwillingness of branches to send on money to headquarters, 
especially where the dissolution procedure was bound up in red 
tape. But by May, the end of Franken's mission was in sight. 
Finances were improved by the two strongest unions handing over 
their assets and by the successful negotiation of a check-off agree-
ment for Central Government unestablished employees. Similar 
arrangements were pending with other employing authorities and 
membership was expanding rapidly. When Franken left in July 
he was well pleased with the internal organisation of the UPEU. 
As well as building up a strong internal organisation, Franken 
also had to contend with the changing attitudes of Government 
as an employer. 
From the beginning, he received firm support from the Colonial 
Office who recognised the PSI as a responsible organisation and 
advised the Protectorate Government to co-operate with its adviser. 
When local opposition was proving a barrier to progress, a formal 
memorandum was transmitted from the Colonial Secretary to the 
Governor reaffirming official support. Later, the Labour Adviser 
to the Colonial Office paid a visit in person, a gesture much appre-
ciated by Franken: 
"A wonderful experience was the visit of Mr. Foggon. Quite 
a lot of people feared too many complaints from my side and so 
there was a hurried clearing of desks." (Interview, Haarlem, April, 
1963). 
As that quotation indicates, many local officials were sceptical 
about the value of a strong trade union movement in the civil 
service. At about the same time, the Labour Department was 
experiencing considerable difficulty with an adviser acting for the 
plantation workers' international and there had been an unfortunate 
strike in the Nairobi Municipality union where the PSI adviser 
seems to have lost control. In 1960, attempts to form a local 
government workers' union in Kigezi had led to serious rioting. 
Visiting unionists were decidedly not welcome as a result. 
For more than three months, no progress was made by Franken. 
Although the administration was committed in general terras 
to the support of trade unions, there seems to have been conside-
rable mistrust of the idea of a union operating within the public 
service. Franken even had difficulties with the local immigration 
authorities. Despite credentials supported by the Colonial Office, 
he was refused a permanent visa and given instead a Visitor's 
Pass of limited duration. A senior official confided that this was 
done to allow his visit to be terminated at short notice, without 
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any fuss, if his activities became troublesome. 
The change in attitude so badly needed came when Franken 
returned to Europe on leave and recounted his frustrations to the 
Colonial Office. Foggons visit followed and a trained labour offi-
cer was installed in the Establishments Section of the Prime Minis-
ter's Office to deal exclusively with the UPEU. With the start of 
union activity, the Labour Commissioner transferred his respon-
sibility for the unestablished employees to this department to avoid 
the embarrassment of being required to act as both employer and 
conciliator. The new official, Antony Mousley, was the key local 
figure in changing official attitudes. In view of the general growth 
of union activity, he realised the value to government of dealing 
with a single union on behalf of the unestablished workers instead 
of allowing non-recognised general unions to recruit different sec-
tions. With the backing of Foggon, he was able to impose this 
idea on the rest of the Establishments Section. 
By January 1962, Franken was able to report that Government 
were now as co-operative as he could ever expect. A dispute with 
the Lango District Council had done much to build up his prestige 
with the Labour Department. The strong Lango union had called 
a dispute over dismissals arising out of the implementation of the 
Fleming Commission. An anomaly in the law allowed the Council 
to refuse conciliation and a strike was threatened. Franken per-
suaded the union to refer the matter to the Ministry of Local 
Government and the Labour Commissioner. After much negotia-
tion the Council was advised to reconvene and change the law. 
Franken believed that this experience has been useful in that the 
union found a serious gap in the law and thereby increased its 
prestige. Shortly afterwards the U P E U was offered a separate 
seat on a Labour Advisory Board appointed to consider general 
labour legislation. 
The long process of negotiating a check-off agreement for the 
unestablished employees clearly shows the change in official poli-
cy. At first there was an outright refusal because it was feared 
that the union, once recognised and financially sound, would be-
come too powerful. Once Franken left, the situation might get 
out of hand, as there were few effective leaders. A high percent-
age of workers enrolled in the union was demanded to resist 
arguments in favour of the check-off arrangement. 
During his visit, Foggon urged that the usual order of recogni-
tion followed by the check-off should be reversed. Recognition 
involved a wide range of rights under the Trade Union Ordinance 
and was resisted on that account. The U P E U could register as 
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a probationary trade union and be recognised after the supervision 
of the Registrar's Department had been tightened up. In the 
meantime, the check-off would give financial stability and replace 
the deplorable dependence on loans f rom the PSI. 
Opposition seems to have continued for a while, although 
couched in more guarded terms to avoid contradicting higher poli-
cy. But a change came about with the appointment of Sir Walter 
Coutts as Governor and his brother, P. G. Coutts, as Establish-
ments Secretary. A Committee was appointed with representa-
tives of the Treasury, the Ministry of Works and the Prime Minis-
ter's Department. The main opposition seems to have come from 
the lower ranks of the Treasury who objected to the increased 
adminstrative burden of operating the accountancy side for the 
union. From its strong bargaining position, the Government was 
able to exclude the established employees from either check-off 
or recognition. Nevertheless, the UPEU had scored a significant 
victory which stabilised its finances and gave it official standing. 
The union's press statement proudly announcing this success 
asserted that : 
"Recognition would also have been given by now but for 
constitutional and political changes which have occupied govern-
ment ministers and officials." (Uganda Argus, 25 April, 1962). 
The effect of these changes almost wrecked the union. From 
February 1962, Uganda was in a political turmoil. Buganda's 
separatism was forcing a constitutional change to a federal struc-
ture. The Democratic Party's dependence on a minority of votes 
meant that it was unlikely to hold power at the next election 
without radical changes in the outlook of the voters. This had 
three separate effects on the progress of the UPEU. 
The first was that negotiations with the local administrations 
almost halted for six months. The councils and the kingdom 
administrations were uncertain of their future powers and unwilling 
to commit themselves to recognition or check-off agreements. They 
wanted to wait until they could be certain of their future sources 
of income under the new federal structure. 
The second effect was that the civil servants were unwilling to 
commit the future central government by giving a definite under-
taking on the check-off. It was feared that a UPC cabinet might 
repudiate an agreement signed by the Democratic Party. Franken 
protested that he could not wait around for the elections to be 
held. He wanted a start made while he could be present to super-
vise the implementation of the check-off from the union side. 
Appreciating the value of his tuition to the union, the civil ser-
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vants found a unique solution. An agreement was signed for 
three months, which would allow the Democratic Party to claim 
prestige for its initiation and still give the UPC the option of 
renewal if it came into office. 
Finally, the action of Prime Minister Kiwanuka himself did 
most to put the future of the union into jeopardy. A committee 
of enquiry into the wages of government unestablished employees 
had revealed some startling anomalies in wage rates and had re-
commended the implementation of a set of uniform rates. (UP, 
1962). The general intention of the civil service seems to have 
been to wait for constitutional stabilisation and the next year's 
budget before taking action. But Kiwanuka was aware of the 
possible short-term benefits of deciding upon an immediate general 
rise which in some cases suddenly doubled the minimum rates. 
Within a limited budget, this immediately caused a 40% drop in 
employment by public authorities. The union objected because it 
was made to appear powerless either to protect jobs or to raise 
wages. 
Then the Prime Minister began to make unrealistic claims on 
Africanisation which threatened the security of expatriates without 
offering any incentive to remain on contract. In Franken's words: 
"The whole civil service was paralysed and the ambition of 
the expatriates to stay disappeared entirely". (Interview, op. cit.). 
The UPEU was also embarrassed in its dealings with expatriates 
by a clause in its constitution which called for effective Africanisa-
tion. The Union seemed to be backing up the politicians so that 
the previous co-operation was replaced by stiffer resistance. 
The April elections brought this difficult phase to an end. The 
election of a government led by A. M. Obote was acclaimed as a 
step towards greater tolerance for unions. The cabinet took steps 
to exert pressure for recognition of the UPEU by local authorities, 
the check-off and recognition agreements for central government 
unestablished employees was renewed permanently and expatria-
tes were reassured of their future within a definite programme of 
Africanisation. 
The key debate during the formation of the UPEU had been 
about the structure of the union, especially the extent to which it 
would cover established staff. The PSI and Franken were com-
mitted to a single union for all public emnloyees from the perma-
nent secretary to the street sweeper. At first, the PSI hoped that 
national agreements might be signed which would impose some 
degree of uniformity in conditions for employees. This soon 
proved impractical in view of the different resources available to 
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the various levels of government in the complex federal structure. 
Franken persisted with his single union scheme and devised an 
ingenious constitution which concentrated responsibility in the 
centre but allowed wide discretion to the various sections in nego-
tiation matters. The constitution adopted at the Inaugural Con-
ference in December, 1961 was a masterly attempt to reconcile 
autonomy with responsibility. 
Autonomy was guaranteed under Rule 10, which enumerated 
the departmental sections of the union, starting with a division of 
established and unestablished staff of central government into 
separate sections. 
"Each such section shall have its own executive officers and 
shall be responsible for all strictly departmental interests of the 
group, including the making of representations to the Executive 
Council, but excluding the conclusion of collective agreements or 
a strike." (UPEU Constitution, Rule 10 (f), p. 5). 
The titular head of the union was the National Conference to 
be held every two years, with delegates elected directly from bran-
ches. The effective head was the Executive Council elected at the 
National Conference and also containing representatives of the 
Departmental Sections. Executive Officers, including the full-time 
officials, were elected at the National Conference and were subject 
to direction from the Executive Council. 
Responsibility for collective bargaining and direct action was 
firmly placed in the hands of the Executive Council. Under Rule 
21(b), a branch official desiring strike action had first to obtain a 
high percentage of votes in support from his branch members. Even 
then he had also to apply to the General Secretary for the sanction 
of the Executive Council which had the power of absolute veto. 
In practice this meant that the U P E U never conducted an official 
strike. On occasions when a branch official had called out his 
members, the General Secretary intervened to force a settlemcn* 
by negotiation. 
Finally, in the interest of local co-ordination, Rule 18 of the 
constitution makes provision for Regional Councils. Resembling 
a miniature British Trades Council, these were designed "for the 
purpose of locally administering the general business of the union" 
and were "responsible for the establishment of branches, their 
proper administration and conduct." Branches at each place of 
employment were required to have at least 50 members, with the 
Regional Council allowed to amalgamate branches which fell be low-
strength in any region. In practice, regional councils scarcely func-
tioned and the only active branches outside the urban centres were 
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the employees of the Central Government Ministry of Works. 
The aim behind the whole structure was first to prevent hasty 
and irresponsible action of branches or sections from bringing the 
union into conflict and disrepute. Franken was aware that if the 
potential power of the country-wide union ever became a threat, 
government would soon impose restrictions. At the same time, 
he wanted to prevent a repetition of the Kenyan experience where 
a comprehensive union fell to pieces because its structure allowed 
dominance by a single section of the established workers. 
From the beginning the Colonial Office and the Protectorate 
Government opposed the idea of a single union. In a letter to 
the Establishments Secretary (19 February, 1962), Foggon set out 
his objections. A monolithic structure would tend to be dominated 
by the most educated established group; it would not take account 
of the very different conditions of service between the various 
levels of government and between the established and unestablish-
ed; it would be a political and economic liability to government 
because of the concentration of power in the hands of a single 
leader. In emphasising the bargaining power and economics of 
scale to be derived from one large union, Foggon felt that Franken 
was disregarding these long range considerations. He urged 
Franken to consider a small number of unions each catering to 
the different financial resources of the various employing autho-
rities, perhaps linked in a loose federation. Franken compromised 
to the extent of providing autonomous sections and this was even-
tually accepted by local administrators as a workable arrangement 
for dealing with the different authorities. 
But the Government refused to compromise on the other ques r 
tion — the participation of established staff as full members of the 
union. From the outset, it was maintained that established staff 
should be covered by consultative machinery only, modelled on 
t fie British Whitley Council system. This was based on the wholly 
reasonable fear that senior civil servants should not become invol-
\ ed in the direction of an organisation which could halt the entire 
machinery of the State. 
Whitleyism had not proved very successful in the colonies. It 
seems first to have been advocated in a memorandum from the 
Colonial Secretary in 1949 (CO, 1949) but a Colonial Labour Advi-
sory Council Memorandum in 1953 pointed to faults in the consti-
tution of the councils and to : 
"An inherent weakness peculiar to colonial conditions that the 
overriding authority of the Executive is very real and tends to 
limit the Official side's freedom to bargain." (CO, 1953). 
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There was no provision for binding independent arbitration and 
many matters negotiated were still subject to the authority of the 
Colonial Office or local finance committees. In 1957, a Colonial 
Office report admitted that : 
"It cannot be ignored that Whitleyism has not been uniformly 
successful and in certain territories the machinery has broken down 
altogether." (CO, 1957). 
This was probably fair comment on Uganda at that time, 
although the Whitley Council did revive to some extent when James 
Brandie, the ex-Trade Unionist Industrial Relations Officer, took 
over as secretary of the Staff Side. The Staff Side in Uganda 
consisted of an equal number of representatives of each of the three 
racial associations and tended to be dominated by the Europeans. 
The African association had the largest number of nominal mem-
bers but by far the smallest number of financial subscribers. As 
in other territories, the Council could act only in an advisory 
capacity as the Official Side could not bind itself to accept the 
results of any bargaining or arbitration. 
By the end of 1962, the changes in the racial balance of the 
civil service made reform of the structure imperative. Govern-
ment emphasised that this reform was to take precedence over any 
scheme to include established officers in the UPEU. A strong 
bargaining position in the check-off negotiations allowed Govern-
ment to exclude the established section from its provisions and the 
general policy was to encourage the UPEU to concentrate on the 
unestablished before allowing it to exert pressure on behalf of 
established groups. It was felt, with some justification, that the 
interests of the two groups were so divergent as to be almost 
conflicting. An individual highly placed in the civil service might 
well find his duties as an officer of the union in direct conflict with 
his duties as an official. It will be seen that, after independence, 
conflict did in fact occur, when the interests of senior civil ser-
vants were in direct opposition to the interests of the unestablished. 
Franken never accepted the principle that the two sections should 
have different organisations, but was forced to accept exclusion 
from the established section as a quid pro quo for co-operation on 
the strengthening of the unestablished section. 
Finally, something must be said of the quality and character 
of leadership in the UPEU. This factor had an important bearing 
on the developments after independence. 
There were two very different groups involved in the founding 
of the union — established officers of sound education and consi-
derable ability, and the unestablished group typified by Wangatia 
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who had considerable initiative and toughness but little finesse or 
education. Inevitably the leaders tended to be chosen from the 
first group. 
At first the senior officers behind the Central Government Civil 
Servants Association were dominant. The first President of the 
union was an extremely able young graduate who quickly rose 
to the rank of permanent secretary. Other super-scale officers 
who had been active in the staff association also held senior posts 
in the new union and did much to provide a sound core for the 
amorphous organisation. 
But this situation could not last, nor was it particularly healthy. 
From the Government side considerable pressure was exerted on 
these officers to resign from the union. Promotions were made 
dependent upon willingness to concentrate solely on civil service 
affairs and avoid any possible conflict of loyalties. This was 
accepted by Franken as valuable to the union also. He was aware 
that the interests of the unestablished bulk of the union would be 
best served by officers closer to their own level. 
Finding adequate replacements was not easy. Franken found 
real drive among the unestablished and lower clerical staff, parti-
cularly in Jinja, but few leaders educated enough to earn the 
the respect of a large union. After much sorting out, he finally 
settled on an executive in which most of the administration was 
left to an effective group of full-time officials based in Kampala. 
This full-time group were drawn mainly from officers at the bottom 
of the established section with sound clerical training and a back-
ground of local government union organising. The General Secre-
tary, Eliab Kibuka, for example, had been a clerk/typist and 
then a junior Fisheries Officer in the Ankole Kingdom gov-
ernment. The Kampala Regional Secretary had been an interpreter/ 
clerk and then a trainee Housing Estate Manager in Jinja. 
There were still many disappointments. The promising young 
secretary of the Bukedi union was made secretary of the Executive 
Council but proved to be lacking in the necessary qualities and 
was removed from office. Instead of learning from his mistakes, 
he immediately wrote off to every conceivable source of funds and 
appealed for assistance in fighting the dictatorship of the PSI over 
local unionists. This was turned to useful anti-western propa-
ganda by the Ghana-based All African Trade Union Federation. 
A letter from the Ghana T U C in reply found its way to the 
Uganda T U C because it had been addressed incorrectly. After 
much delay, because the U P E U had not yet affiliated with the TUC. 
it was passed on to Franken. The matter first came to the notice 
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of Franken because an American organisation had also been 
approached by the same official, and had forwarded the letter to 
the PSI. 
The general complaint made of the leaders was that 
nobody was prepared to do the uninteresting work needed to 
make any large organisation function. An organisation as 
new and large as the U P E U required administrative skill which 
were just not available among the members of the union. Franken 
found himself bogged down with office routine and typing because 
nobody else was ready to do such jobs. 
Here was the fundamental weakness of the union. It is an 
overworked cliche to state that African union leaders did not have 
to struggle to assert themselves like their British counterparts. 
Often such a statement is not true, but in the case of the leaders 
of the U P E U all the struggling was done for them by the PSI 
representative. Unlike the other unions in Uganda such as the 
Railways, the U P E U was spoon-fed and did not develop strong 
roots in the sentiments of members or even leaders. The local 
authorities had to be bullied into accepting the idea of a union, 
but the bullying was done by the PSI and the Colonial Office. To 
some extent Franken himself was guilty of the same paternalism 
of which he accused officials of the Labour Department. Without 
his assistance the U P E U would never have made much progress, 
but his assistance could not continue indefinitely. 
His departure from Uganda coincided with the replacement of 
many of the expatriate civil servants who supported the Colonial 
Office in sponsoring the union. On the eve of his departure from 
Uganda, one of those who had collaborated closely with Franken 
summed up the situation: 
"Uganda will achieve its independence a week from today with 
Government having accorded recognition to a union sponsored by 
the Public Services International in respect of its own unestablished 
labour force. The check-olf has been granted and a Joint 
Central Negotiation Body set up. So far so good, but frankly I 
am apprehensive about the future. I hope that my fears are unjus-
tified. In any event, I do feel that in the last twelve months the 
Colonial Power has granted Uganda a real opportunity in the 
public sector to benefit f rom its own experience." 
The extent to which these fears were justified, and the changes 
which occurred after independence, are discussed in Chapter 13 
on relations between unions and the independent government. 
C h a p t e r E l e v e n 
THE UGANDA TRADES UNION CONGRESS 
In order to understand the complex relationship which existed 
in Uganda between the trade unions and the nationalist move-
ment leading to political independence, it is necessary to review the 
history of the Uganda Trades Union Congress (UTUC). In many 
other African countries, the central union body represented the 
views of the leaders of the union movement and often served as a 
focus for political activity against the colonial regime. This never 
occurred in Uganda because the union leaders tended to be drawn 
from groups not concerned with nationalist politics, and because 
the leaders could rarely agree among themselves upon a common 
course of action. The history of the U T U C is so dominated by 
conflicts of personalities and factions that the organisation exerted 
very little control over the policies of the constituent unions. 
Late in 1955, Mr. Tom Mboya and the ICFTU representative 
for East Africa visited Uganda to discuss the possibility of forming 
a national union centre to parallel the Kenyan and Tanganyikan 
organisations. Mboya appreciated that the Ugandan unions were 
weak, but believed that a national centre would be an effective way 
of strengthening them: 
"The British concept, that a trade union should develop from 
the bottom and that experience should be gained by a man as he 
moves up the ladder, is impossible to adopt in Africa. The whole 
emphasis has to be given to the top . . . The national federation had 
the task of helping to develop trade unions rather than the unions 
coming together to develop the national centre. (It) had the task of 
getting assistance to help weak unions, finding the leaders to spread 
into them and often of negotiating on their behalf." (Mboya, 1963, 
p. 199). 
This philosophy was put to the test in Uganda, and failed be-
cause of fundamental divisions within the movement. 
These divisions were very soon apparent. At the inaugural 
meeting of the Uganda Trades Union Congress, the Clerical Union 
leader was elected U T U C President, the Postal Workers' represen-
tative became Secretary and the Railways' representative Treasurer. 
This touched off a vigorous protest from Luande, President of 
the Railway African Union, who claimed that the railway union, 
as the largest and best organised, should hold most of the key posts. 
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New elections were held and Luande was duly elected Presi-
dent. Two other Railway African Union officials were included on 
the enlarged executive and the former President was 'demoted' to 
General Secretary. The railway workers were not prepared to be 
ordered about by leaders who had no real organisation behind 
them. This was to become a recurrent theme and a cause of con-
stant trouble. 
Although the Busoga African Motor Drivers Union had at-
tended the inaugural conference, their delegate was excluded from 
the executive. This was a significant omission as the Jinja unionists 
and the U T U C proceeded to show little interest in each other for 
several years. At the first Annual General Meeting in March 1956, 
only three unions attended — the Clerical Union, the Railway 
African Union and the virtually defunct Shoemakers Union. For 
all practical purposes, the U T U C was a Kampala organisation. 
Charles Makayu, the Ganda President of the Clerical Union, 
became the leading figure in the U T U C after its inauguration. The 
leaders of the postal and railway unions were preoccupied with 
their own developing organisations whereas the Clerical Union had 
plenty of leaders but few members. Thus many of the clerical lead-
ers had time and enthusiasm to devote to the U T U C with all its 
prestige of being a national union centre. Makayu apparently had 
hopes of associating the U T U C with nationalist politics but was 
successfully opposed in this by officials of the Railway African 
Union. 
Makayu seems to have been the only person interested in the 
UTUC in this early period because no other leader could see the 
value of wasting time on an organisation with no influence or 
power. This changed when Makayu successfully requested assist-
ance from the ICFTU. He was sent to a conference in Tunisia and 
a training course in Brussels and, in August 1957, it was announced 
that the ICFTU had agreed to pay him a salary as a full-time 
official. This provoked Luande into an attack on the work of 
Makayu on the grounds that he had not been consulted over these 
new developments (Uganda Argus, 2 September 1957). He with-
drew from the U T U C and called for its reorganisation on a more 
representative basis, that is. with greater influence being accorded 
the leaders of the Railway African Union as the most powerful 
single union. 
The 1957 Labour Department Report noted tha t : 
"When the Railway African Union withdrew from membership, 
the need for reorganisation became apparent and all the trade 
unions, including those who had in the past refused to join the 
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Congress, got together and by the end of the year were in a fair way 
to building up a new U T U C with a revised constitution which 
would be representative of the movement." (LDR, 1957, p. 14). 
This revised constitution was the work of James Brandie, whose 
career has already been discussed. It was largely through his efforts 
that the UTUC became a reality. The constitution is notable for its 
emphasis upon democratic rights and the wide range of objects to 
be pursued by the organisation, especially the protection of the 
unemployed and unorganised. Membership of the policy making 
body was to be determined by representation proportional to the 
number of paid-up members, clearly an attempt to satisfy the Rail-
way African Union that small unions would not dominate the new 
UTUC. An attempt was made to ensure that the organisation would 
be financially self-sufficient by allowing suspensions where affilia-
tion fees were not paid. 
In addition to writing the constitution, Brandie sought out and 
coached the most promising leader available. Makayu had dropped 
out of consideration after the defection of the Railway African 
Union but the Ganda clerical workers continued to be important 
in the movement. Luande was not considered the leader most likely 
to inspire general confidence, especially as he was relatively un-
educated and not a convincing negotiator. The choice fell to 
Oswald Bernard Kopoka, an intellectual giant compared to many 
of his union contemporaries. Brandie was aware that this man 
would not stay long in the union movement but determined to use 
him as a foundation for a solid organisation. 
Kopoka had been a primary school teacher in Tanganyika be-
fore joining the Army Education Corps as a Swahili instructor. 
After the war, he worked at Makerere College as a librarian and 
then as a research assistant on the East African Swahili Commit-
tee. Because he had no formal tertiary education, he was classified 
as a junior employee. When the local Labour Officer called a meet-
ing to discuss the formation of a Makerere Junior Employees 
Union, Kopoka did not bother to go along as he was not much in-
terested. Later he was persuaded to help out because of his superior 
ability to deal with Europeans, and was appointed President. Help-
ed by tuition, he built up the union as a model for the rest of 
Uganda, and. when the U T U C split, he agreed to join the new 
organisation and act as President. 
In many respects, this period was the high point in the develop-
ment of the UTUC. As a Tanganyikan who had married into 
Ganda society, Kopoka was able to reconcile the tribal factions 
led by Luande and Francis Pulle (who had replaced Makayu 
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in the Clerical Union). In particular, Kopoka was able to blend 
his own quick intelligence with the practical cunning and organising 
ability of Luande. For the first time, an effort was made to attract 
the growing unions in Jinja, and the Eastern Province Transport 
Workers and the Tobacco Workers began to play an active role in 
the UTUC. 
Under Kopoka, the U T U C also began to make an impact on 
the international scene. The 1958 ICFTU Visiting Mission ex-
pressed its appreciation of the speed of development and urged 
the U T U C to concentrate on organising workers in fields still un-
touched by the existing unions, such as the plantation workers. 
Kopoka also set out to resist the influence of Mboya's use of the 
national union centre for political purposes. Kopoka denied that 
unions should have party political links because this would lead to 
a weakening of the unions' influence on the present government 
and compromise their future role after independence. This view 
seems to have fitted in with that of other Ugandan leaders and the 
UTUC's early interest in political nationalism was not sustained. 
Inevitably, Kopoka did not continue as a unionist. A man of 
his calibre had a long way to travel up the promotion ladder once 
Africanisation became established as official policy. When his 
appointment with the Swahili Committee terminated, an attempt 
was made to recruit him to the staff of the Labour College, but a 
more attractive offer was made by an oil company. Despite criti-
cism from other unionists, he "crossed the floor" and became a 
personnel officer and was later sent to Britain for training as a 
General Manager. His year as U T U C President had been valuable 
to the movement, and his absence was felt immediately. 
When Kopoka left, the U T U C was a going concern. Three pro-
blems remained to be solved. The first was that it was wholly de-
pendent on financial assistance from the ICFTU because no affilia-
tion fees were being paid. The constitution devised by Brandie pro-
vided for suspension of defaulters, but this was never applied be-
cause it would have killed the organisation. The second problem 
was the continuing differences of opinion between the Ganda lead-
ers f rom the weak Clerical Union and the Kenyan leaders of the 
Railway African Union. This led to threats once more from the 
R A U that it would withdraw from the U T U C unless its demands 
were satisfied, in this case the removal of two officials from office. 
When this demand was backed by the three Jinja unions, it 
became clear that the U T U C was in danger of being reduced to an 
important body representing only a handful of clerical workers. 
"To prevent complete disintegration, a special congress was 
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held under the chairmanship of the regional secretary of the 
ICFTU. All the previous officials were voted out of office and re-
placed by more active trade unionists who were themselves leaders 
of the major unions." (LDR, 1959, p. 16). 
The ICFTU pledged additional funds to help build up the 
unity of the movement and the leaders who had threatened to 
secede were given the top jobs. 
Failure to extend the influence of the U T U C beyond Kampala 
was the third and most significant weakness in the organisation at 
this stage of its development. By 1959, industrial unions in Jinja 
had made great progress but there had been no previous attempt 
to interest them in the UTUC. When a Labour Advisory Board 
was set up in that year, the Labour Commissioner noted that the 
sphere of influence of the U T U C was so small that it was only 
proper that the Labour Department should nominate four out of 
the six workers' representatives (Uganda Argus, 22 August, 1959). 
In the following year, there were also moves among union leaders 
in the Northern Province to set up their own TUC because of the 
lack of interest being shown from Kampala. 
It was this lack of concern for the interest of Jinja unions that 
finally brought about a major split in the U T U C and led to the 
establishment of a splinter organisation. The removal of Okatch 
and Pulle had brought the Jinja unionists into the inner circle of 
leaders for the first time, but general discontent with the working 
of the UTUC continued. The leader of the Municipal and Town-
ship Workers Union in Jinja complained that the U T U C tended 
to dictate to its Jinja affiliates without consulting them and gave 
no assistance to small unions trying to establish themselves. The 
Railway African Union threat to secede and move its headquarters 
to Jinja confirmed that the centre of union activity was shifting 
away from Kampala. It needed only a strong personality and a 
suitable incident to touch off a revolt against domination from 
Kampala. 
The personality was John Reich, the principal figure in the early 
development of trade unions in Jinja. Like Francis Pulle, Reich 
was of mixed racial origins and had closely identified himself with 
African aspirations. After working as a labour recruiting agent for 
the sugar plantations, Reich became a bus driver in Jinja. He took 
over and expanded the union he found operating there, and the 
Busoga Motor Drivers Union became the Eastern Province (and 
later the Amalgamated) Transport and General Workers Union. 
He also sponsored and helped organise a number of other minor 
unions in Jinja and built up his own private empire. Communica-
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tions from the UTUC were all channelled through Reich's office 
for distribution to the various unions. This meant that Reich was 
able to exercise an unofficial censorship, a fact noted by an inter-
national adviser when he tried to get in touch with the local public 
service unions (Franken Interview, op. cit.). When the Kampala 
unions in the U T U C split, Reich was able to come into the organi-
sation on his own terms. 
The incident which touched off the split with the Kampala 
unions gives an insight into the general emphasis on patronage in 
the Ugandan movement. In 1958, the All-African People's Confer-
ence, a political gathering in Ghana, recommended the establish-
ment of the All-African Trade Union Federation. A preparatory 
meeting was scheduled for December 1960 and invitations were 
sent to all national centres. An invitation to send two Ugandan 
delegates was received by Banyanga as General Secretary; travel 
warrants were enclosed. Banyanga and Reich made arrangements 
for the trip and did not notify the U T U C until immediately before 
their departure. 
The General Council was summoned on December 10, 1960. 
while the Ghana Conference was still in progress. A telegram was 
sent to Ghana denying that Reich and Banyanga were official rep-
resentatives because the UTUC had not met to discuss the impli-
cations of recognising the All-African Trade Union Federation. It 
was nnally decided to suspend them pending their appearance be-
fore a U T U C committee of enquiry. On their return, Reich and 
Banyanga refused to submit to such an enquiry. They held that 
they had ben removed by an unconstitutional meeting to which the 
Jinja unions had not been invited. Luande replied that invitations 
had been sent through the usual channel but, on this occasion, had 
not passed beyond the waste-paper basket in Reich's office. 
A month later another meeting was called and was attended by 
Reich and his supporters. An attempt was made by the Jinja group 
to re-open the question of suspension but was defeated in a close 
vote. At this point, Reich walked out. Conflicting press statements 
later cast doubt on the validity of the critical vote. In any case, the 
damage was done. Luande tried to make it clear that he did not 
regard the issue as a dispute between the Kampala U T U C and the 
Jinja unions, but as "an attempt to oppose the personal aggrandise-
ment of men like Reich." (Uganda Argus, 12 January, 1961). He 
emphasised the danger of outside influences splitting up the move-
ment and attacked press sensationalism which had blown up "the 
significance of the misdeeds and waywardness of a small group in 
our ranks." (Uganda Argus, 30 January 1961). But his whistling in 
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the dark was of no avail and the Jinja group went ahead with plans 
for an alternative national centre. Reich could claim that he would 
have the backing of the majority of U T U C affiliates and a large 
proportion of Uganda's industrial workers. Even the Jinja branch 
of Luande's own union deplored the weakness and bias of the 
UTUC leadership and threatened to seek the intervention of the 
transport workers' international to curb Luande's dictatorial 
activity. 
At the end of January, the UTUC was once more reconstituted. 
The Ganda "white collar" leaders came back again. Pulle was made 
President to act as a compromise candidate in the event of a re-
turn of the Jinja group. Two other Clerical Union members became 
General Secretary and Assistant General Secretary. Luande 
accepted a part-time salary for the post of Organising Secretary. 
The new U T U C continued its efforts to seek the return of the 
Jinja unions. Luande issued a circular criticising Ghana's inter-
ference in internal affairs and opposing the idea of a second union 
centre. Nakabinge, the new General Secretary, tried the softer line. 
In a letter to the Jinja unions, he asked them to state the case 
against the U T U C so that it could be placed before a third party, 
acting as mediator, to decide which should be the recognised na-
tional centre. The third party suggested was to be a representative 
of the ICFTU, either one of the Labour College staff or an official 
from Brussels. Not surprisingly, the offer was turned down. 
At the beginning of March 1961, the Uganda Federation of 
Labour (UFL) was inaugurated in Jinja. Reich was President, H. 
Kasolo of the Tobacco Workers was General Secretary and the 
remainder of the executive were from other Jinja unions. Banyan-
ga had dissociated himself from any splinter group as soon as 
he had returned from Ghana. He left the Tobacco Union and be-
came an industrial relations officer with the Mehta sugar factory 
at Lugazi. The U F L applied for recognition by the government, in-
dividual employers, and, rather surprisingly, the ICFTU. The or-
ganisation claimed that "it was in no way opposed to ICFTU 
policies and it would not seek association with the Ghana spon-
sored All-African Trades Union Federation." (Uganda Argus 
6 March, 1961). Its press statement continued by pointing out that a 
dispute had existed between the Jinja and Kampala unions because 
of "the dictatorial and undemocratic policies of the U T U C in 
Kampala." The dispute with the U T U C was considered over — 
"the two union organisations were now two equal partners each 
on an equal footing." Clearly the aim was to co-exist peacefully 
with the UTUC, tap the same source of financial aid and eventually 
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replace it as the accepted representative of the union movement. 
This was more than a faint hope. The Railways and the Postal 
Employees were the only strong unions firmly committed to the 
UTUC; against them could be set three strong industrial unions 
(Electricity Board, Tobacco and Nyanza Textiles), two civil service 
unions, and Reich's amorphous Transport and General Workers 
Union. Both sides had appendices with imposing titles but few 
active members and there were a few uncommitted organisations. 
The Labour Department refused to be committed to direct sup-
port of the UTUC. In his inaugural address, the new General Sec-
retary of the U T U C "welcomed the Labour Commissioner's state-
ment that a body such as the U F L would not be allowed to form". 
(•Uganda Argus, 31 January 1961). The next day, the Labour 
Commissioner clarified his position: 
"I believe that this development would harm the labour move-
ment in Uganda — there is only room for one central representative 
organisation. But the government has no power to disallow another 
central organisation of workers just because there is already a 
Uganda TUC." (Uganda Argus, 1 February 1961). 
Federations of unions were not required to register under the 
Trade Union Ordinance, so the Registrar had no chance to inter-
vene in jurisdictional disputes as he did with regard to individual 
unions. The Labour Department preferred to deal with a single 
centre but it was not prepared to express a preference. 
The key to the struggle which followed was ICFTU support. 
Reich fell between two stools when he renounced his support for 
Ghana and the All-African Trades Union Federation. The ICFTU 
refused to accept the integrity of this sudden change and continued 
to support the UTUC. At the same time, Ghana unionists were 
probably furious. Certainly the initial funds given to Reich were 
not supplemented and the U F L began to falter once money ran 
short. 
Instead of backing Reich, the ICFTU intensified its support of 
the U T U C in an attempt to win back the Jinja unions. Three weeks 
after the U F L formed, the U T U C opened its first regional office 
in Jinja. The Assistant General Secretary of the U T U C resigned 
to accept a scholarship to Britain and he was replaced by 
James Ojambo. Ojambo had been on a training course himself and, 
in his absence, was removed from the executive of the Plantation 
Workers' union. As he was a Kenyan and acquainted with the Jinja 
situation, he was made full-time regional organiser in Jinja. A few 
months later, the I C F T U also sent in an American trade unionist 
to act as full time organiser in Uganda until the situation improved. 
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Under this pressure, support for the U F L began to waver imme-
diately. The new National Union of Plantation Workers refused 
to become involved, and then the Nyanza Textiles leader was per-
suaded to return to the UTUC. A number of other unions followed. 
Reich even found the leadership of his own union disputed when 
Kampala members attacked his decision to form the UFL. Within 
two months the whole organisation had withered away. 
The name lingered on, but the organisation changed its charac-
ter. Reich continued to act like the leader of a major organisation 
for several months. He was invited to lead a two man delegation 
to a second All-African Trade Union Federation Conference in 
Casablanca. The U T U C sent along observers but did not succeed 
in displacing the Reich delegation as the accredited representatives 
of Uganda. 
At the end of August, an emergency meeting of the U F L 
General Council was summoned to consider questions of adminis-
trative reorganisation. As with Banyanga, Reich announced his 
retirement and accepted the post of industrial relations officer with 
a sugar company. To set the seal on his respectability he also be-
came a town councillor and later Deputy Mayor of Jinja. Although 
now on the employers' side of the bargaining table, Reich continued 
to display considerable interest in union activity. During 1963 he 
again began appearing in public and issuing press statements as 
UFL General Secretary. Subsequently he left Uganda to take up 
a post within the secretariat of A A T U F in Ghana. 
The U F L did not disappear completely. It continued to func-
tion as an unofficial union centre for complaints from all types of 
workers. At any point after the middle of 1961 the U T U C could 
have forced its collapse but, after the initial burst of enthusiasm, 
the U T U C once more tended to neglect Jinja. As the individual 
unions became stronger this did not worry them too much but it 
did allow the U F L officials to claim some importance among the 
unorganised work-force. Workers, ignorant of the nature of the 
organisation, would be attracted by its imposing name and bring 
in complaints, and equally ignorant employers could be bluffed by 
correspondence on impressively headed notepaper. Early in 
1963, Reich's successor returned from one of his periodic trips to 
Eastern Europe and began a vigorous press campaign against the 
UTUC and the ICFTU. This was not important as an attack on 
the solidarity of the U T U C but it represented an important ideolo-
gical challenge. The new U F L propaganda line associated its 
leaders with the views held by an influential section of the ruling 
party regarding Pan-African non-alignment and the need for state 
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intervention in the conduct of industrial relations. The nature of 
this challenge and its implications were critical for the future of 
the U T U C and are discussed in the next chapter. 
With the defeat of the U F L as an immediate challenge by the 
middle of 1961, the U T U C might have looked forward to a period 
of greater progress and harmony. This did not come about because 
of the continuing struggle between the two groups of leaders — the 
Ganda clerical workers on the one side and the Kenyan industrial 
workers, led by Luande, on the other. 
A major squabble developed during the 1962 General 
Election campaign. Pulle and Luande decided to contest the same 
constituency on behalf of their respective parties. This was a re-
grettable decision as it brought the internal dissensions of the 
UTUC into the arena of public debate. Tempers became frayed 
when a controversy developed over the use of a van donated to the 
UTUC by the Austrian Federation of Labour. Pulle had control 
of the vehicle and used it for electioneering until Luande and his 
supporters threatened to leave the U T U C yet again if Pulle was 
not brought to order (Uganda Argus, 20 April, 1962). Pulle's reply 
is worth quoting for the light it sheds on attitudes towards overseas 
aid: he asserted tha t : 
"I t was through my efforts that the Austrian Federation of 
Labour has given the equipment in the U T U C offices and the van 
was also given through me. We (Pulle and Luande) are both claim-
ing to represent the workers in this constituency so I am taking 
around the van to prove to the workers what I have done for them. 
Mr. Luande has been out several times: what has he brought back 
for them?" (Uganda Argus, 20 April, 1962). 
Nakibinge, the new TUC General Secretary sided with Luande 
by agreeing that Pulle's use of the van was contrary to the UTUC's 
declared policy of non-alignment because it might be interpreted 
as indicating union support for the Democratic Party. The van was 
retrieved from Pulle and notice was given of a censure motion call-
ing for Pulle's resignation. The motion was dropped when Pulle 
left to represent Uganda at a conference of Commonwealth union 
leaders in Canada. 
On the second occasion, it was Luande who brought the or-
ganisation into disrepute, particularly with members of his own 
ruling party. In June 1962 the Tanganyikan government passed 
legislation which severely restricted the use of direct action by trade 
unions. In July, Luande issued a circular urging leaders to attend 
the forthcoming meeting of the U T U C General Council which 
would discuss the plans of the Uganda Government to copy the 
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Tanganyikan legislation of which Luande claimed to have confi-
dential knowledge. This touched off strong statements from the new 
Minister of Labour, denying that such plans existed and castigating 
the irresponsible leadership of the UTUC. Nakibinge followed this 
by dissociating himself from Luande's circular and the dispute 
then began to follow a familiar pattern of squabbles between the 
two groups of leaders. 
With this constant series of internal disputes and backbiting, 
the U T U C was still failing to perform any useful function. Not un-
reasonably many of the more stable union organisations were 
doubtful about the value of being counted as members and took 
no interest. At the time of the election fiasco, the leader of the Pet-
roleum and Oil Workers Union complained of the "disgusting 
situation in which U T U C leaders were spending most of their time 
in politics and using trade unions as a stepping stone to further 
their own interests." (Uganda Argus, 20 April, 1962). Behind the 
scenes moves seem to have been made to explore the possibility of 
establishing a new centre but nothing came of it at that time. In-
stead, the Uganda Public Employees Union decided to grasp the 
nettle which it had previously avoided. In the hope of bringing 
about reform from the inside, the UPEU decided to join the UTUC. 
This was the most important development in the months 
immediately before independence in October 1962. While the largest 
and financially strongest union remained outside, the U T U C could 
have no real basis for claiming to be representative of the whole 
labour movement. Once inside, the UPEU would provide a counter-
balance to the radical Railway Union. 
The decision was not taken lightly. The UPEU had been in 
existence almost twelve months and had steadfastly refused to 
commit itself throughout that period. Nor had the erratic behavi-
our of the U T U C encouraged those in the UPEU who were urging 
affiliation. Franken, the PSI adviser with the UPEU, particularly 
resented the UTUC's control over the nomination of students to the 
African Labour College. 
Well before the UPEU came into existence, the U T U C had 
attracted the interest of Wangatia's small unestablished employees' 
union in Jinja. After Mboya had organised the U T U C mainly from 
Kampala unions, a representative was sent across to arrange affilia-
tion of the two Jinja unions. But the U T U C showed little interest 
and the Jinja unions felt that decisions were being taken without 
proper consultation. Wangatia claimed that the U T U C would not 
even provide transport to meetings and wasted time and affiliation 
fees on organising overseas delegations and study tours. When John 
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Reich set up the Uganda Federation of Labour the two civil ser-
vice unions welcomed it as an organisation specifically concerned 
with Jinja. 
As the PSI was an affiliated trade secretariat of the ICFTU, 
Franken felt under an obligation to try and assist the general de-
velopment of trade unionism by supporting the UTUC. Faced with 
a situation in which the Jinja unions were operating out of the UFL 
office, he organised separate office accommodation as the first step 
towards winning them back to the UTUC. He was never completely 
successful. The Jinja branches of the UPEU continued to be very 
suspicious of the U T U C and any hint of high-handed action from 
their own Kampala headquarters. 
From the PSI headquarters, Franken was warned that he should 
not become involved in the internal politics of the union movement 
in his support for the UTUC. On the basis of this advice, U T U C 
affiliation was left to be decided by the new U P E U executive. 
Not surprisingly, the executive refused to affiliate. It was of the 
opinion that the union must consolidate its own position before 
taking on wider responsibilities. The union's attempt to build up 
a reputation for responsibility and reasonableness might well be 
prejudiced by associating itself with such an unstable and irres-
ponsible organisation. The actions of the U T U C did nothing to 
change this opinion. When the UPEU protested against Luande's 
irresponsibility in publicising false rumours, he replied that "We 
(the UTUC) know that the UPEU is a government union and as 
such must defend their boss." {Uganda Argus, unpublished press 
statement, 11 July 1962). Nobody from the U T U C executive 
bothered to attend the U P E U inauguration. When the Busoga 
Local Government Employees made use of U P E U facilities then 
decided not to join, the U T U C recognised their application for 
affiliation and allocated a place on an overseas training course to 
their leader. When the Transport and General Workers Union be-
gan recruiting in fields clearly the preserve of the UPEU, Franken 
was told that this move had been deliberately encouraged by the 
UTUC. 
Franken had written the following clause into the UPEU 
constitution: 
"The union proposes . . . (k) to co-operate with other organisa-
tions dedicated to the interests of labour, trade unionism and trade 
unionists and to affiliate with such organisations whether they be 
national, federational, continental or international in character." 
(Rule 3, p. 2). 
The U P E U executive decided that the U T U C did not qualify 
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as a dedicated organisation. It was not until August 19, 1962, that 
the UPEU finally agreed to affiliate with the UTUC. 
Meanwhile, the UPEU had established a sound reputation in 
its year outside the UTUC. When Luande had stirred up discon-
tent with his allegations that the Government were planning to 
take over the union movement, the UPEU had come out against 
him. A press statement f rom the Jinja Regional Council of the 
UPEU backed its application for recognition in the municipality 
by emphasising the need to trust the judgement of democratically 
elected representatives and opposed the UTUC's recent attempt to 
dictate terms (Uganda Argus, 11 July 1962). The Government re-
cognised this independent and co-operative influence of the UPEU 
by providing the union with a separate seat on the Labour Con-
sultative Council in addition to representatives from the UTUC. 
However, it was becoming clear that this moderating influence 
would be dissipated if the UPEU stayed out of the UTUC indefini-
tely. Franken and his successor had both argued that the way to 
improve the U T U C was to join it and reform the leadership from 
inside. In the first year, the executive of the UPEU felt that its 
leaders did not have the time or confidence to cope with the addi-
tional problems of the UTUC. Later they came round to the view 
that trade unionism as a whole, and the UPEU in particular, would 
benefit from a strong UTUC. 
Kibuka, U P E U General Secretary, detailed the reasons for his 
own support for the move in an interview (August 20, 1962). First 
there was the fact of affiliation with the PSI which was itself closely 
linked with ICFTU organisations. Second, the union wished to 
regularise its relationship with the ICFTU African Labour College. 
Training courses were normally restricted to affiliates of each coun-
try's national centre and the U P E U had been able to send students 
only through the courtesy of the staff in responding to an appeal 
from the PSI. Finally, only the U T U C could provide the opport-
unity for the U P E U to exert influence commensurate with its size 
and strength. The Government was expected to consult the U T U C 
as the general representative of the unions and not to approach 
separate unions. 
So, at the crucial moment when unions were facing the pros-
pect of an independent Government, the U T U C received a most 
important recruit. It was not long before it was given an opport-
unity to assert itself. Nakibinge was given the choice between con-
tinuing work as full-time clerk at the Labour College and becom-
ing full-time U T U C General Secretary. It was becoming clear to 
his employers that he could not effectively do both. He resigned 
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in November 1962 and Kibuka took over as acting General 
Secretary. 
Kibuka's period of tenure was short because the U T U C 
Biennial Congress was scheduled for February 1963, when a new 
set of office bearers were to be elected. It was generally expected 
that Kibuka would be re-elected and that this would be the only 
major executive change. Things did not happen this way. Kibuka 
had accepted U T U C responsibilities in addition to a heavy ad-
ministrative load as U P E U General Secretary. The ICFTU adviser 
reported that he was doing an excellent job, in contrast to the rest 
of the U T U C executive. Because he received no assistance what-
ever in organising the Congress, Kikuba was unable to prepare and 
circulate a written report. He was unfairly criticised for this while 
Nakibinge received praise for his fulsome account of his own period 
of office. This report was significant mainly for its omissions — no 
reference was made to the internal dissension which had split the 
UTUC or to the unfortunate and unnecessary clash with the Go-
vernment — but it was taken as proof of Nakibinge's greater effi-
ciency and enthusiasm. Other unionists, jealous of Kibuka's rapid 
rise, backed Nakabinge and he was re-elected General Secretary 
and resigned his Labour College post. Kibuka became Vice-
President. 
In retrospect, it is now clear that this decision of the Congress 
led directly to its downfall. Spurned by the 'old guard' in control 
of the UTUC, Kibuka lost interest in the organisation except for 
a short period when he virtually ran it in the absence of both 
Luande and Nakibinge. In 1964, he resigned and became head of 
a new union centre, The Federation of Uganda Trade Unions 
CFUTU). F U T U began by attracting the former leaders of the 
Uganda Federation of Labour, such as Reich and Mugala, and 
also members of the UPC Youth Wing, neither of which raised the 
reDUtation of the organisation. However, unlike the UFL, FUTU 
had a solid union base with the support of the UPEU, Petroleum 
and Oil Workers and Kilembe Mineworkers. It was helped immeas-
urably by support from UPC leaders who resented the UTUC's 
continuing affiliation with and financial dependence upon the 
ICFTU. By this stage, Luande had left the UPC and was sitting 
in the National Assembly as an independent member. Kibuka 
appeared on political platforms introduced as the leader of 
Uganda's workers in the company of cabinet ministers, and a 
FUTU delegation was sent as the official workers' representatives 
to the 1964 International Labour Organisation Conference in Addis 
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Ababa. By the end of 1964, it was clear that FUTU had come to 
stay and that the days of the U T U C might be numbered. 
Potentially, the national union centre in a developing country 
has a much greater role to play in union development than in a 
highly industrialised country. New unions can be helped to expand 
their activities by the organising of recruiting drives, the use of 
training courses for executives and the provision of free secretarial 
and office facilities. In a highly fluid situation, the centre can also 
settle jurisdictional disputes among its affiliates and give a lead in 
establishing amicable relations between the union movement and 
the independent government. This never happened in Uganda be-
cause the U T U C never established itself as the sole spokesman 
for the trade unions. Throughout its whole history, the U T U C was 
divided by personal rivalries which consumed most of the energies 
of the organisation. The affiliated unions were left to look after 
themselves. 
Three reasons can perhaps be put forward for this lack of co-
hesion. The first was that the unions were never under political 
pressure to present a united front. The Kenya Federation of Labour 
was welded into a strongly disciplined organisation by threats of 
its proscription by the colonial government during the Mau Mau 
Emergency (Mboya, 1963, p. 196). The U T U C was often ridi-
culed, but it was never threatened during the colonial period and. 
after independence, its leaders failed to come to terms quickly 
enough with the new rulers. The second reason was that the UTUC 
was almost wholly financed from outside and seemed to continue 
in existence solely as a funnel to attract further funds. This meant 
that individual unions had little concern about the operation of 
the U T U C because they had contributed nothing towards it, unless 
their interest took the form of 'wanting a slice of the cake'. Finally, 
there was a fundamental lack of agreement between the groups con-
cerned with the leadership of the UTUC. They were from different 
social origins, different tribes and had different conceptions of the 
role of a national union centre. This absence of strong leadership 
and a common purpose meant that, at no stage in its chequered 
history, did the UTUC fulfil the purposes for which it was designed 
C h a p t e r T w e l v e 
UNIONS AND NATIONALISM 
It is generally taken for granted that trade unions in Africa 
will inevitably become involved in politics. In his analysis of in-
dustrial relations in West Africa, Davison has pointed to two 
reasons for this involvement: the role played by the small industrial 
communities as "the flashpoints of social and political upheaval" 
(Davison, 1953, p. 7) and the fact that the wage structure was so 
completely dominated by the Government that political activities 
proved more immediately effective than collective bargaining. This 
second factor led Sekou Toure, an influential French African trade 
unionist and political leader, to take the view tha t : 
"The necessarily political nature of the union struggle is borne 
out by the fact that the betterment of the workers economic plight 
can be achieved only by political action and victories." (Fischer, 
1961, p. 145). 
Many writers go further and assert that, not only must unions 
in Africa always be politically active, but this activity must take 
the form of integration within the nationalist political party. For 
example, Allen asserts tha t : 
"For better or worse, trade unions throughout Africa are re-
garded by Africans as an integral part of the Pan-African move-
ment. Unions must therefore maintain close ties with the nationalist 
parties. Any attempt to sever them will . . . produce unnecessary 
strife and frustration for the African workers." (Allen in 
Central African Examiner, Oct.—Nov., 1962). Leaders of African 
political parties share this opinion, with Nyerere of Tanganyika 
regarding the union centre and the party as "two legs of the same 
nationalist movement," and Chisiza of Malawi believing that "it is 
an undisputed fact that every son of Africa should first be a 
nationalist and secondly a trade unionist." 
Fischer points out that : 
"In theory, inevitably participation in the nationalist movement 
could assume varied forms and not necessarily lead to the identifi-
fication or quasi-identification of the party with the trade unions. 
In practice, as experience shows, this is almost always the case." 
(Fischer, 1961, p. 168). 
A recent controversial study by Berg and Butler sets out to 
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prove that observers have frequently been misled by local political 
leaders concerning the political involvement of the trade unions: 
"What is most striking about the political role of trade unions 
in the countries of Middle Africa is the extent to which they were 
not politically involved during the colonial period and their limited 
political impact when they did become involved. . . . In the period 
before independence, African trade unions were rarely the instru-
ments of political parties. To the extent that they entered the politi-
cal arena, their role was usually negligible. After independence they 
were quickly subdued by the governing parties and, at least in the 
near future, seem destined to play a subordinate role." (Berg and 
Butler, 1964, pp. 340-41). 
As an all-embracing analysis, this thesis has a number of limi-
tations, especially with regard to areas of extensive European settle-
ment. However, the quotation above does apply exactly to the 
situation in Uganda, as will be seen from a review of the history 
of relations between the unions and the political parties. 
The earliest connection between trade unions and political 
nationalism has already been discussed. It was noted that these first 
"trade unions" were in fact organisations primarily concerned with 
political manoeuvring inside the Kingdom of Buganda. The passing 
of the 1952 Trade Union Ordinance and the emergence of the 
Uganda National Congress caused most aspiring politicians to dis-
card the cloak of trade unionism. Only one leader remained who 
seems to have cherished an ambition to organise Uganda's workers 
as an industrial wing of one of the more radical parties. This was 
Makayu, the first General Secretary of the Uganda Trades Union 
Congress. 
After the U T U C had been formed, following the visit from 
Mboya and ICFTU officials in 1956, Makayu was at first the do-
minant figure in an organisation which existed mainly on paper. 
Until the Railway African Union threatened to withdraw in Novem-
ber, 1957, Makayu was in sole control of U T U C policy because he 
was the only trained official and probably the only interested one. 
He associated himself with a small and ineffective group known 
as the Progressive Party and later joined the Democratic Party as 
an executive officer. In August, 1957, he gave up his Party office to 
become full-time General Secretary of the U T U C and issued a press 
statement to mark the occasion which clearly reveals his political 
hopes for the union movement. He attacked any form of govern-
ment opposition which limited political activity by unions, objected 
to the East Africa Royal Commission's support for works commit-
tees and pledged union support for direct elections to the Legislative 
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Council (Uganda Argus, 2 August 1957). 
When Makayu was ousted by leaders of the more active trade 
unions, the union movement placed itself firmly outside politics. Be-
cause both the U T U C and the Clerical Union functioned within a 
small circle, the Labour Department was satisfied that the unions 
had never been concerned seriously with politics: 
"The trade unions, though they, may be weak as yet, are strong 
on one point. They have refused steadfastly to allow their organi-
sations to be used for political purposes by outsiders and the union 
leaders have lost no opportunity to make this clear to the public 
and to their own members." (LDR, 1955, p. 18). 
This view was borne out by the statements of Railway African 
Union leaders who had asserted from the beginning that the unions 
should avoid entanglement with politicians. 
By the end of 1958, the unions were being drawn into politics 
by the pressure of events. Political independence was in sight and 
the union movement was finally beginning to emerge as a force of 
some significance in the community. The two developments were 
not related to each other in any direct way: the growth of the 
unions was due mainly to non-political factors and there was no 
common leadership or programme of action. Nevertheless, union 
leaders turned political developments to their advantage. For ex-
ample, during the prolonged railway strike, Luande successfully 
requested the support of the Uganda National Congress and after-
wards threatened Asian blacklegs that "the U T U C and the elected 
Government will remember your actions and act accordingly" (after 
independence). (Uganda Argus, 15 January 1960). At the end of 
1960, the Annual Conference of the Railway African Union agreed 
"that complete industrial freedom could only be achieved when 
the country attained political freedom". Consequently, it urged its 
members "to support the African politicians who were working for 
political freedom". (Uganda Argus, 31 December 1960). In return, 
the leaders of the three main factions supported the union leaders 
in their attack on the Labour Administration's handling of the re-
moval of James Brandie. Going further than either Obote or 
Benedicto Kiwanuka, the radical Joseph Kiwanuka even threatened 
that "the reins of government would soon be in African hands and, 
if Brandie were sent away now, the Government would bring him 
back." {Uganda Argus, 18 February 1961). This came to nothing, 
as did a token one-dav stoppage called jointly by the political 
leaders and the UTUC. 
The clearest statement of policy by Uganda union leaders 
towards nationalism was given by the U T U C General Secretary in 
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1960, Angelino Banyanga: 
"The U T U C intends to keep aloof from politics and does not 
identify itself with any particular party . . . Were the U T U C to 
affiliate to a particular party, it would cease to be a free labour 
movement. U T U C members can join parties, but those who do so 
join in their individual capacities and not as U T U C officials." 
(iUganda Argus, 25 June, 1960). 
Until one party was firmly established in control of the inde-
pendent government, this seemed the most reasonable policy as the 
unions could not risk "backing the wrong horse" by being commit-
ted to an opposition party which might never achieve power. How-
ever, problems developed when individual leaders tried to use their 
union positions to advance themselves in politics. These incidents 
might have seemed to indicate a fierce political consciousness 
among the union leadership but it is clear from all that had gone 
before that this was not the case. Unions in Uganda were never 
deeply involved in party politics or the "struggle" for independence. 
Two reasons might be put forward to explain this separation 
of the trade unions from nationalist politics. The first is the fact 
that, for different reasons, most union leaders were not eligible to 
participate in party politics. Elkan has pointed out tha t : 
"Many union leaders come from outside Uganda and are there-
fore not interested in local politics, whilst others have sought in 
trade unions an outlet for their desire to play a part in public life 
which for some reason they are denied in politics." (Elkan, 1960. 
p. 66). 
The first point relates to the large number of Kenyan union 
leaders, particularly in the Jinja area. The second is more complex. 
Almost all the Ganda union leaders were Roman Catholics and 
were opponents of the traditionalist regime in Buganda with its 
Protestant "Establishment". Before 1955, they had shown interest 
in radical political organisations but the triumphant return from 
exile of the Kabaka of Buganda effectively entrenched the authority 
of the old regime. It was at this point that most of the Ganda 
leaders turned to union activity. In addition, two of the most active 
leaders, Pulle and Reich, may have been excluded from party 
politics because of their mixed parentage. 
The second reason relates to the whole character of political 
development in Uganda. Millen (1963) has attempted to show that 
the strength and general influence of the trade union movements 
in new countries is directly related to the extent to which they be-
came involved in the nationalist struggle and that the degree of 
unity among the political groupings will be reflected in the organ-
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sation of the trade unions. Since independence in Uganda was 
achieved by a coalition of diverse political groups rather than by a 
single mass party, Millen's analysis perhaps explains why unions 
in Uganda never involved themselves in the nationalist movement 
and why the national union leadership remained disunited. Political 
life in pre-independence Uganda was characterised by disunity bred 
from personal, religious and regional rivalries. No party offered a 
coherent programme which could attract the unified support of 
union leaders. Consequently, union leaders were left to disagree 
among themselves and, in general, to avoid total commitment to 
any of the competing nationalist parties. 
This situation compares with that in many parts of French West 
Afr ica : 
"The labour movement in French West Africa might have gone 
the way of labour movements in many other countries and become 
an arm of a political party or nationalist movement. That it has 
not done so can be explained by the absence of coherent political 
programmes to which the unions could dedicate themselves and, in 
particular, by the inchoate state of nationalist sentiment. . . . In 
short, the labour movement has not thrown itself directly into poli-
tical struggles or become part of a nationalist movement, mainly 
because there have been few opportunities to do so." (Berg, 1959, 
p. 222). 
During 1962, the situation began to change rapidly as the 
Uganda People's Congress established itself as the dominant poli-
tical party. One commentator noted that : 
"During the last year (1962), due mainly to some quick-fire 
nationalist politics and the coming to power of a radical populist 
party, the unions have greatly increased in strength." (Sanger, 
Central African Examiner, Oct.—Nov., 1962). 
This was not strictly true as the unions had been increasing in 
strength since 1958 for reasons not related to politics. What did 
happen during 1962 and 1963 was that the unions began to take 
in active interest in politics instead of carefully steering clear of 
them as they had done in the pre-independence period. A confused 
situation had given way to a much clearer position and it was now 
necessary for the union leaders to reconcile their interests with those 
of the ruling group of the politicians who could ultimately make or 
break the union movement. 
Luande was the first to appreciate the needs of the new situa-
t ion: As far back as September 1961, he stated tha t : 
"The unions cannot insulate themselves from politics entirely 
. . . free unions in this country are committed not only to the de-
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fence of the workers but also to fight along with the politicians who 
are struggling to achieve this country's independence." (Uganda 
Argus, 18 September 1961). 
This completely contradicted statements he had made in 1956 
when opposing Makayu's political ambitions. In February, 1962, 
foreshadowing his own candidature in the impending national 
elections, he accused "selfish politicians of forgetting that the work-
ers had played a great part in the struggle for political and indus-
trial freedom and for thinking that workers should not stand as 
candidates — yet organised labour could make or break any 
government." (Uganda Argus, 3 February 1962). 
It is doubtful whether the leaders in the Uganda People's Con-
gress were impressed by this fiction, but Luande was nevertheless 
endorsed by the party and later elected to represent an urban con-
stituency. 
Other union leaders subsequently held high offices at the 
municipal level though Luande was the first and only active union-
ist to hold national office. This situation reflects both the extent 
to which the nationalist movement developed separately from the 
unions and also the dearth of charismatic leaders within the union 
movement. When he was excluded from the cabinet, Luande inter-
preted his role as the guardian of the interests of the workers and 
proved a virulent and often irresponsible critic of Government 
policy. At times, this led him into conflict with the leaders of his 
party, and eventually to his resignation. 
Within the Uganda People's Congress, a radical school of 
thought existed which refused to accept the contention that the 
union movement should not become an integrated part of the 
structure of the ruling party. This view was first put forward by 
John Kakonge in 1961 when he stated tha t : 
"The UPC does not accept the theory that trade unionism can 
be entirely isolated from politics . . . A U T U C statement said that 
trade unionism in Uganda did not need the interference of politi-
cians in their disputes. Such a view smacks of imperialism and 
colonialism." (Uganda Argus, 16 August 1961). 
The theme was expanded in 1962 by one of Kakonge's 
supporters: 
"The independence of the U T U C is a reactionary myth. The 
unions are a force in the machinery for the building and recons-
truction of the country and, in this capacity, it is inconceivable that 
they should exist independent of Government direction . . . For 
a trade union to consider itself a mere social organisation is to 
obstruct the development of the country. The Government is thp 
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agent of the people and must control the instruments of the State." 
(iUganda Argus, 6 April 1962). 
The same press release also stated that the UPC had lost con-
fidence in the U T U C and was considering launching its own 
national trade union movement. 
The first moves in this direction were to bring the party closer 
to the Uganda Federation of Labour. In the period between 1962 
and 1964, the U F L became closely identified with the Pan-African 
ideology of the Ghana-inspired A A T U F . This made it attractive 
to a section of the UPC leadership who favoured a similar approach 
to existing problems instead of dependence on support f rom the 
"neo-colonialist powers in the Western bloc". At the Mbale Con-
ference of the U P C in 1962, the party attacked the union move-
ment's foreign affiliations and implicitly supported the ideas of the 
UFL. In turn, many of the U F L leaders became active members 
of the UPC Youth Wing and a prominent party official and univer-
sity economics lecturer became President of the UFL. 
During March, 1963, the Youth Wing and the U F L reached the 
height of their influence. Threats from their leaders that the union 
movement would be turned into an organ of the State went uncon-
tradicted by Government and set off a spate of rumours that such 
action might soon take place. No less a person than the Adminis-
trative Secretary of the UPC came out in support of the proposals 
although Cabinet Ministers were careful not to express an opinion. 
In retrospect, it seems that the Prime Minister was acting shrewdly. 
At this time, the established union organisations were resisting his 
entreaties to co-operate voluntarily with Government in aiding 
economic development. Pressure was exerted on these leaders by 
allowing a radical body of opinion to grow in importance which 
advocated the abolition of free trade unionism. High level support 
for the Youth Wing declined once the U T U C leaders began to 
adopt a more co-operative attitude. 
However, the Youth Wing remained a source of embarrassment 
for the Government during the remainder of 1963. The importance 
of the Youth Wing and the increasingly synonymous U F L should 
not be over-rated. For the most part, the members of both organi-
sations were semi-educated unemployed who cherished political 
ambitions but had failed to make any progress towards them. 
Despite its name, the Youth Wing was not a mass organisation. 
Yet events showed that it was an organisation capable of stirring 
up considerable trouble. In November, 1963, it began to make a 
more direct challenge in the field of union activity by organising un-
official strikes despite the opposition of the established union 
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leaders. Little progress was made among the better organised 
unions such as the Tobacco Workers, but they did succeed in dis-
rupting the conduct of industrial relations wherever unions were 
not solidly established. 
The National Union of Clerical, Commercial and Technical 
Employees was the union most affected. The Youth Wing applied 
to Kampala techniques of intimidation against small-scale Asian 
employers which had been developed in up-country areas with much 
success. Grievances were discovered when workers, lacking know-
ledge of the role of their union, complained to the local party office. 
In Kampala, the Youth Wing followed up two disputes to the point 
of calling the employees of two motor traders out on strike. The 
union quickly disowned the action and called on the men to return 
to work so that legitimate negotiations could begin. One employer 
co-operated, but the other ignored his commitment to a collective 
agreement and accepted the conciliation of a politician in settling 
the dispute, thus recognising the legitimacy of the Youth Wing. 
This led to a joint submission to the Minister of Labour from the 
UTUC and the Uganda Federation of Employers, requesting clari-
fication of official policy in view of the Government's earlier sup-
port for free collective bargaining. The Minister for Internal Affairs 
(and former Minister of Labour). Felix Onama, gave his back-
ing to the unions by imprisoning four of the strike leaders on 
charges of trespass, intimidation and assault. In turn, this led to 
a major upheaval among the party officials and an angry argument 
followed concerning the role and freedom of the Youth Wing. 
Onama was subjected to intimidation himself and party offices 
closed in protest against the detention of the four men involved, 
all of whom held office in both the Youth Wing and in the U F L 
(Uganda Argus, 15-19 November, 1963). 
The strength of the "radicals" in the cabinet was revealed when 
the prison terms of the four men was suddenly commuted by ex-
ecutive order. However, within a week of their release, most were 
back in custody again on a similar charge of intimidation of non-
Africans. The Youth Wing could not be disbanded because of the 
trouble it would cause amongst the unemployed, but efforts were 
made to divert its energies into more constructive channels not 
connected with politics. In December, 1963, following prompting 
from the Prime Minister, a scheme to employ the Youth Wing on 
tasks of national service was announced and Government depart-
ments were urged to find work for its members. The Youth Wing 
also announced the official dissolution of the Uganda Federation 
of Labour, although it was hinterl that • 
156 Unions and Nationalism 
new organisation. 
This organisation (Federation of Uganda Trade Unions) ended 
attempts on the part of the U P C to exercise control over the policies 
of the UTUC. The main issue of disagreement was the continuing 
affiliation of the U T U C to the ICFTU. This was regarded by the 
political leaders as an infringement of the sacred principle of non-
alignment which could only be preserved by the unions joining the 
All-African Trade Union Federation sponsored by Ghana. The 
main complaint was that international advisers and outside 
financial assistance prevented the U T U C from falling under the 
influence of the ruling party. In April 1963, Kakonge stated that : 
"It is an affront to the dignity of the African trade union 
leaders that they still feel that they need the continuing help of so-
called foreign advisers in the labour movement. The UPC considers 
that there is no need for these advisers which the party consider 
to be instigators and saboteurs." (Uganda Argus, 17 April 1963). 
At the same time, the Prime Minister announced that the pre-
sent labour legislation might soon be amended "to curtail the 
foreign hands behind the trade union movement." (Uganda Argus, 
12 April 1963). 
At a conference of East African unionists in August, 1963, the 
Ugandan leaders bent before the official pressure and supported 
a recommendation that upheld the policy of non-alignment and 
called for a review of existing affiliations with international organi-
sations with a view to disaffiliating from the ICFTU. This decision 
was welcomed by the Uganda political leaders but was later re-
pudiated by the union leaders. A visit by senior ICFTU officials 
from Belgium underlined the fact that the U T U C would be bank-
rupt without ICFTU financial aid and the Ugandan leaders 
apparently decided to sacrifice political popularity for solvency. 
The past activities of the ICFTU in Africa give few grounds to 
doubt the assertion that the organisation had been in the forefront 
of the struggle against colonialism. From the beginning, leaders in 
the ICFTU asserted their support for the various nationalist 
movements in Africa and often came into conflict with political 
leaders in their own country on the subject. However, this was not 
the image of the ICFTU projected into Africa and the suspicion 
remained that ICFTU advisers and funds were somehow intended 
to restore the superiority of the Europeans over the local leaders. 
In his 1964 May Day address, the Prime Minister of Uganda 
asserted that : 
"There is no single cent that you receive from abroad without 
strings. Whoever pays you will control you. You cannot get money 
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from abroad and then talk of the independence of the labour 
movement". (East African Standard, 4 May 1964). 
Dr. Obote clearly did not apply this reasoning to all forms of 
foreign aid, but here he was asserting the determination of the 
Government to oppose the union's continuing dependence on out-
side assistance. 
When the U T U C failed to reform itself and pointedly rejected 
the leader most closely associated with the ruling party, its fate 
seemed to be sealed. The emergence of the Federation of Uganda 
Trade Unions with its open support from political leaders marked 
the start of the final phase of subjecting the unions in Uganda to 
direct political control. 
C h a p t e r T h i r t e e n 
UNIONS AND THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT 
The achievement of political independence has an immediate 
and dramatic effect upon the relations between the union move-
ment and the new Government. The workers in under-developed 
countries have often been led to expect an increase in living 
standards and real wages as a result of being under the rule of 
their own people instead of being exploited by outsiders. At the 
same time, these expectations are in direct conflict with the policies 
of the new political leaders. Most under-developed countries, in-
cluding Uganda, rely upon the agricultural sector as the basis for 
national prosperity and wish to resist any tendency for labour to 
drift away from the rural areas into the towns. The standard of 
living of urban workers is not high, but it is neverthelss consider-
ably higher than in many rural areas so that the workers appear 
as a relatively privileged minority. Pressure from the unions for 
advanced social services for their members are resisted because 
these would tend to widen this gap and lead to rural discontent. 
A second factor which encourages independent governments to 
exercise greater control over the union movement is the new 
nation's drive towards economic self-sufficiency. This drive usually 
takes the form of trying to attract overseas capital investment and 
also lifting the level of local savings and industrial productivity. It 
is realised that unregulated collective bargaining between unions 
and management may produce decisions which ignore the wider 
interests of the community. There is also the danger that wide-
spread strike activity may lead to heavy losses in productivity and 
also discourage prospective overseas investors. 
Finally, there is the fear that unions will serve as a focus for 
opposition to the regime. Millen has pointed out tha t : 
"Despite the voting preponderance of the rural elements, it is 
the industrial elements of the city that dominate the political 
picture at certain crucial moments". (Millen, 1963, p. 90). 
Union leaders free from party control could thus exercise a key 
role in any organised opposition and attempts are made by the 
political leaders either to recruit or to subdue them. 
Political leaders in all the new states in Africa have pointed 
to the new role which they expect the trade unions to play. Perhaps 
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the clearest explanation of their position has been given by Presi-
dent Sekou Toure of Guinea, himself a unionist and a keen student 
of history: 
"Trade union activity must constantly take note, in its fight for 
the aspirations of the working population, of the character and 
forms of the measures being undertaken by the nation to satisfy 
these aspirations . . . The trend towards 'claim making trade 
unionism' contracted in the course of union practice in the fully-
developed capitalist countries has no significance in countries 
where the future of the worker is closely tied to the nation's powers 
of development. (In these countries) trade union action has direct 
repercussions upon the quality of national independence and the 
character of the fight for social and economic freedom which, in 
order to be carried out in accordance with the higher interests of 
the people, demands an absolute national political unity." (Sekou 
Toure, 1962). 
This concept of political unity is interpreted in practical terms 
as a willingness to accept the need for restraint in the use of direct 
action wherever such action is seen by the government to endanger 
economic progress. There are various methods used by the ruling 
parties in Africa to achieve this sense of responsibility among union 
leaders. The more authoritarian regimes have used direct force to 
remove the threat of any challenge to their authority from the 
union movement. A more common pattern is for the union leader-
ship to be "co-opted" by the Government so that, in return for 
certain concessions, the union movement is guided along the lines 
desired by the Government. A rarer arrangement is the establish-
ment of a system of voluntary co-operation between union leaders 
and the economic planners in the Government. 
A characteristic common to all newly-independent countries is 
the greater intervention by the Government into the conduct of in-
dustrial relations, both formally through expanded labour legisla-
tion and informally through the personal intervention of officials. 
Although arbitration was not made universally compulsory in 
Uganda, it was accepted as a common feature in the settlement of 
industrial disputes. There was a marked increase in the number of 
disputes settled informally through the intervention of labour offi-
cers as conciliators. This reflects the willingness of both politicians 
and civil servants to take the initiative in the settlement of disputes 
before they get out of hand. They have been able to make use of a 
range of unofficial sanctions not available to administrators under 
the colonial regime. A recalcitrant employer can be coerced into a 
more reasonable attitude by threats that his behaviour will affect 
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his dealings with other departments, especially regarding the issue 
of Temporary Employment Passes for his expatriate staff. Similar-
ly, union leaders are made to realise that the Government will not 
tolerate constant breaches of established negotiation procedure. 
Both these aspects were illustrated in an incident between the 
Transport and General Workers Union and a Kampala bus com-
pany. A dispute arose over the dismissal of a driver and the Minis-
ter of Labour, F. Onama, directed that the worker should be re-
instated pending an enquiry. The bus company management put the 
driver back on the pay-roll but refused to allow him to work. When 
the union again protested and went on strike, the Minister threaten-
ed to revoke the company's licence to operate and to give it to an-
other contractor unless the management complied with the original 
direction. Then the union, believing that they had won a victory, 
tried to press their advantage by refusing to return to work unless 
several other unrelated demands were also met. The Minister then 
met the strikers and warned them that they were in danger of being 
misled by the union because the Government would back the 
management in dismissing all strikers and would protect their re-
placements. By bringing pressure on both sides, the Minister set-
tled a dispute in which the established procedures had been ignored 
in favour of a trial of strength which inconvenienced the rest of the 
community. 
In the absence of new formal machinery, this trend towards 
more positive official action and to greater use of arbitration had 
a number of drawbacks. The first was that it placed considerable 
stress upon the officers of the Labour Department, particularly 
those in more senior positions. It was generally accepted by 
employers and union officials that the calibre of the junior members 
of the Labour Department declined after independence. This was 
partly caused by the departure of a number of experienced ex-
patriates and partly the effect of a drain of trained Africans into 
the personnel departments of the large enterprises. Because of the 
inexperience at lower levels, disputes tended to be forced higher up 
the administrative structure than previously. This meant that senior 
officials such as the Labour Commissioner and the Permanent 
Secretary to the Minister often found themselves involved in the 
settlement of relatively minor disputes instead of merely supervising 
the work of their subordinates. 
A second drawback arose from the functioning of the arbitra-
tion machinery. Arbitrators were appointed on an ad hoc basis for 
each dispute and, almost inevitably, this led to a number of in-
consistencies and even irregularities in their decisions. This was 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS IN UGANDA 161 
clearly illustrated in the case of two arbitrations between the East 
African Tobacco Company and the Tobacco Workers Union. In 
circumstances such as these, there seemed a strong case for the 
creation of a permanent arbitration tribunal or industrial court to 
which all cases could be referred for judgement. Provision was 
finally made for this when the Trades Disputes Ordinance was re-
formed at the end of 1964. This provided the basis upon which a 
coherent and consistent policy could be developed to replace the 
existing confusion. It also overcame the difficulty of finding qualifi-
ed independent arbitrators cach time that a new dispute came up 
for settlement. 
As with most developing countries, the independent Govern-
ment went beyond merely intensifying its role in the industrial re-
lations machinery created during the colonial period. It changed 
the basic character of the machinery, and, in particular, extended 
the levers of official control over the trade unions. 
Uganda was much influenced by the experience of both Tanga-
nyika and Kenya in this respect. In Tanganyika, the Tanganyikan 
African National Union (TANU), the major nationalist party and 
the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) had been closely as-
sociated during the colonial period. After independence, relations 
between the two organisations deteriorated as the unions pressed 
for increased wages and other concessions which were not 
acceptable to the newly installed Government. Attempts at a 
voluntary solution failed and the Government eventually passed 
restrictive legislation modelled upon that of Ghana. 
In June 1962, the Tanganyikan Minister of Labour was given 
wide power under a new ordinance to control and discipline union 
officials. All registered unions were required to belong to the single 
national centre and. through this centre, union finances were to be 
subject to rigid supervision. A new Trades Disputes Act also made 
all strikes and lock-outs illegal unless the existing voluntary 
machinery had been exhausted and the Minister had decided not 
to refer the dispute to a special tribunal. With regard to the civil 
service, the Minister was given the ultimate power to settle any 
issue personally. The legislation was extended in 1964 by replacing 
the national centre and its affiliates with a single nation-wide union 
organisation. The Minister of Labour was named the first General 
Secretary of the new body and given the power to appoint all other 
officials in order to ensure their sense of responsibility to the Gov-
ernment and to the ruling party. As compensation for this "take-
over", all but the most recalcitrant union leaders received posts in 
the new organisation and provision was made for the compulsory 
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introduction of the check-off method of subscription collection, the 
use of the "closed shop" wherever more than 50% of the workers 
were organised and the establishment of workers' councils with 
power to question management decisions relating to personnel 
matters. 
Nevertheless, the trend of events in Tanganyika during 1962 
provoked a hostile reaction among union leaders in Uganda which 
finally touched off a critical struggle between the union movement 
and the political leaders. The first statement in the prolonged battle 
of words came from Nakibinge, U T U C General Secretary, in his 
press statement commenting on the Tanganyikan legislation. He 
warned that "any move to deny Ugandan workers the right to 
strike will be strongly resisted" and that the Government should 
not follow the example of Tanganyika. (Uganda Argus, 29 June 
1962). The idea that the Government might be tempted to do so was 
played upon by Luande to increase the militancy of his own follow-
ing. 
A number of union leaders opposed Luande's "scare campaign" 
on the grounds that it was likely to provoke the repressive action 
from the Government that he claimed to foresee. Thus Nakibinge 
and a spokesman of the Public Employees Union both reaffirmed 
their trust in the elected representatives of the people and pointed 
out that "at present there is no sign that the Government seeks to 
dominate the trade unions". (Uganda Argus, 11 July 1962) The 
whole issue became involved in the complex struggle for influence 
within the U T U C with Luande's supporters opposed by more 
moderate elements. The Government, through the Acting Minister 
of Labour, A. A. Nekyon, tried to discredit Luande by an-
nouncing that it had no intention of limiting strike activity and 
charging that the workers were being misled by a union movement 
organised on a tribal basis by union leaders abusing the trust placed 
in them by the community. Nekyon had cause to return to this 
theme on a number of occasions as the situation deteriorated 
further. 
By September 1962, industrial unrest had reached a peak and 
waves of unofficial strikes swept the country. The Labour Depart-
ment recorded that there were 29 strikes in August and 35 in Sep-
tember; on one day in the middle of September there were ten 
unions on strike simultaneously and some were still out a fortnight 
later. A local commentator noted tha t : 
"One gets the impression that the unions have a list of firms 
which they are steadily working through, keeping six or seven 
strikes going at the one time". (Reporter, 29 September 1962). 
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The reasons for this sudden outburst were probably a combina-
tion of the fear, stimulated by Luande, that unions would face a 
bleak future under an independent Government and the general 
air of uncertainty surrounding this transfer of power, scheduled 
for the following month. The view was also put forward that there 
was a deliberate conspiracy behind i t : 
"It began to appear to Ugandans that the whole thing was be-
ing fomented deliberately. Kenya men, it seemed, were either using 
every weapon to increase their structure in the unions and their grip 
on the movement as a whole or they were bent on embarrassing the 
national government". (Reporter, 27 October 1962). 
This accusation of undue foreign influence was taken up once 
again by Nekyon. Claiming that Kenyans controlled most of 
Uganda's unions, he accused them of trying to sabotage the new 
nation. When the October independence celebrations were en-
dangered by a strike among hotel workers, he went further and 
threatened to deport "those leaders bent on sabotaging the nation-
al effort". (Uganda Argus, 6 October 1962). In defence of the 
unions, attempts were made to deny that Kenyans were behind the 
strikes by showing that only four unions had Kenyan General Sec-
retaries and all 22 affiliates of the U T U C had a Ugandan majority 
on their executives. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that the 
most militant spokesmen in the union movement had a close affi-
liation with Kenya and that Kenyan migrants formed the hard 
core of union supporters in almost every industry. Further, the 
reaction of some of these militants tended to reinforce the validity 
of Nekyon's attack. A Kenyan official of the Hotel and Domestic 
Workers Union attacked Nekyon and the whole Uganda Govern-
ment as "enemies of the workers" and threatened to ask Kenyan 
dockworkers to refuse to handle Uganda cargoes and so cut 
Uganda's economic lifeline. This seemed to prove Nekyon's point 
that all loyal Ugandans, including trade unionists, should resist 
this challenge to the new nation's national integrity. 
The policy of the Government through this trying period was 
to resist the temptation to intervene. The prevailing unemployment 
situation and the absence of any strike funds meant that most 
strikes collapsed after a few days and that workers then tended to 
lose confidence in the more militant leaders. In a press statement 
after independence, the Minister of Labour, Felix Onama, re-
affirmed his opposition to any form of repressive legislation but 
warned that a repetition of the events of the September strike wave 
would cause him to change his mind. In future the Government 
would also refrain from intervening too quickly in unofficial dis-
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putes since this gave de facto recognition to irresponsible leaders 
(Uganda Argus, 10 November 1962). 
In taking this line, the Government was opposing the view of 
many people within the ruling party who believed that the union 
movement should be more directly responsible to the rest of the 
community for its actions. Agitation for greater official control 
came mainly from the same group who favoured the establishment 
of the Youth Wing or the Uganda Federation of Labour as an ap-
pendage of the nationalist party. Thus the President of the Uganda 
Federation of Labour, in a memorandum to the UPC Research 
Bureau, stated tha t : 
"Union leadership does not appear to concentrate on the basic-
requirements of trade unions. This may be due to the influence of 
certain United States dominated affiliations that the unions have 
been led to abide by. For this reason, I do not consider it a bad 
thing to introduce new legislation to restrict the powers of unions 
as in the case of Tanganyika". (Uganda Argus, 5 February, 1963). 
This was backed up by accusations from John Kakonge and 
others that the U T U C was "setting itself up in arms against the 
Government" and that "union leaders had set themselves up as 
chief spokesmen for religious and social organisations in the fight 
against the Government. As is so evident, it is the intention of the 
UTUC leaders to function as a rival of political parties". (Uganda 
Argus, 17 April 1963).. 
However, the key figures in the Government remained unmoved 
and pressure for more repressive legislation acted as a stimulus to 
greater voluntary collaboration from the established union leaders. 
After October 1962, the debate between the Government and the 
UTUC ceased to be fought out in the columns of the local press. 
In the course of informal discussions in the following months, it 
seems that pressure was brought to bear on some of the top union 
officials as there was a marked moderation in their attitudes and 
strike activity declined. The turning point seems to have come 
after the U T U C Annual Congress in February 1963. 
At this conference, the Prime Minister, Dr. Obote, made a 
forthright but generally conciliatory speech in which he pointed to 
the need for the union movement to redefine its relationship with 
the independent Government. The idea of complete separation was 
not acceptable in view of the important role to be played by the 
union movement in national economic development and such sepa-
ration did not exist in practice. Although this speech provoked 
dissatisfaction among union officials because of its criticism of 
union indiscipline and the continuing influence of outside organi-
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sations, it seems clear that some union leaders had at last been 
persuaded that the alternative to repressive legislation could never 
be complete separation and that they should settle voluntarily for 
some other form of co-operation. At this late date, the unions be-
gan to work for the establishment of a voluntary tripartite struc-
ture to replace the system of bilateral collective bargaining 
inherited from the colonial era. 
The idea of a voluntary agreement was derived from Kenya. 
The Industrial Relations Charter had been signed by the Kenya 
Government, the Kenya Federation of Employers and the Kenya 
Federation of Labour in October 1962. It was an outgrowth from 
the National Joint Consultative Council which had been set up by 
the Kenya Federation of Labour and the Kenya Federation of 
Employers in October 1961, to provide machinery for the main-
tenance of amicable relations between the two bodies and to pro-
vide voluntary and informal conciliation machinery to supplement 
the work of the Labour Department. The Charter was a much 
more ambitious undertaking, made possible only by the presence of 
far-sighted leaders on all sides. It began by laying down a set of 
agreed responsibilities for employers and unions, emphasising in 
particular the need to utilise existing machinery and the need for 
both sides to recognise each other's right of freedom of association. 
Principles of union recognition and a model recognition agreement 
were agreed upon and a joint Disputes Commission was set up as 
a voluntary body to speed up the solution of disputes. Agreement 
was also reached on redundancy procedures, the removal of dis-
crimination in employment policy, the discouragement of direct 
action or intimidation and the extension of joint consultation. 
The idea of imitating the Kenyan Charter had been put forward 
first by the Executive Officer of the Federation of Uganda 
Employers in 1962 at a meeting of the Labour Consultative Council, 
an advisory body set up by the Government with representatives 
of both sides of industry. At the time, the idea received little sup-
port from the unions because they believed that they could continue 
to operate without any formal machinery for contact with the 
Government. Ideas began to change after the February conference, 
perhaps the effect of some strong talking from Government officials 
and from the unions' international advisers. Consequently a report 
on the conference proceedings noted that: 
"Trade union leaders are beginning to come out in favour of 
adopting an Industrial Charter, possibly along lines already adopt-
ed in Kenya, as an alternative to restrictive labour legislation." 
(Reporter, 1 March 1963). 
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Formal talks began in April 1963, between the U T U C and the 
Employers' Federation, after it had been agreed in the Labour 
Consultative Council that the Government would only enter nego-
tiations after the initial difference between unions and employers 
had been settled. These talks progressed smoothly and a draft 
agreement was ready by July. The only awkward moment occurred 
when one of the union officials concerned repudiated the secrecy 
of the talks "behind the back of the Government" in the mistaken 
belief that the Government itself had been excluded from the first 
stages of discussion. The draft agreement was submitted first to 
the Ministry of Labour and then to the Ministry of Justice and the 
Crown Law Department for a review of the legal aspects of the 
agreement. 
At what was hoped to be a final meeting of the three parties, 
negotiations were unexpectedly brought to a halt when the Minis-
ter of State, G. Magezi, announced that the Government were 
not in a position to commit themselves totally to the principles 
enunciated in the Charter. This caused the members of the U T U C 
to break off the talks and they were not resumed until May 1964. 
By then, it had been accepted by all parties that the Government 
would sign only as a witness, a move which would at least increase 
the moral authority of the Charter as an agreement between the 
two sides of private industry. The Charter was finally signed on 
June 1st, 1964. The full text of the document is included as Ap-
pendix A. In most respects, it resembles the Kenya Charter describ-
ed earlier, with an acceptance of the need to maintain industrial 
harmony by preventing disputes from leading to direct industrial 
action and a statement of general policies governing redundancy, 
employment policy, intimidation and joint consultation. An inter-
esting addition was Clause II, in which the Federation of Uganda 
Employers and the U T U C "agree to dissuade their affiliates from 
issuing to the Press and to Radio Uganda during negotiations 
statements which might prejudice matters under negotiation". This 
was an attempt to avoid use of the provocative publicity tactics 
which had in the past often disrupted private negotiations. 
The reason put forward by the Government for its refusal to sign 
the Charter as a full signatory, as occurred in Kenya, related to the 
special constitutional position of the Public Service Commission. 
Entrenched in the Uganda Constitution were certain provisions 
which gave this Commission unrestricted control over matters which 
were regarded as subject to negotiation within the terms of the In-
dustrial Charter. For the Government to commit itself to the pro-
visions of the Charter would have thus been a breach of the Consti-
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tution. 
However, later events showed that this legal loophole merely 
concealed the Government's intention to refuse to be bound by the 
spirit as well as by the letter of the Charter. Shortly after negotia-
tions were broken off in 1963, new legislation was introduced which 
radically altered the Government's relationship with the Uganda 
Public Employees Union and effectively removed that union's 
ability to indulge in collective bargaining. 
Before independence, the U P C had pledged its support for the 
idea of a union in the public service. John Kakonge, Secretary-
General of the party, publicly stated: "When we are in power, we 
will certainly do everything we can to encourage the development 
of your union." (Uganda Argus, 2 April 1962). In relation to the 
unestablished section, this proved to be true. One of the main pro-
blems of the union had been the way in which the urban authorities, 
especially Jinja Municipality, held out against recognition by sett-
ing an unrealistically high percentage of union membership as a 
prerequisite. Encouraged by the Cabinet, the Minister of Local 
Government called a meeting of the Urban Authorities Association 
and pushed through a joint recognition agreement with the U P E U 
on the same terms as that of the central government. In addition, 
the Joint Central Industrial Council (covering unestablished only) 
began to function and the Minister of State responsible for civil 
service matters also committed himself to support of the union. 
At the same time, however, efforts were being made to split 
most of the established section from the union. In August 1962, a 
bargain was announced — the Government would recognise the 
union as representative of the E scale established group (up to 
£597 per annum) of the union agreed not to try and attract mem-
bers from above this grade. Government announced that : 
"Any attempt on the part of the union to recruit members from 
staff graded in other scales would be regarded as a breach of the 
agreement and result in the withdrawal of recognition of the union 
as a negotiation machinery for all central government employees." 
(Uganda Argus, 14 August 1962). 
This was followed up by a move which was designed to rein-
force this split. Following an official Commission on Africanisa-
tion, a 20% salary cut for all recently appointed super-scale 
employees was announced. This was based on the sound reasoning 
that posts previously held by expatriates need no longer be paid 
at a level comparable to European salaries. But the cut was re-
presented as a means of financing a wage increase in the unestab-
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lished groups. Consequently the UPEU made only perfunctory pro-
tests on behalf of the established section, while it warmly welcom-
ed the increase on behalf of the unestablished. As a result, the 
established group bitterly attacked the UPEU executive and 
threatened to break away of their own accord and reconstruct their 
staff association. It was becoming obvious that the UPEU could 
not serve two masters and that the established group were being 
deprived of effective union representation. 
From independence until the end of 1963, the UPEU maintain-
ed its satisfactory record of never calling an official strike. It be-
came involved in two important issues. The first was a "wild cat" 
stoppage called by Kampala municipal employees without refer-
ence to any official. The union called upon them to return to work 
before it would consider taking up their grievances. Among those 
involved were the refuse collectors, and it was pointed out that 
this group was liable for prosecution under the essential services 
clauses of the Trade Union Ordinance. However, the strikers did 
not return until the Minister of Labour intervened with promises 
to investigate their case personally. After conciliation failed, the 
Labour Commissioner tried to persuade the union to withdraw the 
dispute until the decision of the Minimum Wages Board had been 
announced. However, the union continued to press for arbitration 
as prescribed under the Ordinance because it feared the conse-
quences of withdrawal. The Minister had already given in to the 
strikers over the heads of the union officials, and the union did not 
wish to be blamed for the failure of their case. When arbitration 
awarded no increase, the strikers could blame the Minister and 
not the union. 
The second dispute involved the UPEU only marginally, but 
it is important for the statement of policy which resulted. The 
dispute arose out of the refusal of nurses in the largest Kampala 
hospital to wear numbers as a means of easy identification. As 
nurses are classified on the E scale, the U P E U took up their case. 
No strike action could be contemplated, but persistent disobedience 
of the order to wear numbers finally led to mass dismissals. In 
addition to the UPEU, the U T U C protested vigorously and called 
a well-publicised meeting which criticised the action of Govern-
ment as an irresponsible waste of trained resources. 
This called forth a response from the Minister of State, 
Magezi, which clearly indicated the trend of official thinking. He 
denied that the U T U C could concern itself with the dispute: 
"The nurses, as members of the civil service of Uganda, do not 
belong to trade unions of this kind. Only the U P E U is authorised 
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to handle the affairs of government employees in the E scale and 
downwards, and this is embodied in their agreement. The agree-
ment does not refer to the U T U C . . . Civil Service matters are en-
tirely the responsibility of the Uganda Public Service Commission, 
the Prime Minister, and in some cases, the Governor-General. What-
ever agitation the trade unions may make concerning civil service 
matters, they will not deter the government from pursuing the pro-
visions of the constitution and the various legislations". (Uganda 
Argus, 22 April 1963). 
The UPEU was being regarded as different in kind from the 
rest of Uganda's unions and would not be allowed to deflect Gov-
ernment from the exercise of its constitutional sovereignty over its 
own employees. 
The culmination of this philosophy was the Public Service 
(Negotiation Machinery) Bill, first published in the Uganda Gazette 
on December 6, 1963. Three weeks later it was hurriedly pushed 
through the National Assembly while the attention of most poli-
ticians was concentrated on a more controversial education debate. 
The Bill begins by distinguishing between junior and senior 
public officers — juniors being all unestablished employees and 
those in the S and E scale of the established, seniors being ail 
above. Under Section 25 (1) "no senior public officer shall be or 
become a member of any trade union or any body or association 
affiliated to a trade union". The earlier bargain was thus made 
legally binding. 
A Joint Staff Council was set up. The Council consisted of a 
chairman and up to ten members nominated by the permanent 
secretary, and a vice-chairman and the same number of members 
nominated by the trade union. The Minister would make appoint-
ments from these nominations. The UPEU was not mentioned by 
name — the Minister also had "the right to designate which trade 
union shall be represented". The objects of the Council were: 
"To secure the greatest measure of co-operation between the 
Government, in its capacity as an employer, and junior public 
officers, to provide machinery for dealing with the grievances of 
public officers and to enable consultation to take place in matters 
affecting the well-being of the service". (Section 4). 
Section 5 specifically excluded the Council from "any matter 
concerning the appointment or non-appointment, disciplinary 
control or removal from office of any individual public officer". 
When agreements were reached in Council, they became bind-
ing for twelve months if approved by the Minister. In the case of 
a dispute, a report was made to the Minister who might then refer 
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it on to a specially appointed board and, after considering its re-
port, might decide to make an award. The Minister determined the 
constitution of the board and controlled its operation: 
"The Minister may give directions relating to the scope, method 
and conduct of any specific proceedings before the board" (Section 
27 (2). 
Section 17 laid down the only conditions under which junior 
public officers were permitted to strike. Strikes were permitted if, 
after a dispute had been reported, 21 days elapsed before action 
was taken or before the Minister acted on the report of a board. 
But, as the Minister was unilaterally allowed to extend this 21-day 
period indefinitely by a qualifying clause in each case, the possibi-
lity of legal strike action was virtually non-existent. 
"Any public officer contravening the provisions of this section 
shall be deemed to be guilty of misconduct justifying his summary 
dismissal". 
To tidy up any contradictions, the second schedule of the Bill 
excluded "public officers or persons otherwise employed by the 
Government", as well as the army and the police, from the provi-
sions of the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordin-
ance, and from the Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages 
Council Ordinance. It was later necessary to exclude them as well 
from the 1952 Trade Union Ordinance which guaranteed the right 
of free association in accordance with the Conventions of the Inter-
national Labour Organisation. 
In the National Assembly debate, Magezi based his arguments 
on the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
"The Government will not agree to any limitation of its 
sovereignty in this matter, which allows an arbitrator to commit 
public funds to which this Assembly could do no more than act as 
a rubber stamp . . . Parliament is the guardian of the public offi-
cer" (UG, 1963 (b), p. 705). 
This guardianship was in future to be exercised when the 
Minister laid his award before the House, a rather dubious pro-
tection for a minor civil servant. 
The opposition to the Bill came mainly from two members on 
the Government side — Luande, the President of the UTUC, 
and Daudi Ocheng, a prominent businessman who acted as 
spokesman for the Federation of Uganda Employers. Luande 
pointed out that any division of opinion in the Staff Council 
virtually gave the Minister power to dictate his own terms of set-
tlement. He claimed that freedom of association was guaranteed 
by both the Uganda Constitution and by the Trade Union Ordi-
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nance but was being overridden by this Bill. He denied that strict 
legislation was the best way to improve industrial relations. Final-
ly, he complained that the Government, having gone to the trouble 
of setting up a Labour Consultative Council, had not called it to-
gether to discuss this most important piece of labour legislation. 
Daudi Ocheng concentrated on the constitutional aspects, and 
also the impact of the Bill on general industrial relations. He 
pointed out that the limitation of the right to strike contradicted 
the conventions of the International Labour Organisation of which 
Uganda was a member, the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights, and even Uganda's Constitution. He also claimed that the 
practice in private enterprise of appointing an independent arbi-
trator inspired confidence and might improve relations if included 
in the Government set-up. Finally, he expressed the fear among 
private employers that this Bill was the thin end of the wedge and 
the beginning of a process of government restriction on the freedom 
of collective bargaining. 
In reply to these criticisms it was stated that the Uganda Gov-
ernment, although a member of the International Labour Organi-
sation, had not ratified those conventions on freedom of association 
which were not thought to be applicable to under-developed areas. 
In any case, International Labour Organisation conventions could 
not be regarded as superior to the Uganda Constitution which, in 
Section 27(2), permitted the exclusion of the employees of Govern-
ment from the provisions of freedom of association cited by 
critics of the Bill. 
One opposition member touched on the basic weakness of the 
Bill when he pointed out that "the Bill affected such employees as 
grass cutters, whose real protection was trade unionism. The Bill 
now would deny them that protection". (UG 1963 (b), p. 713). 
Parliament may be termed the guardian of the public officer, but 
the politicians had few contacts with the lowest grade of unestab-
lished employee. He believed that a strong union was the best 
means of protecting this group's interests from exploitation by the 
employing authority and it was feared that this Bill would greatly 
weaken the union. 
Before the final passage of the Bill, a delegation from the 
UTUC and the Employers' Association discussed the matter with 
the two ministers concerned, at a meeting of the Labour Consulta-
tive Council. The union memorandum repeated points already 
touched on in Parliament regarding fundamental rights embodied 
in constitutional documents and international conventions. It also 
suggested that existing machinery had not been found wanting in 
172 Unions and the Independent Government 
relation to public servants and that the proposed legislation 
emphasised an unnecessary difference. 
"I t would have been far better had Government concentrated 
on finalising the Industrial Relations Charter. Through this Char-
ter both Government and the union would feel bound by honour 
to respect 'industrial ethics' in matters concerning any difference 
between us", (para. 3). 
Detailed clauses were criticised, including the failure to pro-
vide grievance machinery for issues specifically excluded from the 
Council and the right of Ministers to postpone awards without con-
sultation with the affected party. The key assertion of the memo-
randum was tha t : 
"The power to make an award should be vested in the Board 
and not in the Minister as, in the final analysis, he is an interested 
party", (para. 13). 
However, the memorandum was not publicised and little was 
done to make the Bill a popular issue. The General Secretary of the 
union seems to have accepted the inevitable after quietly voicing 
his disagreement. He accepted that the Minister of State had replac-
ed the Labour Department as far as his union was concerned and 
claimed, somewhat optimistically, that the union's right to strike 
had not been removed completely. He asserted that if the union 
disagreed with the final decision after all the procedures had been 
completed, it could still go on strike. This was wishful thinking as 
well as a misinterpretation of the practical possibilities of a legal 
strike. The leaders of the unions realised that there was no hope of 
resisting Government and saw that co-operation would help them 
more than open criticism. 
To some extent, this acquiescence was in line with the policy 
of the Public Services International (PSI). When Tanganyika had 
passed similar legislation relating to the Tanganyika Union of 
Public Employees, the General Secretary had written for advice. 
The PSI's reply reaffirmed their policy resolution of demanding 
full negotiating rights and free arbitration as well as freedom for 
all civil servants to join the union of their choice. However, the 
advice to the Tanganyika Union of Public Employees was that it 
should collaborate with the Government to build up mutual trust 
and confidence despite the restrictions imposed by the legislation. 
In this way, the union might show that Government could restore 
full rights without any danger that these rights would be misused. 
The same line seems to have been taken on Uganda, with a mi-
nimum of protest being made against the new legislation. The local 
leaders seemed to have accepted the change quite amicably. The 
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UPEU was led by able administrators rather than devoted unionists 
because of the nature of its growth. These leaders were not willing 
to sacrifice the security of their jobs, either in Government or as 
full-time unionists, by opposing the legislation too vehemently. A 
union genuinely devoted to western principles of free collective 
bargaining might have stirred itself to effective protests. But the 
only people in the UPEU devoted to such principles were the ex-
patriate advisers, and they had gone home. The African leaders 
and the rank and file had never exerted themselves in pursuit of 
these principles and so were less concerned about their removal. 
Kibuka, the main leader, was also becoming aware that he might 
have a bright future as a national union leader if he was co-ope-
rative with Government. Events were to prove that he was right. 
By the end of 1964, the lines of Government policy towards the 
trade union were clearly drawn, although all the details had not 
been fully worked out. As in many other countries, the public 
service was treated as a special category because of its key role in 
the execution of the business of the State. Union membership was 
restricted to unskilled employees and the lowest grade of clerks, 
and even this union was subject to the absolute power of the 
Minister if a major dispute threatened. 
When dealing with employees in private enterprise, the Gov-
ernment was more equivocal. In August 1962, Onama, Minister 
of Labour had stated categorically that : 
"The Government does not intend to introduce legislation to 
restrict the rights of employees in any way. I remain convinced 
that machinery for collective bargaining and the settlement of dis-
putes on an industrial basis, and the co-operation of both parties 
in a spirit of goodwill and determination to make the machinery 
work, is the only way to achieve industrial peace". (Speech to Fed-
eration of Uganda Employers, August 1962). 
By 1964, another Minister of Labour felt it necessary to go back 
on this principle to some extent. A new Trades Disputes (Arbitra-
tion and Settlement) Act made it an offence to strike without first 
exhausting the existing disputes procedure. Heavy fines or prison 
sentences could be imposed on leaders counselling a strike under 
these conditions, and on workers for committing a breach of their 
contract by participating in such a strike. In addition, the schedule 
of essential services to which more stringent legislation applied 
was made variable at the discretion of the Minister. 
Finally, the Government had given its support to the establish-
ment of an Industrial Charter which recognised the value of 
voluntary co-operation between the Federation of Uganda 
174 Unions and the Independent Government 
Employers and the U T U C as the representative national union 
centre. At the same time, the Government negotiators had been 
careful to exclude the provision of the Kenya model which would 
have recognised the monopoly position of the UTUC. Instead, 
during 1964, it began to support the emergence of an alternative 
centre which would be more amenable to official direction. 
Although this centre fell far short of majority support in terms 
of affiliated union members, the trend towards exclusive govern-
ment recognition as the representative national centre made it an 
important force to be reckoned with. The eventual outcome is like-
ly to be some compromise organisation created out of an amalga-
mation of FUTU and UTUC, made under official pressure, which 
will allow a rationalisation of the overall union structure and 
greater official influence over national aspects of union policy. 
So, in its relations with the trade unions, the Government pur-
sued a number of different lines of policy. Behind all of them was 
the clear intention that, one way or another, unions should be made 
to conform to the broad policy intentions of the Government and 
not left to pursue their own narrow interests at the expense of wider 
national objectives. 
C h a p t e r T h i r t e e n 
A WIDER PERSPECTIVE 
The development of trade unions reflects to some extent the 
existence of social and political conditions peculiar to Uganda. 
Generally, however, observations made in the course of this survey 
seem to be relevant to many other parts of Africa and this is borne 
out by a review of some of the comparative literature available. 
One fundamental feature common to many African countries is 
that there are few "workers" in the western sense of a landless pro-
letariat dependent solely upon their wages. During the formative 
period of trade union growth in Uganda, the mass of the workers 
were migrants who intended to resume their tenure of an area of 
tribal land after a short spell of wage employment. The only 
groups who were in a position to stay longer in employment, the 
Luo and the Ganda, were also the only groups to be interested in 
trade union activity in its early stages. 
Because the mass of the workers did not identify their long-
term interests with wage employment, unions were slow to develop 
in Uganda and never claimed wholehearted support f rom all the 
workers. Characteristically, union leadership came from clerical 
and semi-skilled workers who intended to stay longer in employ-
ment than most of the manual workers. It was also noted that many 
of the top union leaders were individuals who, for one reason or 
another, were excluded from advancement in other fields. Roper 
has pointed out that trade unions in many areas came to be re-
garded as legitimate instruments in the struggle for nationalist 
political goals (Roper, 1958, p. 101) This did not occur in Uganda, 
partly because of the character of Ugandan politics and partly be-
cause of the exclusion of most union leaders from the dominant 
political forces. 
As elsewhere in Africa, trade unions have been one of the 
most important associational interest groups concerned with the 
urbanisation process. And, again characteristically, this process has 
represented a compromise between modern values and the tenacity 
of traditional loyalties. Although unions acted as supra-tribal units 
concerned with work groups, ethnic and tribal loyalties continued 
to be of supreme importance in the internal politics of the trade 
union movement. It was this ethnic identification between leaders 
176 A Wider Perspective 
and ordinary members which helps to explain the passive toleration 
of the wide cultural gap between the mass of workers and the na-
tional leadership. 
The Ugandan unions suffered from the same weaknesses in 
negotiation which have been noted elsewhere in Africa. Writing 
of French West Africa, Berg noted three reasons for the special 
vulnerability of African unions: their inability to force employers 
to shut down during a dispute because of the key role played by 
non-Africans in most enterprises, their lack of solidarity as a result 
of ethnic differences between the members which caused constant 
splits within the union leadership, and the lack of financial resour-
ces to sustain a long strike (Berg, 1957, p. 225). In Uganda, ex-
amples can be cited in support of all three of these factors: the 
maintenance of rail services during the 1960 strike by Asian and 
European employees, the series of disturbances in the National 
Union of Plantation Workers arising out of tribal disputes, and 
the collapse of the Nyanza Textiles strike because of the absence 
of any form of strike fund. This dependence on outside financial 
support in order to sustain a strike indicates a more fundamental 
weakness in African unions. Many unions in western countries 
have shown that it is possible to maintain a strike action for many 
months at a time if the union members believe in the cause enough 
to suffer hardship by "living off the land". In Africa, living off the 
land is a much more, comfortable operation because of the links 
between urban workers and traditional agriculture. The fact that 
strikes cannot be sustained points to the absence of a firm com-
mitment on the part of the workers to the ideals of trade unionism. 
In his analysis of industrial relations in Egypt, Harbison deve-
loped what he called "a typology of employer-union relationships" 
(Harbison, 1959, pp. 168-176). His four types were: (1) the paterna-
listic relationship; (ii) the unstable truce; (iii) the stable truce; and 
(iv) permanent mutual accommodation. 
Each of the four types can be related to the case studies of 
Ugandan unions. The paternalistic relationship is characterised as 
a situation in which "the union is recognised as a junior partner 
which should reflect management wishes and policies". (Harbison, 
1959, p. 169). Fear of unrestricted protest by workers leads to an 
attempt to impose a loyal and conservative union leadership which 
will gain the support of the workers through concessions made by 
management. In this way the management retain their absolute 
authority and actively work against any attempt by "bad elements" 
to invade the union leadership. This was obviously the situation in 
Nyanza Textiles, where the policy finally led to persistent unrest 
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caused by frustration among those aspiring union leaders who re-
jected the idea of "junior partnership". 
The unstable truce describes the situation in which the com-
pany management is intent on preventing union organisation or 
breaking it up when it can no longer be resisted. There is no ac-
ceptance of the fact that there is a need for an organised system 
for the ventilation of grievances. This was true of employers in the 
sugar industry in their dealings with the National Union of Planta-
tion Workers, particularly in the early period. Having resisted the 
formation of a union for as long as possible, the employers then 
made it as hard as possible for the N U P W to become established, 
and even tried to sponsor an alternative organisation. 
The stable truce relationship depends upon recognition by 
management that the union cannot be dislodged from its position 
as representative of their employees, and an acceptance by the 
union that it will make most progress by peaceful negotiation 
rather than direct action. This more sophisticated approach is 
common among large foreign-owned enterprises, and is perhaps 
the product of wider experiences with organised labour in other 
areas. Of the unions studied in detail, only the Tobacco Workers 
Union had achieved this degree of stability but much the same 
situation prevailed among other Ugandan unions dealing with the 
oil companies and the largest commercial firms. 
Finally, there is the permanent mutual accommodation, in 
which the union is more powerful than in any other type of re-
lationship. As Harbison points out, it is often transport workers 
who achieve this position in which the union has genuine strength 
and can effectively bargain for concessions. In Uganda, it was 
the Railway African Union rather than the motor transport work-
ers who made most progress. Because many officials had had ex-
perience with the more advanced union movement in Kenya, the 
R A U was the first to be established in Uganda. It remained the 
strongest and most militant organisation in Uganda despite 
frequent internal leadership disputes. 
In noting the general weakness of trade unions in Africa, 
Hunter has stated that : 
"Perhaps the main difficulty has not been so much the alien 
character of the Trade Union in the traditional context but the fact 
that the movement came from above and was never lived and suf-
fered by the bulk of the membership". (Hunter, 1962, p. 218). 
This has yet to be established on the basis of empirical evidence 
regarding the role of the trade union in a traditional context. How-
ever, the imposition was the work of the policy makers in the 
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British Colonial Office, and later the representatives of the inter-
national trade union movement, particularly the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its associated organisa-
tions. It has been seen that this second group had a particular im-
pact in Uganda because of the late development of unions there 
and because Kampala became a focus for ICFTU activities in 
Africa through the presence of the African Labour College. 
Protagonists of this transfer to Africa of the union experience 
of Europe and North America believe that the problems of indus-
trialisation are universal and respond to similar solutions. While 
admitting that institutions will naturally be influenced by the 
environment in which they operate, Roberts asserts that : 
"It does not follow that different fundamental principles ought 
to be applied to overseas territories simply because they are at an 
earlier stage in their economic and social development . . . What-
ever the shortcomings of British Colonial policy might have been, 
there can be no possible doubt that the governments of both 
parties have been absolutely right to foster free trade unionism and 
a pattern of industrial relations based in principle on ideas 
pioneered and tested in Britain and the western world". (Roberts, 
1957, p. 402). 
Against this view, writers such as Davison have questioned the 
continuing applicability of these British and American ideas be-
cause of fundamental differences in the political and economic 
structure of African countries. The absence of a free market eco-
nomy, the dominant role of the State in wage setting and, latterly 
the trend towards totalitarian political control all point to the need 
to recognise that trade unionism in Africa will necessarily take on 
a different form from trade unionism in the more developed coun-
tries of Western Europe and America. 
In Uganda, the most undesirable effect of these international 
influences was the extent to which the union leaders were encour-
aged to stand up for their conception of "free trade unionism", a 
conception which was becoming dangerously irrelevant under the 
African government. Political leaders were suspicious of the unions 
as a possible future source of opposition and as a hindrance to 
their plans for rapid economic development. In particular, they 
wished to exert a measure of control over the unions in order to 
prevent any acceleration of wage demands or use of strike action 
which might jeopardise the country's economic stability. 
Millen has analysed what is narrowly defined in the United 
States as free trade unionism: 
"In general it seems to imply a model of unionism that (i) is 
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primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the economic function 
of collective bargaining to win benefits for the workers, (ii) is not 
linked with and/or controlled by a government or political party, 
(iii) has no Communist connections. The only labour movement in 
the world whose operation accords with all three specifications is 
that of the United States. Least of all does the model relate to the 
trade unions of Asia and Africa." (Millen, 1962, p. 5). 
It is difficult to evaluate the effect of external influences on the 
development of trade unionism with any certainty. It is clear, how-
ever, that the combination of Colonial Office encouragement and 
international trade union finance and training assistance caused 
unions to increase their strength much more quickly than would 
have been the case had the African workers been left to their own 
devices. In addition, the structure of trade unions and the patterns 
of industrial relations were initially closely modelled upon western 
practices. What is not clear is the extent to which external in-
fluences actually changed the direction of union development from 
a wholly indigenous response to local economic and political con-
ditions. Perhaps, it might be closer to reality to view external in-
fluences as acting as a brake on the now well-established trend to-
wards rigid and direct government control over the political and 
economic activities of African trade unions. 
It has been seen that the pattern of relationships in Uganda be-
tween the trade unions, the nationalist political parties and the 
independent government fits in with the controversial Berg-Butler 
thesis regarding the political impotence of trade unions in Africa. 
This can be explained in terms of the role of non-Ugandans in the 
union leadership, the absence of a comprehensive nationalist mass 
movement and the relative insignificance of the urban wage-earning 
population in the national economy. Perhaps it is possible to draw 
a comparison with Nigeria where the trade union movement is also 
outside the mainstream of political activity. Similar conditions in-
clude the existence of a system of indirect rule which strengthened 
particularist loyalties at the expense of nationalism, the competi-
tive party system which led from this and the disunity and weak-
ness of bodies claiming to act as national spokesmen for the union 
movement. Events in Nigeria during 1964 which culminated in an 
effective General Strike indicate that there is a limit to the extent 
to which political leaders can ignore the aspirations of organised 
labour. However it seems clear that Uganda still has some distance 
to travel before this limit is reached. 
In his introduction to a comparative study of labour in deve-
loping countries, Galenson has summed up the choice facing the 
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new national leaders: 
"There are, in the final analysis, two great conceptions of labour 
market organisation confronting one another in the world today. 
One of them regards the interests of labor, as well as other social 
groups as subordinate to the interests of the state, which is con-
ceived of as the only legitimate representative of parochial interests. 
The second conception starts with the basic assumption that 
sectional interests may on occasion diverge from the national in-
terest, and permits the establishment of organisational means by 
which parochial interests may be furthered. 
Every country which is now in the process of determining its 
ultimate institutional arrangements will have to opt for one or the 
other of these systems". (Galenson, 1962, p. 9). 
This study of Uganda has shown how the second, permissive 
approach was adopted by these concerned with the formulation of 
colonial labour policy and by the representatives of the western-
oriented international trade union movement. And the study has 
also shown how the authoritarian approach has begun to assert it-
self since independence, in keeping with the general trend towards 
the centralisation of political authority in the hands of national 
political leaders. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
A A T U F All-African Trade Union Federation. 
A T G W U Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union. 
CLAC Colonial Labour Advisory Council. 
CO Colonial Office. 
EACSO East African Common Services Organisation. 
E A H C East African High Commission. 
EAISR East African Institute of Social Research. 
E A R H A East African Railways and Harbour Administration. 
F U E Federation of Uganda Employers. 
F U T U Federation of Uganda Trade Unions. 
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
IFCCTE International Federation of Clerical, Commercial and 
Technical Employees. 
IFPAAW International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural 
and Allied Workers. 
I L O International Labour Organisation. 
ITS International Trade Secretariat. 
K F E Kenya Federation of Employers. 
K F L Kenya Federation of Labour. 
L D R Annual Reports of the Uganda Labour Department. 
N U C C T E National Union of Clerical, Commercial and Technical 
Employees. 
NUPW National Union of Plantation Workers. 
O E F Overseas Employers' Federation. 
PSI Public Services International. 
R A U Railway African Union. 
T A N U Tanganyika African National Union. 
T F L Tanganyika Federation of Labour. 
T U C Trades Union Congress, Britain. 
U F L Uganda Federation of Labour. 
U G Uganda Government. 
U N C Uganda National Congress. 
U P Uganda Protectorate. 
UPC Uganda People's Congress. 
UPEU Uganda Public Employees' Union. 
U T U C Uganda Trades Union Congress. 
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions. 
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A p p e n d i x A 
INDUSTRIAL R E L A T I O N S C H A R T E R 
The Government of Uganda, the Federation of Uganda 
Employers and the Uganda Trades Union Congress: 
(1) realising that it is in the national interest for the Govern-
ment, Management and Workers to recognise that consultation and 
co-operation on a basis of mutual understanding render an essen-
tial contribution to the efficiency and productivity of an under-
taking and that progress can only be made on a foundation of 
good terms and conditions of employment which include security 
of service and income also the improvement of workers' conditions 
of service; 
(2) desiring to make the greatest possible contribution to the 
success and prosperity of Uganda. 
Hereby agree together as follows: 
1. A G R E E D RESPONSIBILITIES O F M A N A G E M E N T 
A N D UNIONS. 
(i) that the statutory machinery for settlement of disputes 
should be utilised as quickly as possible; 
(ii) that both sides undertake to settle any or all industrial 
disputes at the appropriate level and according to the 
procedure laid down hereafter; 
(iii) that affirming their faith in democratic principles, they 
agree to settle all future differences, disputes and 
grievances by mutual negotiation and according to 
principles laid down in the Trades Disputes (Arbitra-
tion and Settlement) Ordinance; 
(iv) that neither party will have recourse to intimidation or 
victimisation or conduct contrary to the spirit of this 
Charter; 
(v) that they undertake to promote maximum co-operation 
in the interests of good industrial relations between 
their representatives at all levels and abide by the 
spirit of agreements mutually entered into; 
(vi) that they undertake to observe strictly the agreed 
grievance procedure which will ensure a speedy and 
full investigation leading to settlement; 
(vii) that they will educate the Management Personnel and 
Employees regarding their obligations to each other 
for the purpose of good industrial relations. 
(viii) that they respect each other's right to freedom of as-
sociation; 
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(ix) that they will deal promptly with all correspondence 
that arises between them. 
2. M A N A G E M E N T A G R E E : 
(i) to recognise the Union appropriate to its particular 
undertaking or industry provided that the Union is ac-
ceptable to workers in that undertaking or industry 
and to accord reasonable facilities for the normal 
functioning of the Union in the undertaking; 
(ii) to discourage such practices as (a) interference with 
the rights of employees to enrol or continue as Union 
members; (b) discrimination, restraint or coercion 
against any employee because of recognised activity of 
trade unions; (c) victimisation of any employee and 
abuse of authority in any form; (d) abusive or intempe-
rate language; and (e) generally to respect the provi-
sion of the I L O Convention No. 98. 
(iii) to take action for (a) settlement of grievances and (b) 
implementation of settlements, awards, decisions and 
orders, as speedily as possible; 
(iv) to investigate all cases of misconduct strictly in accord-
ance with the grievance procedure laid down in the 
recognition agreement; 
(v) to impress upon their staffs the contents of this Charter 
and to take appropriate action where Management in-
quiries reveal that the spirit or contents of this Charter 
have been contravened and to give full publicity on 
their Notice Boards to this Charter; 
(vi) to discourage any breach of the peace or civil commo-
tion by Employers or their Agents; 
(vii) to encourage (a) diligence at work; 
(b) punctuality; 
(c) strict observance of provisions for 
safe working. 
3. UNION(S) A G R E E : 
(i) that Management has the exclusive right and power to 
manage its undertaking and to engage, promote, 
transfer, demote or lay off employees and to discipline, 
suspend or discharge employees for just cause provided 
that this does not preclude the Union's right to raise 
any grievance through the accepted grievance procedure 
(ii) not to engage in any activities which are contrary to the 
spirit of the Charter; 
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to discourage any breach of the peace or civil commo-
tion by Union members; 
to discourage such practices as : 
(a) negligence of duty; 
(b) careless operation; 
(c) damage to property; 
(d) interference with or disturbance to normal work; 
(e) insubordination; 
(f) abusive or intemperate language; 
(g) "go-slow" 
(h) intemperance; 
and to encourage: 
(a) diligence at work; 
(b) punctuality: 
(c) strict observance of provisions for safe working, 
to take action to implement awards, agreements, settle-
ments and decisions as speedily as possible; 
in the event of a stoppage for any reason to ensure the 
maintenance of essential services and such security 
services as shall be provided for in any recognition 
agreement but the employees concerned shall not be 
called upon to perform any other duties than the main-
tenance of the service concerned; 
(vii) to display in conspicuous places in the Union offices the 
provisions of this Code and to impress upon their 
officers and members the contents of this Charter and 
to take appropriate action where Union inquiries re-
veal that the spirit or contents of this Charter have 
been contravened. 
4. G O V E R N M E N T A G R E E S : 
to maintain or introduce legislation providing for 
machinery of conciliation, arbitration and inquiry 
suitable for dealing with different kinds of industrial 
disputes. Representatives of the employers and workers 
concerned including representatives of the Federation 
of Uganda Employers and Uganda Trades Union 
Congress shall be associated where practicable in the 
operation of the machinery, in such manner and to 
such extent, but in any case in equal numbers and on 
equal terms, as may be determined by the Government. 
Such determination will take into consideration the 







ernment further agrees to ensure that bodies that al-
ready exist such as the Labour Consultative Council 
meet regularly at least twice a year at definitely stated 
intervals. 
5. S E T T L E M E N T O F DISPUTES: 
In the event of failure to achieve settlement by negotiation the 
Uganda Trades Union Congress and the Federation of Uganda 
Employers agree that : 
(a) where it is appropriate for Management and Unions to 
use mutually-established conciliation and arbitration 
machinery such machinery shall be used; 
(b) where such mutually-established machinery cannot be 
quickly set up or used, or where it appears to either side 
to be inappropriate for the matter under dispute, the 
Management and the Union concerned will refer the 
dispute to the Government-established machinery; 
(c) in referring a dispute to Government each party to the 
dispute will describe the issues and the points of dif-
ference between them, and will express its views as to 
the kind of body or bodies which it considers will most 
efficiently deal with the matter under dispute. 
6. T R I P A R T I T E C O - O P E R A T I O N : 
The Uganda Trades Union Congress and the Federation of 
Uganda Employers agree to participate constructively in tripartite 
bodies which may be formed by Government in order to achieve 
liaison between them for the purposes of examining labour policy 
and legislation, fostering industrial co-operation, and raising indus-
trial efficiency and productivity so as to build up the economic 
prosperity of Uganda and its peoples. 
7. R E D U N D A N C Y : 
In the event of redundancy, the following principles will apply: 
(a) the Union concerned shall be informed as far in 
advance as possible of the reasons for and the extent of 
intended redundancy; 
(b) the principle should be adopted of "Last in, First out" 
in the particular category of employees affected subject 
to all other factors such as ability to do the job and a 
satisfactory work record being equal; 
(c) the redundant employee will be entitled to the appro-
priate period of notice or pay in lieu which shall be 
not less than one month. 
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8. E M P L O Y M E N T P O L I C Y : 
The provisions of the ILO Convention adopted June, 1962, 
Article 14, shall apply as follows: 
(i) It shall be an aim of policy to abolish all discrimination 
among workers on grounds of race, colour, sex, belief, 
tribal association or trade union affiliation in respect 
o f : 
(a) labour legislation and agreements which shall afford 
equitable economic treatment to all those lawfully 
resident or working in the country; 
(b) admission to public or private employment; 
(c) conditions of engagement and promotion; 
(d) opportunities for vocational training; 
(e) conditions of work; 
(f) health, safety and welfare measures; 
(g) discipline; 
(h) participation in the negotiation of collective agree-
ments; 
(i) wages rates, which shall be fixed according to the 
principles of equal pay for work of equal value 
in the same operation and undertaking. 
(ii) All practicable measures shall be taken to abolish, by 
raising the rates applicable to the lower-paid workers, 
any existing differences in wage rates due to discrimi-
nation by reason of race, colour, sex, belief, tribal as-
sociation or trade union affiliation. 
(iii) Workers engaged outside Uganda for employment in 
Uganda may be granted, in addition to their wages, be-
nefits in cash or in kind to meet any reasonable per-
sonal or family expenses resulting from employment 
away from their homes. This is to apply in cases of 
special skills not available in Uganda. 
(iv) The foregoing provisions of this Article shall be with-
out prejudice to such measures as the competent autho-
rity may think it necessary or desirable to take for the 
safeguarding of motherhood and for ensuring the health, 
safety and welfare of women workers. 
9. I N T I M I D A T I O N : 
It is hereby agreed that employees and management shall enjoy 
adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other 
or each other's agents or members. Such protection shall apply 
more particularly in respect of such acts as : 
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(a) will make the employment of an individual employee 
subject to the condition that he shall or shall not join a 
union; 
(b) the dismissal of an employee by reason of union 
membership or acts of participation in union activities 
outside working hours or with the consent of the 
employer within working hours; 
(c) the drawing up, issuing or publication of discriminatory 
lists or any action which will prevent a supervisor or 
shop steward from carrying out his normal functions. 
10. J O I N T C O N S U L T A T I O N : 
Management and employees recognise that consultation and 
co-operation on the basis of mutua l confidence render an essential 
contribution to the efficiency and productivity of an undertaking 
and also contribute to the social and economic well-being of all. 
It is therefore agreed that : — 
(i) encouragement shall be given to voluntary agreements 
between parties; 
(ii) management shall take appropriate measures to facili-
tate the proper functioning of joint machinery by 
making available facilities for meetings; 
(iii) it is clearly understood, however, that the employees' 
representatives, not being full-time paid officials of the 
union, are first and foremost employees of industry and 
as such their first and prime responsibility is to carry 
out the duties assigned to them as employees of their 
employer Company during working hours. It is agreed 
that this does not prejudice the managements under-
taking under Clause 2 (i) above. 
(iv) (a) that the recognised procedure covering negotiations 
and discussions between both parties should be so far 
as is practicable fully known and understood by the 
employees and by all members of Management; 
(b) that an essential factor in successful negotiations 
and discussions is the clear statement or report of the 
issues involved and of the resulting decision after 
mutual agreement between the parties; 
(v) the Federation of Uganda Employers and Uganda 
Trades Union Congress agree to set up a joint body to 
meet at regular intervals to consider common problems 
and to decide any changes or amendments which may 
prove necessary to this Charter in the light of experience 
202 Appendix A The Ugandan Industrial Relations Charter 
gained after it has come into operation. 
11. PRESS S T A T E M E N T S : 
The Federation of Uganda Employers and Uganda Trades 
Union Congress agree to dissuade their affiliates from issuing to 
the Press and to Radio Uganda during negotiations statements 
which might prejudice matters under negotiation. 
12. R E C O G N I T I O N : 
It is agreed that the items set out in Appendix 'A' should 
normally be included in any recognition agreements. 
(i) No employer will negotiate with a Union until the 
Union has been registered and gazetted in the normal 
manner; 
(ii) If either the Employer or the Union considers that an 
agreement has been breached it should give notice in 
writing to the appropriate side calling for a discussion 
before making a complete break in the agreement; 
(iii) That these principles be brought to the notice of parties 
who are not affiliated to Federation of Uganda 
Employers or Uganda Trades Union Congress. 
13. T H E PUBLIC S E R V I C E : 
For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared by the Gov-
ernment of Uganda and recognised by the Federation of Uganda 
Employers and the Uganda Trades Union Congress that this 
Charter is not intended to apply and does not apply to the public 
service of Uganda or matters relating thereto. 
Dated this first day of June 1964. 
SIGNED F. W. Reynolds 
For and on behalf of the 
Federation of Uganda Employers. 
H. M. Luande 
For and on behalf of the 
Uganda Trades Union Congress. 
WITNESS G. B. K. Magezi 
Minister of Housing and Labour. 
INDUSTRIAL R E L A T I O N S C H A R T E R — Appendix 'A' 
Items normally included in a recognition agreement: 
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1. Subjects for negotiation: 
(a) Rates of pay 
(b) Hours of work 
(c) Rates of overtime 
(d) Public and religious holidays 
(e) Leave terms 
(f) Sick leave, sick pay and medical facilities 
(g) Maternity leave 
(h) Severance pay or Provident Fund 
(i) Collection of Union dues and Check Off 
2. Grievance procedure. 
A p p e n d i x B 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
This is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all those 
names mentioned in the thesis but rather an indication of the 
positions held by those people at the time that their actions had a 
significant influence on trade union development. Tribe or nation-
ality is given in brackets. 
(A) UGANDAN T R A D E UNIONISTS: 
Banyanga, A : General Secretary, Tobacco Workers Union, 
1957-1961; General Secretary, UTUC, 1959-
1960; Personnel Officer, Uganda Sugar Factory 
since 1961. (Ankole). 
Dullo, A : Branch Secretary Namasagali, R A U until 
1959; leader of abortive National Union of 
Railwaymen, 1960 (Luo). 
Eribankya, J: President, NUPW, 1960; General Secretary, 
NUPW, 1962; Personnel Officer, Uganda Com-
pany, 1963. (Toro). 
lmanyoha, R : Regional Secretary, Fort Portal, NUPW, 
1960; General Secretary, NUPW since 1963. 
(Toro). 
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Kanyago, P : 
Kibuka, E: 
Kopoka, O. B: 
Luande, H. M: 
Makayu, C: 
Mbwanga, A : 
Mugala, A. H : 
Musazi, I. K: 
Nakibinge, E . W : 
Nkuuti, H: 
Ojambo, J: 
Executive member, Clerical Union, 1958; ex-
ecutive member, NUCCTE, 1961; Research 
Officer, ICFTU African Regional Organisation, 
African Labour College, since 1963. (Ganda). 
General Secretary, Ankole Local Government 
Employees Union, 1960; General Secretary, 
UPEU, since 1961; General Secretary, FUTU 
since 1964. (Ankole). 
President, Makerere College Junior Employees 
Union, 1956; President, UTUC, 1957-8; Per-
sonnel Officer, Shell Oil Company, since 1959. 
(Tanzanian). 
Vice-President, Kenya and Uganda Railway 
African Staff Union, 1950; President, RAU, 
1952; full-time executive President since 1958; 
President, UTUC, 1956, 1959 and since 1962; 
Organising Secretary, UTUC, 1961; UPC 
member for Kampala East in National Assem-
bly, 1962; resigned from party to sit as an inde-
pendent member, 1964. (Samia). 
General Secretary, Clerical Union, 1952-1957; 
General Secretary, UTUC, 1956-1957. (Ganda). 
Secretary, Municipal and Township Employees 
Union, Jinja, 1960; committee member, Jinia 
Regional Executive, UPEU, since 1961. (Luo). 
General Secretary, Uganda Textiles Workers 
Union, 1961; Organising Secretary, UFL, 
1962; executive member, FUTU, 1964. (Samia) 
President, African Motor Drivers Union, 
1938-1945; President, Transport and General 
Workers Union, 1949; President, Uganda Na-
tional Congress, 1952. (Ganda). 
Clerk, ICFTU African Labour College, 1958-
1963; Executive member, NUCCTE, 1958-
1961; General Secretary, UTUC, since 1961. 
(Ganda). 
Treasurer, NUCCTE, 1959; Education Secre-
tary, UTUC, 1962; Treasurer, UTUC, since 
1963. (Ganda). 
General Secretary, NUPW, 1960; Regional 
Organising Secretary, Jinja, UTUC, 1961-1962; 
Personnel Officer, Madhvani Sugar Factory, 
1963-1964; Executive official, FUTU, since 
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Zarabweji, P. C: 
(B) OTHERS: 




Regional Organiser, UPC Youth Wing, Soroti, 
1962; Regional representative, ATGWU, 
Soroti, 1962; National Treasurer, UPC Youth 
Wing and executive member, UFL, 1963. 
(Teso). 
General Secretary, RAU, 1956; Vice-President, 
UTUC, 1957-1958; Ministry of Works 
employee since 1959. (Luo). 
President, Clerical Workers Union, 1957-1961; 
President, NUCCTE since 1961; President, 
UTUC, 1957 and 1961; Treasurer, UTUC, 
1962-1963. (Goan-Ganda). 
General Secretary, Eastern Province Transport 
Workers Union, 1954-1957; General Secretary, 
ATGWU, 1958; Vice-President, UTUC, 1960 
General Secretary, UFL, 1961; Personnel Offi 
cer, Madhvani Sugar Factory, 1961-1964 
President, FUTU since 1964. (Soga-European) 
General Secretary, Fort Portal section of Na 
tional Union of Plantation Workers, 1960 
Branch Secretary, NUPW, Lugazi, 1961 
Branch Secretary, Uganda Sugar and Allied 
Workers Union, 1962. (Toro). 
General Secretary, Clerical Union, 1959; Gene-
ral Secretary of NUCCTE since 1961. (Ganda). 
President, Uganda Civil Servants Union (Jinja), 
1960; Executive member, Jinja Region, UPEU, 
1961. (Samia). 
Treasurer, UTUC, 1962; Treasurer, NUPW 
since 1962. (Ankole). 
Lecturer in Industrial Relations, Leeds Uni-
versity; IFPAAW adviser in Uganda, Decem-
ber 1960 — September 1961. (British). 
IFPAAW adviser in Uganda, September, 1960. 
(British). 
Regional Official, Transport and General 
Workers Union, London until 1958; Industrial 
Relations Officer in the Uganda Labour De-
partment, 1958-1961; Senior Industrial Rela-
tions Officer, BOAC, London Airport, since 
1962. (British). 
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Cohen, Sir A. B: 
Coutts, Sir W: 
Crawford, Sir F: 
Franken, G: 
Foggon, G: 






Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 1947-1951; Governor of Uganda, 
1952-1957; Permanent British Representative 
on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, 
1957-1961; Director-General of the Depart-
ment of Technical Co-operation, London, 
1961. (British). 
Chief Secretary, Kenya, 1958-1961; Governor 
of Uganda, 1961-1962; Governor-General, 
Uganda, 1962-1963. (British). 
Deputy-Governor Kenya, 1953-1956; Gover-
nor, Uganda, 1956-1961; Resident Director, 
British South Africa Company, Salisbury, 
Rhodesia, since 1961. (British). 
PSI adviser in Uganda to UPEU, 1961-1962. 
(Dutch). 
Labour Commissioner, Nigeria, 1954-58; lab-
our adviser to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 1958-1961; labour adviser to the 
Secretary for Technical Co-operation, 1962 
(British). 
F . Mutesa: Traditional ruler of Buganda. 
1939-1953; reinstated in 1955 under new 
Buganda Agreement; appointed first President 
of Uganda, 1963. (Ganda). 
Secretary-General, UPC, 1960-1963; Director 
of Planning in Prime Minister's Office, 1963. 
(Nyoro). 
President-General, Democratic Party since 
1958; Chief Minister in the Democratic Party 
administration 1961-1962. (Ganda). 
sometime Secretary-General, Uganda National 
Congress; at present UPC member of Uganda 
National Assembly. (Ganda). 
Secretary-General, UPC, 1961; specially-elected 
member, Uganda National Assembly, 1962; 
Minister of State, 1963; Minister of Housing 
and Labour since 1963. (Nyoro). 
National General Secretary, Kenya Local Gov-
ernment Workers Union, 1953-1957; Secre-
tary-General, KFL, 1953-1963: Secretary-
General, KANU in 1960; Minister of Labour, 
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Kenya Coalition Government, 1962; Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 1963; 
Minister of Development and Planning, 
December 1964. (Luo). 
Nekyon, A : UPC member for Lango South East since 1961; 
Minister of Information, Broadcasting and 
Tourism, 1962-1964; Acting Minister of Lab-
our, 1962; Minister for Planning and Com-
munity Development, since 1964. (Lango). 
Nicklin, L : Industrial Relations Officer, Uganda Labour 
Department, 1949-1958; transferred to ap-
prenticeship and in-service training, Establish-
ments Branch, 1959; 1961, Labour Adviser 
and then Labour Commissioner, Fiji. (British). 
Obote, A. M : President, UPC, since 1960; member, UNC. 
1952-1960; Leader of the Opposition, 1961-
1962; Prime Minister since 1962. (Lango). 
Ocheng, D: Deputy Manager, Agricultural Enterprises 
Ltd., since 1962; Kabaka Yekka member of the 
Uganda National Assembly since November 
1963; Opposition Whip, 1965. (Acholi). 
Odero-Jowi, J : Lecturer in economics, African Labour College, 
Kampala, 1961; UN Economic Commission for 
Africa, Ethiopia and USA, 1962; Head of the 
African Labour College, 1962-1963; KANU 
member of Kenya House of Representatives 
for Lambwe, 1963; Parliamentary Secretary 
for Kenya Ministry of Labour and Social 
Services since 1963. (Luo). 
Onama, F: General Manager, West Nile Co-operative 
Union since 1960; Minister of Works and 
Labour, 1962-1963; Minister of State for In-
ternal Affairs since 1963. (Madi). 
Ojera, A : Member of National Assembly, 1962; Minister 
of Community Development and Labour, 1963; 
Minister of Information, Broadcasting and 
Tourism, since 1964. (Lango). 
Thalmayer, J: International Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers, adviser in Uganda, 1962-1963. 
(American). 
Welsh, E : TCFTU Regional Representative for East 
Africa, 1960-1962. (American). 
Zake, J. L: Lawyer in Kampala; Member of National 
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Assembly, 1961; Minister of Education since 
1962. (Ganda). 
SOURCES: Information obtained in interviews was supple-
mented by reference to Who's Who, 1964 (116th Annual Edition, 
published by A & C. Black, London), and Who's Who in East 
Africa, 1963-1964 (Marco Surveys Limited, Nairobi). 
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